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The United Nations recently declared 2005 to 2015 the
International Decade for Action, “Water for Life.” In honor of
this new decade of water, Sustainable Development Law &
Policy and the Center for Human Rights present a half-day con-
ference focusing on the debate about whether there should be a
Human Right to Water. 
The first panel will present arguments about whether water
should be a human right, what form this right should take, and
who will have this right. This panel will also discuss what the
implications are of creating a human right to water on the con-
servation of water resources and the economic sustainability of
projects promoting the access to water. 
The second panel will explore several former and current
disputes over the access to water. This panel will focus its dis-
cussion on factors considered when resolving disputes over
who has the right to water and how to resolve these conflicts.
This panel will discuss how having a “human right to water”
shaped past conflicts, and it will look at future sources of
water conflicts and how such disputes may change if there is a
recognized “human right to water.”
For more information, please contact Sustainable
Development Law & Policy at sdlp@wcl.american.edu or
visit our website at http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sus-
tainabledevelopment/ 
Many of us live in a society of water fountains and fifteen
minute showers.  However, not every region of the world has
the luxury of using so much water in ways that are arguably
wasteful.  Even in Texas and the western United States, access
to water is increasingly a concern as water is being shipped
across states to those areas that are suffering from water short-
ages, in some cases left only with the dried up remnants of lakes
and rivers.  In other countries, limited access to water has aggra-
vated health problems and exacerbated transboundary conflicts.
The United Nations recently declared 2005 to 2015 the
International Decade for Action, “Water for Life.”  This issue of
Sustainable Development Law & Policy presents several of the
most pressing issues surrounding access to water, including
water privatization, public participation, the constitutional right
to water, and transboundary water conflicts.  Because water is a
resource fundamental to the existence of human life, concern
over access to water should not be a priority only for environ-
mentalists, but also for private businesses, governments, interna-
tional organizations, and local communities.  Through this issue
we hope to spread awareness of the immediacy of this issue.
Melanie Nakagawa 
Kirk Herbertson 
EDITORS-IN-CHIEF
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EDITORS’ NOTE
WINTER 2004 
The first observers in space called Earth the “blue marble”and reflected on how much of the planet was covered bywater.  Of course, 97% of that water is salt water and
largely unavailable for human consumption. To much of human-
ity scratching out a living on the Earth’s surface, the Earth is
certainly not a blue planet.  Access to fresh water has become
one of our most serious issues, as by recent estimates more than
half of all available fresh water is already being used.  Yet, one
billion people lack access to adequate water supplies and 2.4 bil-
lion require access to improved sanitation.1 At the same time,
freshwater ecosystems are now among the most stressed of all
habitats on the planet, with some estimates claiming nearly one-
third of freshwater fish to be threatened with extinction.
The growing demand for water and the increased awareness
that fresh water is a finite resource inspired the United Nations
to declare 2003 “The International Year of Fresh Water.”2
Although largely symbolic, the declaration aimed to highlight
the serious fresh water shortages facing ever-growing regions of
the world and build political support for the sustainable stew-
ardship of our water resources.  
The International Year was also designed to raise the pro-
file of other more tangible efforts by the United Nations.  In par-
ticular, the first World Water Development Report was released
in March 2003.3 That report is the first in what is expected to
be a regular, international assessment of the state of the world’s
water resources.  It provides baseline information for the galva-
nization of broad international action in securing global access
to water.
Perhaps most importantly, the United Nations recognized
the importance of freshwater to poverty and development when
the international community pledged in the U.N. Millennium
Declaration of 2000 “to halve by 2015 the proportion of people
who are unable to reach, or to afford, safe drinking water” and
“. . . to stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources, by
developing water management strategies at the regional, nation-
al and local levels, which promote both equitable access and
adequate supplies.”4 Two years later at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (“WSSD”), the world’s governments
repeated this pledge and added another goal in the WSSD Plan
of Action: “to halve, by the year 2015 … the proportion of peo-
ple who do not have access to basic sanitation.”5 Achieving the
above targets will require far greater commitment and coopera-
tion than the international community has yet achieved.
Improvements in existing water supply systems must be made
for 100 million people each year until 2015 (approximately
274,000 per day), and in existing sanitation systems for an esti-
mated 125 million people per year (342,000 per day). 
These global perspectives are important for raising aware-
ness, organizing international cooperation, and acknowledging
the enormity of the task at hand, but they can also mask even
more interesting and difficult challenges of sustainable water
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management—challenges that occur on the ground between
countries, between users, and between social priorities.  It is
these conflicts and their resolution that will determine whether
humanity successfully meets the ambitious Millenium
Development or WSSD goals or more generally meets the
imperative of sustainable development.  And it is to highlight
these conflicts, and their resolution, that this edition of
Sustainable Development Law and Policy is dedicated.
Fresh water serves many different and critical roles.
Ecologically, water is what makes a river a river, and a lake a
lake.  Water provides habitat for fish, amphibians, reptiles, and
a host of invertebrates.  Water also shapes the land through
flooding, erosion, and similar processes, and provides nutrients
to the coastal areas and oceans. 
But water is also an economic resource.  In the American
West and in many economies still today the primary use of water
has been agriculture.  Irrigation can make a desert or a Great
Plains bloom.  Approximately 70% of all available water use is
used for irrigation.  Water is also increasingly important for
modern industry, with many sectors requiring large amounts of
water.  By 2025, industrial uses are expected to represent about
24% of total freshwater withdrawal.  Industrial use of water
resources includes not only withdrawals but also discharges as
“dilution” is often still used in lieu of pollution control. Indeed,
in developing countries, an estimated 70% of industrial wastes
are dumped untreated into waters where they pollute the usable
water supply.  Furthermore, hydropower is a critical source of
energy, providing the promise of renewable energy with little or
no impact on the global climate.  Today, hydropower produces
19% of the world’s total electricity.  Canada is the largest pro-
ducer of hydroelectricity, followed by the United States and
Brazil.  Some estimates indicate that economically feasible
hydropower sites could provide three times as much electricity
as current levels, with much of the untapped potential in Latin
America, Central Africa, India, and China.
The conflict between water’s economic and ecological
roles has been clear and well documented.6 To serve its eco-
logical roles, water must stay put – but water is only economi-
cally valued when it is diverted, dammed, channeled, diked, or
otherwise controlled.  “Beneficial use” in the U.S. western
states, for example, always requires the diversion of water, leav-
ing little room for the protection of water’s ecological services.
The United States has built more than 75,000 large dams (near-
ly one every day since the Declaration of Independence).  The
ecological impact of our approach to water has been devastating
and increasingly today we are engaged in high-profile restora-
tion efforts such as the re-plumbing of the Everglades and
removal of the Edwards Dam on the Kennebec River.7
Simply viewing water scarcity as a conflict between eco-
logic and economic uses misses much of the important context
for future challenges in water management.  In the future, con-
flicts will increasingly be between different uses with regional
or international implications.    
The international nature of water conflicts has been
reflected in a growing international law of water.  International
law has developed primarily to reduce conflict over the devel-
opment of water resources and encourage its “equitable utiliza-
tion,” while taking into account concerns of national security
and sovereignty.  International law has historically addressed
lakes and rivers, with recent examples being Slovakia’s unilat-
eral construction of the Gabcikovo dam on the Danube and the
allocation of scarce water in the Rio Grande.8
Relatively under-represented in international law has been
the status of ground water resources.  In this regard, Gabriel
Eckstein’s article discusses the International Law Commission’s
initiative to extend and develop transboundary rules of law to
ground water resources, a much-needed recognition of the eco-
logical interconnectedness of the hydrosphere and of the
increasing value of ground water resources.9
Nowhere is the potential for transboundary water conflicts
more acute nor more worrisome than in the Middle East.  Fears
abound that water scarcity could serve as a future flashpoint in
an already tense region of the world.  Two articles address a fre-
quently overlooked aspect of the Middle Eastern water issue –
how Palestine’s status as an occupied territory potentially com-
plicates Palestinian access to water.   Ms. Niehuss’s article
addresses the limitations of international and regional coopera-
tion in addressing Palestinian access to water,10 and Jonah
Schein highlights an important non-governmental effort to
depoliticize the water issue and provide water at the local
level.11
State sovereignty over water releases is now not the only
source of international water disputes; recently water’s role as a
private good subject to international investment or trade policies
has been the source of international concern.  Ms. Gerbasi’s arti-
cle highlights how U.S. limitations on interbasin water transfers
and sales, intended to allow for local management of water
resources, may increasingly come into conflict with internation-
al trade rules ensuring the free flow of goods across borders.12
Given all of the economic and policy trends, international chal-
lenges to state and local regulation of water resources seem
almost inevitable.  
The internationalization of the water industry has also
given rise to significant questions over the fairness and efficien-
cy of privatizing local water supplies and provisions.  Major
conflicts have arisen over privatization of water, frequently pit-
ting multinational corporate investors and international devel-
opment organizations against local communities concerned over
the increased costs of water.13 Erin Webreck’s case study on
Swedish firms involved in international privatizations14 and the
Vivendi-Argentina Water Dispute litigation update15 both
address issues arising from international investment in the con-
text of water privatization.  
At root in many of the current conflicts over privatizing
water are issues of distributive justice and of individual or com-
munity rights and interests in access to water.  The role of the
public in participating in and benefiting from the use of water
resources has taken on new urgency in this time of water scarci-
ty.  A major challenge for effective water management today is
how to balance the interests of multiple stakeholders and respect
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principles of public participation and local decisionmaking crit-
ical to concepts of sustainable development.  Karin Krchnak dis-
cusses how enhancing public access to information and public
participation can improve water governance generally.16 Two
other articles discuss public participation in a specific context:
first, Ayako Sato describes public participation issues in the
implementation of agricultural regulations under the U.S. Clean
Water Act,17 and, second, Jonathan Brown, Ayse Kudat, and
Kristen McGeeney show through a case study on an Uzbekistan
water project how social assessments can be used to enhance
public input and improve water management decisions.18
Recognizing and respecting the public’s procedural rights
in water resources are critical but in recent years a new dimen-
sion has emerged in rights-based discourse over conflicts of
water use—that of a substantive human right to water.  The evo-
lution of a human right to water has recently been documented
in Salman Salman and Siobhan McInerney-Landford’s new
book, A Human Right to Water, which shows the growing recog-
nition of such a right.19 As suggested by the reviewers, still
unclear are the practical implications of that right.  Anna Welch
explores the obligations inherent in South Africa’s Constitution,
perhaps the most important national level example of a human
right to water.20 To be sure, such a human right would seem to
tilt the balance even further away from protecting water’s eco-
logic role, but in practice, a right to water may present more of
a challenge to large-scale diversions and privatization of water.
A human right to water would seem to be most important in pri-
oritizing uses in times and for regions of water scarcity. It also
will ensure that concerns of distributive justice and fairness will
not be lost in the increasingly acrimonious and critical debates
over water resources. 
As illustrated by the articles in this volume, the clash over
shrinking water resources takes place from the international to
the community level and involves aspects of environmental pro-
tection, national security, economic growth, and distributive jus-
tice. To be successful in husbanding our water resources wisely
and fairly, society must be successful on all these levels and bal-
ance all these concerns, while necessarily operating under the
planet’s ecological constraints.  For water, although renewable
over time, is finite in any given time or region.  We cannot
change that fact, but through smarter and more equitable poli-
cies, we can achieve the ecologically sustainable development
of our water resources and fulfill every person’s need (and right)
to have access to water.  
4WINTER 2004 
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ENDNOTES: New Challenges in an Era of Global Water Scarcity 
INTRODUCTION
Ground water today is a true “hidden” treasure. It isburied from sight, often at great depths; consideredpriceless by many, though indispensable to all; and is
occasionally stolen and often contested in court.
Historically, ground water was used primarily in the arid
regions of the globe like the Middle East. The rest of the world
relied on surface water resources, such as streams and lakes.
Beginning in the mid 1900s, ground water began to emerge as a
chief source of fresh water worldwide. This was mainly the
result of the tremendous growth in development and global pop-
ulation that has occurred over the past century,1 as well as tech-
nological improvements in ground water extraction.2
Today, ground water is the most extracted natural resource
in the world.3 It provides more than half of humanity’s fresh-
water for everyday uses such as drinking, cooking, and hygiene,
as well as twenty percent of irrigated agriculture.4 In Europe,
between sixty and ninety-nine percent of drinking water comes
from ground water;5 in the United States, that number is
between one-half to ninety-seven percent.6 Overall, water use
today is increasing four to eight percent per year,7 far outpacing
the global population growth of 1.4 percent annually.8
Given the world’s considerable reliance on this precious
resource, it would be reasonable to assume that international
attention to, and especially legal consideration of, ground water
would be substantial. Nothing is further from the truth. Despite
the growing dependence,9 legal and regulatory attention to
ground water resources have long been secondary to surface
water, especially among legislatures and policymakers and
above all in the international arena.10 Today, while there are
hundreds of treaties governing transboundary rivers and lakes,
there is only one international agreement that directly addresses
a transboundary aquifer.11
Recently, the United Nations International Law
Commission (“ILC” or “Commission”) embarked on an effort
to address this shortcoming and to consider the international
law applicable to transboundary ground water resources. This
undertaking follows and builds on the Commission’s work on
international watercourses, which culminated in 1997 in the
U.N. Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (“Watercourse Convention”).12
This paper reviews the work of the ILC in its present effort to
codify and progressively develop the international law applica-
ble to transboundary ground water resources. It begins with a
short background of the present work and briefly considers the
applicability of the 1997 Watercourse Convention to trans-
boundary ground water resources. It then reviews the relevant
issues facing the Commission and offers commentary and
analysis as appropriate.
BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT WORK
OF THE ILC
In 1997, the United Nations General Assembly took the
first step to formally recognize the need to establish principles
of law governing ground water resources when it adopted the
Watercourse Convention. This effort was lead by the ILC, which
gave structure to and drafted the basic principles contained in
the Convention. Under the article on definitions, a “water-
course” is defined as “a system of surface waters and ground
waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a uni-
tary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.”13
An “international watercourse” is “a watercourse parts of which
are situated in different states.”14 The inclusion of certain
ground water resources within these definitions and, hence, the
scope of the Convention, provided the clear understanding that
ground water is a proper subject of international law.
While this inclusion is not a trivial occurrence, a close
review of the definition of watercourse reveals that the agree-
ment excludes many types of ground water from the
Convention’s span. In particular, the Convention applies only to
ground water that: 1) is physically part of a system of surface
and ground waters; 2) is part of a unitary whole; 3) normally
flows to a terminus that is common with the hydraulically linked
surface water; and 4) has parts of the system located in different
states. Significantly, the types and numbers of ground waters
excluded from this definition are not insignificant and include
both recharging and non-recharging ground water resources that
are unrelated to any surface waters.15
As a result, the Convention leaves considerable gaps and
generates confusion about the applicability and appropriateness
of the Convention’s principles to the management (use, alloca-
tion, development, regulation, conservation, protection, etc.) of
various types of transboundary ground water resources.
Moreover, the fact that the Convention has not yet entered into
force raises the question of whether its provisions truly repre-
sent international law applicable to any ground waters at all.16
Recognizing the need to better articulate the rules govern-
ing transboundary ground water resources, the ILC recently
launched an effort to address this deficiency in the Convention
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and international law in general. At its fifty-fourth session in
2002, the ILC appointed Ambassador Chusei Yamada of Japan
Special Rapporteur for the subject of shared natural resources,
which includes ground water.17 To date, the Special Rapporteur
has produced two reports and two addenda focusing on ground
water resources. While neither the Special Rapporteur nor the
Commission have indicated whether they intend to produce a
treaty or mere guidelines, the ILC’s fundamental purpose is the
codification and progressive development of international law.
Significantly, in his Second Report, which was submitted in the
spring of 1994, the Special Rapporteur presented a general
structure for a future ground water instrument based largely on
the Watercourse Convention. He also presented in that Report
six draft articles for consideration by the ILC (see Annex). In
introducing this proposed structure and draft articles, the
Special Rapporteur assured the ILC Members that his work to
date does not represent a final and definitive interpretation of
international law. Rather, his proposal is merely intended “to
provoke substantive discussions, to identify the areas to be
addressed and to promote better understanding of the problems
of groundwaters.”18 A third report is expected from the Special
Rapporteur in the spring of 2005.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES CONSIDERED BY THE
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
SHARED VS. INTERNATIONAL VS. TRANSBOUNDARY
Based on the original mandate from the ILC, the Special
Rapporteur was asked to address ground water resources within
the rubric of shared natural resources. Following the submission
of his First Report, some of the Members of the ILC and its par-
ent body, the Sixth Committee of the United Nations, expressed
considerable doubt about the use of the term “shared.”19 The
term “shared” relates to ownership and suggests that the
resource at issue may be subject to common or equal ownership,
and possibly subject to the common heritage of mankind.20
Given the sensitivities expressed in both bodies, the Special
Rapporteur amended the focus of his present work to “trans-
boundary groundwaters.”21
While this terminology mollified most Members’ concerns,
this terminology is a divergence from the approach of the
Watercourse Convention, which addresses “international” water-
courses. In his First Report, the Special Rapporteur explains that
an aquifer is international where it is “part of a system where
groundwater interacts with surface water that is at some point
intersected by a boundary.”22 Thus, a purely domestic aquifer that
is hydraulically linked to a river that traverses an international
boundary would constitute an international aquifer, or an aquifer
that is a part of an international watercourse, and would fall with-
in the scope of the Watercourse Convention.23 In contrast, the
Special Rapporteur defines a “transboundary” aquifer as “ground-
water body that is intersected by a boundary itself.”24 He further
notes that this distinction would classify a transboundary aquifer
as a sub-category of international aquifers.25 However, a trans-
boundary aquifer would be subject to the Watercourse
Convention only if it fulfills the other criteria of international
watercourses (i.e., part of a system with surface water that is a
unitary whole and which flows to a common terminus).26
While both descriptors (international and transboundary)
could have relevance for the new instrument, their use is large-
ly dependent on the scope of the instrument. The relevant and
preliminary question that must be addressed is whether the
resulting agreement will apply solely to aquifers that traverse an
international boundary, or whether it will have a broader scope.
In using the term “transboundary,” the Reports suggest that the
Special Rapporteur intends to limit the scope of the instrument
to the former. While this nomenclature is not necessarily prob-
lematic, it could certainly foster confusion in the event that there
is a question as to dual applicability of the Watercourse
Convention and of the present instrument. The Special
Rapporteur, however, has indicated that should a situation of
dual applicability become evident in the course of the present
work, he would propose an article to prevent such conflict.27
AQUIFER SYSTEM APPROACH
In formulating the draft articles on transboundary aquifers,
Special Rapporteur Yamada has opted to focus his efforts on
“aquifer systems” rather than on “ground water.” This is appar-
ent in the principles offered in the Second Report all of which
address the management and protection of transboundary
aquifer systems. The Special Rapporteur explains that this
nomenclature is preferable because the term “ground water”
may be somewhat cumbersome and legally imprecise for the
purpose of a legal instrument. The Special Rapporteur considers
the terms “aquifer” and “aquifer systems” as more technically
and legally precise.28 In his Second Report, the Special
Rapporteur defines an aquifer in Article 2 as “a permeable
water-bearing rock formation capable of yielding exploitable
quantities of water,”29 and aquifer system as “an aquifer or a
series of aquifers, each associated with specific rock formations,
that are hydraulically connected.”30
In developing an aquifer system-based approach, the
Special Rapporteur is promoting a science-based approach for
the regulation of ground water resources. This approach is evi-
dent in the Special Rapporteur’s two addenda, which offer a
great deal of technical and factual data on the science of ground
water.31 It is also evident given the Special Rapporteur’s ongo-
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ing use of an advisory group convened at his request and com-
posed of hydrogeologists and other scientists and legal profes-
sionals with expertise in international water law.32
By formulating principles of law that focus on an aquifer
system, the analysis considers the matrix, the water contained
therein, and the interrelated strata surrounding the rock forma-
tion. From a hydrogeological perspective, it is inconceivable
how any authority could manage or regulate ground water with-
out considering the aquifer itself and the interrelated adjacent
formations. This approach, however, is somewhat of a departure
from the Watercourse Convention, which concentrates on the
“uses of international watercourses and of their waters,” but not
the watercourse itself.33
The definition of aquifer, however, is not beyond criticism.
By describing an aquifer in terms of exploitability, the Special
Rapporteur’s definition excludes aquifers that are not currently
“exploitable” (i.e., for technological or economic reasons), but
which might be “exploitable” in the future. Similarly, the term
“quantities” intimates the present production requirement of a
minimum volume of water in order for a water-bearing rock for-
mation to be deemed an aquifer. The effect of these two terms
may jeopardize the future development of water-bearing strata
that are not yet exploitable or whose productivity presently is low,
but which in the future could become more productive. An alter-
native definition, which would include deep aquifers and low vol-
ume water-bearing strata that presently may not be economically
harvested, might be: a permeable water-bearing rock formation
capable of yielding water and the water contained therein.
In addition, the commentary to the definition of aquifer indi-
cates that recharge and discharge zones are not included within
the meaning of the term.34 This is a deviation from the hydroge-
ological definition of aquifer, which includes both zones. Most
hydrogeologic texts define an aquifer in terms of its potential for
storing, transmitting and producing water in usable quantities.35
The recharge and discharge zones are mere extensions of the
aquifer that could, if saturated, achieve these criteria. Here, how-
ever, the definition restricts an aquifer only to a formation that is
actually water bearing. The Special Rapporteur excluded the
recharge and discharge zones from the definition because of the
need for and difficulty in establishing geographic limitations for
an aquifer. From a hydrogeologic perspective, protection of the
recharge and discharge zones is crucial to the protection of the
aquifer because of the prominent causal relationship between
what occurs in the two zones (i.e., introduction of pollutants,
changes in the rate of discharge, etc.) and the health of the aquifer.
An alternative to including the recharge and discharge zones with-
in the definition of aquifer, and one which the Special Rapporteur
may yet consider, is a separate provision that would offer ade-
quate protection to the zones and the aquifer. Such a provision
would have to regulate activities in these areas to minimize any
detrimental impacts on the recharge and discharge zones.
SCOPE
One of the preliminary issues addressed by the Special
Rapporteur, though one that may be revisited, is the question of
scope of the present work and any instrument that results from
this initiative. Under the original mandate of the ILC, the
Commission was assigned the task of considering the interna-
tional law applicable to ground water resources unrelated to sur-
face waters.36 The intent here was to supplement the
Watercourse Convention to the extent that the Convention
excludes this specific type of ground water.
In his First Report on Outlines, however, the Special
Rapporteur recognized that hydrogeology – the science of
ground water – treats ground water resources as a whole and
does not distinguish between aquifers that are related or unre-
lated to surface waters.37 Thereafter, in his Second Report, he
questioned the practicability of creating legal distinctions
between different types of ground water resources38 and pro-
posed an article on scope that does not distinguish between dif-
ferent aquifer types. Article 1 on scope provides: “The present
Convention applies to uses of transboundary aquifer systems
and other activities which have or are likely to have an impact
on those systems and to measures of protection, preservation
and management of those systems.”
If the present work is to encompass all aquifer types, this
may result in the dual applicability of the new instrument and
the Watercourse Convention to certain aquifers. As noted above,
the Watercourse Convention applies to ground water that is part
of “a system of surface waters and ground waters constituting
by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and nor-
mally flowing into a common terminus.”39 Accordingly, to min-
imize confusion, the Special Rapporteur must consider the rela-
tionship of any new instrument to the Watercourse Convention
and address how overlapping authorities and conflicts might be
resolved. As noted above, the Special Rapporteur has indicated
that should a situation of dual applicability become evident in
the course of the present work, he would propose an article to
address such a situation.40
Notwithstanding the general approach, the Special
Rapporteur and the ILC must consider whether the same rules
actually can be applied to all aquifer types. For example, an
aquifer with a stable source of recharge can be managed sus-
tainably in that the rate of withdrawal can be gauged against the
rate of recharge. In contrast, an aquifer with zero or negligible
recharge rates can never be used sustainably. Any withdrawal
from a non-recharging aquifer will affect the volume of water in
the aquifer, and continued withdrawals eventually will exhaust
the resource.41 Whether such characteristics indicate the need
for different rules is still unclear and additional attention by the
Special Rapporteur is expected. In addition, the Special
Rapporteur may evaluate other unique aquifer types (s.a.,
karstic, coastal, submarine, and frozen) and whether they
require specialized rules, as well as certain integral aquifer char-
acteristics, including geothermal qualities, purification charac-
teristics, distinct vulnerabilities, and other unique aspects.
In addition, the last sentence of Paragraph 15 of the Second
Report is particularly noteworthy. This sentence suggests that the
resulting agreement may be formulated as an “environmental
treaty” rather than a use or resource allocation agreement. There
are substantial differences in the two types of agreements, most
notably that environmental treaties can give credence to the
interests of third party states (i.e., states in whose territory the
subject resource does not lie) and often protect natural resources
regardless of any injury to a state. Given that this is the only indi-
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cation in the Reports to date of an “environmental” approach, the
purpose and meaning of this sentence is still unclear.
One additional point worth mention is the inclusion within
Article 1 of activities, other than the uses of transboundary
aquifer systems that have or are likely to have an impact on
such systems. Here, the Special Rapporteur conceptualized
including activities, such as industrial and agricultural activi-
ties that could contaminate the aquifer, mineral mining projects
that might destroy the aquifer matrix, and forestry programs
that could impact recharge of the aquifer.
PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO TRANSBOUNDARY
AQUIFERS
In his Second Report, the Special Rapporteur asserts that
“[t]here is no doubt that the most relevant existing general treaty
is the 1997 [Watercourse] Convention.”42 While this technical-
ly may be true, it is questionable whether all of the principles
proffered in the Watercourse Convention are equally applicable
to all ground water resources. In fact, Members of both the
Commission and the Sixth Committee expressed their consider-
able doubts to the suggestion that, as recommended in the
Commission’s 1994 Resolution on Confined Transboundary
Groundwater,43 the Convention applies with only minimal
changes to non-recharging aquifers.44
Surface and ground water resources share numerous simi-
larities that might indicate the applicability of the same manage-
ment regime. Ground water, however, has some unique charac-
teristics that must be carefully considered when contemplating
an appropriate international regulatory scheme. For example,
ground water is typically more vulnerable than surface water to
pollution and other forms of contamination because it generally
flows at much slower rates than surface water, which causes con-
tamination and other problems to manifest at slower rates and
reduces aquifers’ natural reclamation abilities. Additionally,
reclamation of a polluted aquifer can be extremely difficult and
expensive, if at all possible, and can render the aquifer unusable
for years, decades or longer. Moreover, due to their physical
location, ground water is relatively more difficult and costly to
monitor than surface waters. Finally, certain aquifer types have
unique characteristics, such as non-recharging aquifers, which,
by definition, cannot be used sustainably, and non-recharging
and frozen aquifers, which have no natural water flow.
Accordingly, the applicability of surface water law to ground
water resources must be examined carefully, keeping in mind the
similarities and differences of surface and ground water, the rela-
tionship between the two resources, and the science of water.
NO SIGNIFICANT HARM
Under Article 7 of the Watercourse Convention, water-
course states must “take all appropriate measures to prevent the
causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.”45
While it is unclear what harm might rise to the level of “signif-
icant,” given the unique characteristics of ground water, it is
questionable whether the same standard can be applied to both
surface and ground water resources. In particular, when an inter-
national harm actually occurs is an ambiguous concept.
Moreover, it is unclear whether an international harm must be
tangible and affect another state’s ability to use the water,
whether harm can be more general and merely affect another
state’s interest in the water resource, or whether harm to an
aquifer can be defined in environmental terms (i.e., impact on
ecosystems dependent on the aquifer, or, possibly, protect the
aquifer for the sake of the aquifer).
As noted by the Special Rapporteur, the greater difficulties
and costs associated with aquifer remediation, as compared to
surface water, as well as the prolonged time required for reme-
dial work, may mandate a more stringent standard than the no
significant harm rule, or possibly a stricter construction of the
rule.46 For example, as suggested by some Members of the
Commission and Sixth Committee, it may be reasonable to
require a lower threshold for determining when “significant”
harm occurs to an aquifer.47 It also may be appropriate to
require that the scope of what constitutes harm to an aquifer be
defined more clearly and, possibly, to expand the scope to
include an aquifer’s vulnerable areas, such as zones of natural
recharge and discharge, and any hydraulic relationships with
other bodies of water. Furthermore, the unique characteristics of
certain aquifer types, such as non-recharging aquifers, might
require yet additional standards or tailored principles that
address their special circumstances.
In addition, there is the question of how best to deal with
“time bomb” situations in which previously deposited contam-
inants, from both human as well as natural origins, threaten
ground water resources. These are circumstances that have not
yet resulted in harm, but which in the future may impair or oth-
erwise impact a transboundary aquifer. In many countries,
such as the former Soviet Bloc, toxic and otherwise dangerous
materials were deposited underground under prior political
regimes and during a time when there was little awareness or
political recognition of environmental risk and precaution.
Today, many of these deposits pose a significant threat to
ground water resources and could be released as a result of
affirmative human activities (i.e., exploitation of the threat-
ened aquifers or activity on the land overlying the deposition),
or as a result of natural conditions (i.e., changes over time in
the acidity of precipitation). Since any new instrument would
not be applicable ex post facto, it is unclear how such threats
from human origins might be addressed in a new agreement.
Moreover, it is unclear how risk and uncertainty of potential
harm to ground water might be regulated, how situations of
inaction would be addressed, whether the rules of no signifi-
cant harm or any other principle could adequately or effec-
tively address such conditions, and whether the same logic can
be applied to conditions of naturally occurring contamination.
Notwithstanding the above discussion, there may be value
in replacing the term “harm” with “impact.” Under internation-
al law, “harm” is generally understood in relation to a negative
effect on a state actor. “Impact,” however, has a broader con-
notation in terms of including both negative and positive
effects, and considering effects on states as well as non-state
subjects, such as the environment, human health, and natural
historical landmarks. Given the unique aspects of ground water
resources, and especially their vulnerabilities, it may be appro-
priate to broaden the discussion by focusing on the impact of
activities as a means to better address the unique aspects of
ground water. Such usage would comport with other interna-
tional instruments, such as the UN/ECE Watercourse
Convention48 and the European Water Framework Directive,49
and would be consistent with the Special Rapporteur’s com-
ment in his Second Report that “[t]he Special Rapporteur
adopted the term ‘impact’ over ‘adverse effect’ or ‘harm’ …”50
In addition, the concept of “impact” is more accepted within
the water science community.
While these issues are far from resolved, the Special
Rapporteur has proposed a draft article relating to harm. The
proposed Article 4, paragraph 1 provides that states in whose
territory lay a transboundary aquifer must “take all appropriate
measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other
aquifer system States” in the utilization of that aquifer. This
paragraph is analogous to the one found in the Watercourse
Convention, including with regard to the threshold issue.51 In
offering this paragraph, the Special Rapporteur indicates in the
commentary that an alternative for “significant” was not neces-
sary because he believes that the threshold of “significant” harm
“is a flexible and relative concept.”52
To supplement the protection of aquifers, however, the
Special Rapporteur offers two additional paragraphs that have
no counterpart in the Watercourse Convention. Paragraph 2
obligates aquifer system states to “take all appropriate meas-
ures” to ensure that their other activities (i.e., activities not relat-
ed to the utilization of the aquifer), “which have or are likely to
have an impact on a transboundary aquifer system,” do not
cause significant harm to other aquifer system states.53
Paragraph 3 requires that such states “shall not impair the natu-
ral functioning of transboundary aquifer systems.” While para-
graph 2 builds on the provision of paragraph 1 in protecting the
interests of other states, paragraph 3 presents a more progressive
proposition – of protecting the aquifer in and of itself regardless
of whether harm is caused to another state.
In addition, the Special Rapporteur presented a fourth para-
graph addressing any harm that might nonetheless result.
Analogous to Article 7(2) of the Watercourse Convention, the
proposed paragraph considers measures for mitigating and com-
pensating for such harm. It provides that where significant harm
to another state occurs, “the State whose activity causes such
harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such activity, take all
appropriate measures in consultation with the affected State to
eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to dis-
cuss the question of compensation.”54
EQUITABLE AND REASONABLE UTILIZATION
Under Article 5 of the Watercourse Convention, water-
course states must utilize the waters of an international water-
course in an equitable and reasonable manner.55 This is a utili-
tarian concept employing a cost-benefit analysis that attempts to
maximize the beneficial use of limited water resources while
limiting the burdens. What is equitable and reasonable is based
on a non-exhaustive list of factors identified in Article 6 of the
Convention.56 The concept of equitable utilization, however, is
based on the sharing of the resource, meaning that the two coun-
tries in whose territory the aquifer lies agree that they must
“share” or otherwise divide the aquifer. Given the objections of
the 6th Committee and the ILC to this concept, it is questionable
whether equitable utilization would be acceptable as a principle
for managing transboundary aquifers.57
In addition, the factors listed in Article 6 of the Watercourse
Convention are inadequate and incomplete as a means to assess
whether a particular use of an aquifer is equitable and reason-
able. Given that the list is not considered comprehensive, if the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization were applied to
ground water resources, additional factors tailored to ground
water resources should be added, such as: hydrogeological set-
ting and processes; composition and makeup of the aquifer
matrix; impact on the aquifer matrix, hydrostatic pressure, geot-
hermic properties, net recharge, and water quality; and time of
aquifer response to impacts.
To date, the Special Rapporteur has not proffered equi-
table and reasonable utilization as a principle for the use of
transboundary ground water resources. In his Second Report,
the Special Rapporteur indicated some hesitations with the
concept and suggested that he is “not yet ready to submit a
draft article on principles governing uses of aquifer systems
because it is first necessary to conduct further research.”58 He
has, however, inserted an empty Article 3 into the general
structure under the heading “Principles governing uses of
aquifer systems” (see Annex).
GENERAL OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE
The obligation to cooperate is a widely accepted principle
under international law and is applicable to most transboundary
issues.59 It is found in Article 8 of the Watercourse Convention
and requires states to cooperate “on the basis of sovereign
equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith.”
Paragraph 1 of the Special Rapporteur’s draft Article 5 applies
this obligation to aquifer system states “in order to attain appro-
priate utilization and adequate protection of a transboundary
aquifer system.” Paragraph 2 further encourages aquifer system
states to develop joint mechanisms or commissions as a means
“to facilitate cooperation.”60 While the obligation to cooperate
is indispensable for the sound management of a transboundary
aquifer, it also is essential for the realization of other principles,
including equitable and reasonable utilization, notification
requirements, exchange of data and information, and others.
REGULAR EXCHANGE OF DATA AND INFORMATION
Draft Article 6 on the regular exchange of data and infor-
mation is analogous to Article 9 of the Watercourse
Convention and obligates aquifer system states to regularly
exchange data and information. Paragraph 1 of the article
emphasizes the need for data of a “geological, hydrogeologi-
cal, hydrological, meteorological and ecological nature and
related to the hydrochemistry of the aquifer system, as well as
related forecasts.” Paragraph 3 provides that if one state
requests another state to supply data and information that is
not readily available, the requested state “shall employ its best
efforts to comply with the request, but may condition its com-
pliance upon payment by the requesting State of the reason-
able costs of collecting and, where appropriate, processing
such data or information.” Under paragraph 4 of draft Article
6, aquifer system states must use their “best efforts to collect
and … process data and information in a manner which facili-
9 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
tates its utilization by the other aquifer system States to which
it is communicated.”
Apart from these provisions, draft Article 6 also includes a
paragraph that departs from the standard found in the
Watercourse Convention. Paragraph 2 of the proposed Article
provides that “[i]n the light of uncertainty about the nature and
extent of some transboundary aquifer systems, aquifer system
States shall employ their best efforts to collect and generate, in
accordance with currently available practice and standards, indi-
vidually or jointly and, where appropriate, together with or
through international organizations, new data and information to
more completely define the aquifer systems.” This commitment
is based on the fact that data about ground water resources is
often lacking, but that the fulfillment of other obligations, such
as no significant harm or equitable and reasonable utilization, is
dependent on the availability and production of a minimum of
information.
It is noteworthy that the obligation for regular exchange of
data can be misunderstood with regard to the type, quantity, and
quality of data and information that must be developed and
exchanged. Relevant data can range from general field observa-
tions to detailed well studies to complex flow models and satel-
lite imaging. Due to inadequate cooperation and communica-
tions, states producing data for a transboundary aquifer often
use different methodologies and procedures and sometimes
focus on different aspects of the aquifer. As a result, the data
produced can be incompatible and, at worse, may be useless as
a means to establish baseline characteristics of the aquifer and
to monitor and assess subsequent changes. Moreover, the deci-
sion of what data a state can generate often is subject to the
availability of resources. Many countries, especially developing
nations, face difficulties in complying with such obligations
because of a lack of finances, field and laboratory equipment,
and knowledgeable people capable of generating, processing,
and interpreting the necessary data.
Accordingly, it may be appropriate to provide better guide-
lines for the type, quantity, and quality of data and information
that should be generated and exchanged when dealing with trans-
boundary aquifers. It also may be useful to include obligations to
jointly develop the relevant data, or, at the very least, to harmo-
nize the standards, methodologies and target characteristics to be
assessed. Furthermore, it may be appropriate to include consid-
eration of mechanisms to assist countries in need of data genera-
tion, processing, and interpretion of the necessary data.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF USES
The Special Rapporteur’s draft Article 7 on the relationship
between different kinds of uses addresses the need to balance
priorities in the use of a transboundary aquifer. Paragraph 1 pro-
vides that “[i]n the absence of agreement or custom to the con-
trary, no use of a transboundary aquifer system enjoys inherent
priority over other uses.” Notwithstanding, where different uses
conflict or interfere with each other, and where no system of pri-
orities governing those uses has been established, paragraph 2
provides that “it shall be resolved with special regard being
given to the requirements of vital human needs.” While the
phrase “vital human needs” may be somewhat amorphous, the
same language is used in Article 10 of the Watercourse
Convention where it was applied with reference to ensuring
basic levels of sustenance.61
CONCLUSION
Ground water has become an integral component of life for
a majority of the world’s population and is today the most
extracted natural resource. The lack of legal attention to this hid-
den treasure, however, has left a considerable void in the law
that is now threatening numerous aquifers world wide. Given
the importance of this resource to humanity and the environ-
ment, there is considerable need to further study and assess the
rules and principles applicable to ground water, especially in a
transboundary context.
The work of the Commission and the Special Rapporteur is
a major and long overdue undertaking, which, it is hoped, will
result in guidelines and principles that are not only politically
sound and judicious, but also scientifically sensible. In order to
achieve this goal, as well as the mandate of the ILC to codify
and progressively develop international law, the Commission
and Special Rapporteur must continue to address numerous and
complicated issues related to transboundary aquifers.
In particular, the applicability of surface water law to
ground water resources must be examined carefully, keeping in
mind the similarities and differences of surface and ground
water, the relationship between the two resources, and the sci-
ence of water. Greater attention also must be focused on the par-
ticular qualities of ground water – e.g., rate of flow, susceptibil-
ity to pollution, availability or absence of recharge, geothermal
characteristics – and on whether those qualities warrant stricter
application of existing international water law to ground water
resources, whether additional standards are needed, or whether
a completely different regulatory and management regime is
appropriate.62 For example, specific guidelines or rules may be
necessary to address: land-based activities in or around an
aquifer’s recharge and discharge zones that could impact the
aquifer; activities related to a hydraulically connected surface
body of water that can affect an aquifer (and visa versa); artifi-
cial recharge of aquifers; unique aquifer types, such as non-
recharging, karstic, coastal, submarine, and frozen aquifers. In
addition, given the dynamics and vulnerabilities of aquifers,
monitoring is a critical component of the assessment, protection,
and preservation of transboundary aquifers. Accordingly, a duty
to monitor, as well as the specifics of this obligation, should be
included within the new instrument. The Special Rapporteur has
indicated in Part IV of the draft articles that such an article is
forthcoming. Furthermore, consideration must be given to rec-
onciling any overlap and conflict that may occur between the
Watercourse Convention and the new instrument.
To date, the Special Rapporteur has presented six proposed
articles, as well as relevant scientific information, in order to
provoke discussion, promote a better understanding of the prob-
lems of ground water, and encourage the codification and for-
mulation of appropriate principles of law by the ILC. The
Special Rapporteur is expected to submit his Third Report on
the subject in the spring of 2005 at the fifty-seventh session of
the Commission. That Report is expected to present further
research and analysis, additional articles, and examples of rele-
vant state practice related to transboundary aquifers.
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ANNEX
DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFER SYSTEMS
Adapted from Chusei Yamada, Second report on shared natural resources: transboundary groundwaters
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/539 (2004)
Part I. Introduction
Article 1 Scope of the present Convention
The present Convention applies to uses of transboundary aquifer systems and other activities which have or are likely to have an impact on those sys-
tems and to measures of protection, preservation and management of those systems.
Article 2 Use of terms
For the purposes of the present Convention:
(a) “Aquifer” means a permeable water-bearing rock formation capable of yielding exploitable quantities of water;
(b) “Aquifer system” means an aquifer or a series of aquifers, each associated with specific rock formations, that are hydraulically connected;
(c) “Transboundary aquifer system” means an aquifer system, parts of which are situated in different States;
(d) “Aquifer system State” means a State Party to the present Convention in whose territory any part of a transboundary aquifer system is situated. 
Part II. General principles
Article 3 Principles governing uses of aquifer systems
[Draft to be proposed later]
Article 4 Obligation not to cause harm
1. Aquifer system States shall, in utilizing a transboundary aquifer system in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of
significant harm to other aquifer system States.
2. Aquifer system States shall, in undertaking other activities in their territories which have or are likely to have an impact on a transboundary aquifer
system, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm through that system to other aquifer system States.
3. Aquifer system States shall not impair the natural functioning of transboundary aquifer systems.
4. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another aquifer system State, the State whose activity causes such harm shall, in the absence of
agreement to such activity, take all appropriate measures in consultation with the affected State to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appro-
priate, to discuss the question of compensation.
Article 5 General obligation to cooperate
1. Aquifer system States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain appro-
priate utilization and adequate protection of a transboundary aquifer system.
2. In determining the manner of such cooperation, aquifer system States are encouraged to establish joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed
necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light of experience gained through cooperation in existing
joint mechanisms and commissions in various regions.
Article 6 Regular exchange of data and information
1. Pursuant to article 5, aquifer system States shall, on a regular basis, exchange readily available data and information on the condition of the trans-
boundary aquifer system, in particular that of a geological, hydrogeological, hydrological, meteorological and ecological nature and related to the
hydrochemistry of the aquifer system, as well as related forecasts.
2. In the light of uncertainty about the nature and extent of some transboundary aquifer systems, aquifer system States shall employ their best efforts
to collect and generate, in accordance with currently available practice and standards, individually or jointly and, where appropriate, together with
or through international organizations, new data and information to more completely define the aquifer systems.
3. If an aquifer system State is requested by another aquifer system State to provide data and information that is not readily available, it shall employ
its best efforts to comply with the request, but may condition its compliance upon payment by the requesting State of the reasonable costs of col-
lecting and, where appropriate, processing such data or information.
4. Aquifer system States shall employ their best efforts to collect and, where appropriate, to process data and information in a manner which facili-
tates its utilization by the other aquifer system States to which it is communicated.
Article 7 Relationship between different kinds of uses
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of a transboundary aquifer system enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of a transboundary aquifer system, it shall be resolved with special regard being given to the requirements
of vital human needs.
Part III. Activities affecting other States
Impact assessment
Exchange of information
Consultation and negotiation
Part V. Miscellaneous provisions
Part VI. Settlement of disputes
Part VII. Final clauses
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INTRODUCTION
While the non-oil economy of the Middle East is large-ly agricultural, it is based in an arid, untamabledesert environment. Water is naturally scarce in the
region, and there has always been conflict over possession and
use of water resources. Recent history has shown that while
water supplies in the Middle East are limited, maldistribution
and overuse of water resources by Israel has aggravated devel-
opment, and ultimately peace, between Israel and Palestine, and
the region as a whole. Specifically, the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict can be attributed, in part, to disputes over scarce and valu-
able water resources of the Jordan River basin and its aquifers. 
This article focuses on the legal implications of the water dis-
pute between Palestine and Israel. The article first discusses cur-
rent water conditions in the Palestinian Territories, including
Israeli water policies and the region’s unstable water resources.
The second part discusses regional and international agreements
regarding water-sharing and transboundary watercourses. The
third part examines the successes and failures of those mechanisms
in regard to Palestinian water access. Finally, the article describes
the effect that water disputes have on Palestine’s status as an occu-
pied territory, as opposed to its status as a sovereign “state.”
WATER ACCESS AND CURRENT CONDITIONS IN
THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
Israel and Palestine are located in one of the most arid
regions in the world. Demand for water greatly exceeds nature’s
ability to recharge those resources. In fact, current water
recharge minimally sustains the demand. Israelis and
Palestinians use 2,570 million cubic meters (“mcm”) of water
per year combined, while the recharge rate does not exceed
2,634 mcm of water per year.1 This is a net gain of 64 mcm of
water per year as recharge rates continue to fall and overuse of
water has steadily decreased water supplies by approximately
1.6 mcm annually.2
Israel’s highly disproportionate use of the region’s water
supply exacerbates the current crisis in the region. Estimates
show that Israelis use four to six times as much water as
Palestinians.3 Additionally, Israeli water policies allow for dis-
tribution of only 50 to 70 cubic liters of water per day for each
Palestinian household,4 which is less than half of the 100 to 150
cubic liters recommended by the World Health Organization for
the minimum to average sanitary conditions necessary for
healthy living.5
Israel’s water policies have systematically worsened the
general health of the Palestinian population, as well as
Palestine’s economy, development, and overall infrastructure.
Such policies include rationing Palestinian households’ access
to water, diverting Palestinian water sources for use by Israelis
and settlers, and preventing the drilling of additional wells in
Palestinian territories that would help to meet the rising demand
for water.6 These restrictions have forced Palestinians to use
unclean water for their daily uses, or to put off daily chores such
as washing food, cleaning dishes and utensils, and flushing toi-
lets.7 Due to these restrictions, Palestinians are exposed to
water-borne diseases through lack of sanitary drinking or
bathing water,8 and some estimates show that over 60% of
Palestinians living in West Bank communities are infected with
diarrhea.9 Palestinian water, when accessible, is also highly sali-
nated, causing kidney problems and hypertension in Gaza in
particular.10
Additionally, the Palestinian economy has been heavily
impacted by Israel’s water policies.11 Palestinian businesses are
affected by these policies on a regularly occurring basis, are
forced to rotate water access, and are unable to attract high-tech
or manufacturing industries because of this unpredictability.12 A
recent survey of water usage by the Palestinian Central Bureau
of Statistics shows that overall, 68% of Palestinians experience
loss of water at least twice weekly; in the Gaza Strip, this figure
jumps to 73% of Palestinians.13
In the Palestinian territories, groundwater (water that accu-
mulates in underground acquifers and springs) is the primary
source of renewable water, whereas surface water in the Jordan
River and wadis (valleys) provide a far less rechargeable supply.
Studies by the Palestinian Water Bureau show that the majority
of rechargeable water for the Israel-Palestine region occurs
beneath Palestinian territories in the Mountain Aquifers, but
Palestinians are only allotted 17% of groundwater, 10% of the
runoff recharge, and none of the Jordan River recharge.14 It
should be noted that Palestinian usage is only 11% of the total
available water recharge, while Israeli usage is 89% of the total,
which includes all of the potential recharge of the Jordan River
waters.15 (See Figure 1 for more on water usage.)
Despite similarities in the size of their respective popula-
tions, Israelis consume over 85% of the region’s total water
resources even though Israelis and Israeli settlers make up only
68% of the population.16 In contrast, Palestinians comprise
32% of the region’s population, yet use only 11% of the region’s
water.17 Most alarming is the fact that each settler consumes
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600 liters of water per day, which is almost ten times as much as
Palestinians and nearly twice as much as the average Israeli
although settlers make up only 3% of the population.18
HISTORIC WATER AGREEMENTS AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENTS
Palestine and Israel have addressed these water disputes in
a variety of past negotiations. The Johnston Plan, which was for-
mulated by the United States in the 1950s and has become de
facto customary law in the region, proffered a proposal for equi-
table distribution of the Jordan River waters between the five
states sharing its banks: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and
Palestine.20 The Gaza-Jericho Accord of 1994 led the
Palestinian Liberation Organization to formally recognize
Israel’s water policies in the Gaza Strip.21 The Accord stipulat-
ed that water resources in the Gaza Strip and Jericho would be
managed by the Palestinian Authority (“P.A.”), while existing
supply systems for the settlements would continue to be man-
aged by Merkorot, an Israeli water company, and that the P.A.
was not to interfere with such supplies.22 The 1993 Declaration
of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements23 laid
the groundwork for the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 1995.24 These
Agreements set out provisions on the goal of joint water man-
agement of the Occupied Territories. Article 40 of the Interim
Agreement’s Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs recognized
Palestinian water rights in the West Bank, although it made no
mention of the Gaza Strip Coastal Aquifer or Palestinian access
to the Jordan River.25
However, despite significant steps towards recognizing
Palestinian water rights through such bilateral agreements, the
water rights debate essentially has been ascribed the role of a
“final status” issue that will not be fully negotiated until the cre-
ation of a Palestinian state. One must, therefore, look to cus-
tomary and international law that may provide support for
Palestinian water rights. While a range of international mecha-
nisms provide moral and legal support for granting Palestinians
increased water rights, Palestine’s tenuous political status com-
plicates the enforcement of these international laws on Israel. 
INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
The United Nations (“U.N.”) International Law
Commission and the non-governmental International Law
Association (“ILA”) have formulated a recognizable body of
international water law, addressing water rights to various
sources, including rivers, drainage basins, groundwater sources,
surface water sources, underwater aquifers, and other freshwa-
ter bodies. Internationally, there is also an increasing recogni-
tion of an inherent right to water, included in an expanded theo-
ry of fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and the
right to favorable living conditions.26 The World Health
Organization recently published a report on the right to water as
a fundamental human right,27 which it sees as deriving from
principles of health and sanitation put forth in Article 12(1) of
the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(“ICESR”),28 and more recently U.N. General Comment
No.15.29 In fact, over the last fifty years, a range of internation-
al conventions and decisions have addressed this fundamental
right to water and have increasingly provided support for
Palestine’s claim to water rights. 
The Helsinki Rules
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers (“Helsinki Rules”) establish that a “basin
state” is “entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equi-
table share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an internation-
al drainage basin.”30 The Helsinki Rules were formulated and
adopted by the ILA in 1966 and are respected as customary inter-
national law.31
One primary principle of the Helsinki Rules suggests that a
riparian state, a state occupying land adjacent to a river system,
must obtain a “reasonable and equitable share” of that state’s
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FIGURE 1: SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY AND
TOTAL USE IN MILLION CUBIC METERS
ANNUALLY19
Israelis and Palestinians use the following water supplies: 
The Jordan River Basin: including Lake Tiberias, the Dead
Sea, the Yarmuk and Zerka Rivers
The West Bank Mountain Aquifer: including the Coastal
Aquifer, the Western Aquifer, and the Northeastern Aquifer. 
The Jordan River Basin, Western Aquifer and Northeastern
Aquifer are directly within the West Bank territories. The
Coastal Aquifer covers all of the Gaza Strip. Even though the
majority of the water supply is underneath Palestinian territory,
Israel has restricted Palestinian riparian rights and water access,
using all of the Coastal Aquifer waters to the detriment of the
Gaza Strip, and using most of the West Bank aquifers and all of
the Jordan River Basin to the detriment of West Bank territories.
A 1995 Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (“ARIJ”)
survey of water allocation between Israel and Palestine showed
that Israel used at least three times as much water from the
Jordan River Basin and West Mountain Aquifer as Palestinians
were allowed. Specifically, the Jordan River waters have been
diverted by the Israeli National Water Carrier to irrigate settle-
ments and agricultural lands in the Negev Desert, violating the
terms of the 1950s Johnston Plan and Palestine’s international
water rights as a riparian state of the Jordan River.
Although all of the recharge (or replenishing) areas of the
Mountain Aquifers are underneath Palestinian territories –
mainly the West Bank – Israel uses more than half of these
resources. As of 1995, Israel used 115 mcm per year from the
Northeastern Basin Aquifer, 325 mcm from the Western Basin,
and 65 mcm from the Eastern Basin. From those same aquifers,
Palestinians are only allocated 25 mcm, 25 mcm, and 60 mcm
per year, respectively.
water sources, including equal use of its rivers, drainage basins,
aquifers, and other ground- and sub-surface sources.32 Article
V(II) of the Helsinki Rules lists eleven factors that must be con-
sidered when determining if a riparian state possesses “a rea-
sonable and equitable share” of their water sources, including
the past utilization of the waters, the economic and social needs
of the basin State, the population dependent on the waters, and
the availability of other resources.33
The Helsinki Rules also state that “a basin State may not be
denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an interna-
tional drainage basin to reserve for a co-basin State future use of
such waters.”34 Interpreted broadly, this principle supports the
notion that Israel cannot deny Palestinian access to water for
Israel’s own future needs, either by preventing well drilling or by
diverting Jordan River flow. However, as noted, the Helsinki
Rules were drafted by the ILA, a private non-governmental
organization, and although respected within the international
community, are not legally binding on Israel’s actions.35
The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses
Israel is legally bound by the Convention on the Law of
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (“the
Convention”).36 Israel signed the Convention in March 1989,
and ratified it in December of 1994. The Convention was adopt-
ed by the U.N. in 1997, and regulates the use of an “interna-
tional watercourse” that is shared by two or more states.37
Specifically, the Convention regulates the non-navigational uses
of water resources such as rivers, basins, and sub- and ground-
water systems. The Convention redefined water rights with the
consideration that international drainage basins are highly com-
plex transnational systems that generally affect multiple
nations.38 The Convention also notes the right of a watercourse
or riparian state to be included in multilateral negotiations and
to be a party to watercourse agreements that will ultimately
affect its rights.39
The Convention focuses on two main principles of custom-
ary water law. The first is the “equitable and reasonable utiliza-
tion” of watercourses,40 and the second is the “obligation not to
cause appreciable harm” to other states’ watercourses.41
Equitable and reasonable utilization establishes that each state
associated with an international drainage basin has an equal
right to the use of its waters.42 The “no appreciable harm” con-
cept refers to a principle of property law, sic utere tuo it alienum
non laedas, discussed later in this article, that provides that one
state cannot cause detrimental harm to the property of its adja-
cent states.43 The Convention requires several factors be taken
into account when determining whether the reasonable and
equitable utilization of a watercourse, such as the watercourse
state’s social and economic needs, its population needs, conser-
vation concerns, the effects of the use of water, and the avail-
ability of alternative uses of the watercourse.44 Moreover, the
Convention confers an obligation on watercourse states to “take
all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant
harm to other watercourse states,”45 and creates an obligation to
mitigate or eliminate harms when they do occur.46
The Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and
their Disposal
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal47 (“Basel
Convention”), was ratified by Israel in 1994,48 and is binding
upon Israel’s actions. The Basel Convention establishes that rat-
ified states have a right to prohibit the movement of hazardous
waste through its territories. 
Pollution of Palestinian water sources by Israel is a common
occurrence and makes what little water is available for Palestinians
unsanitary and undrinkable. The Center for Economic and Social
Rights (“CESR”) notes that Israeli settlements are primarily to
blame, as they are six times more polluting than their Palestinian
neighbors.49 According to CESR, Israeli settlements located on
West Bank and Gaza Strip hilltops dump sewage and wastewater
into the Palestinian valleys below. Furthermore, Israeli industries
are increasingly relocating to West Bank hilltops to avoid strict
Israeli environmental regulations. Over 200 of these industries
dump factory effluents and waste directly onto Palestinian agricul-
tural land.50 CESR also notes that in 2001, the Israeli government
discharged 3.5 million cubic meters of untreated wastewater into
the Gaza Strip.51 This continued pollution is in direct violation of
the Basel Convention. However, Israel argues that because the
Palestinian Territories are not a sovereign state, such instruments
as the Helsinki Rules and the Basel Convention do not apply to the
current dispute even though they are international instruments
designed to bind Israel.52
PALESTINIAN WATER RIGHTS UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The international treaties and conventions discussed above
all refer to watercourse “states,” the protection of “state” sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, and immovable borders. Israel has
always qualified Palestine’s claim of water rights by arguing that
the Palestinian Territories do not yet constitute an independent
and sovereign “state” for the purposes of binding or customary
international law. Israel further argues that since Palestine is not,
and never has been, a sovereign state, international human rights
and customary law provisions do not apply, and therefore
Palestine does not have independent riparian rights.53
Many legal sources and scholars, however, disagree with
Israel’s determination, and recognize that Palestine is a riparian
to the rivers that run through it.54 They argue that recent histo-
ry indicates the international community, which includes Israel
and Palestine, are preparing for a future independent Palestinian
state. Even the U.N. has recently acknowledged as much by
passing a resolution with a “vision” of Palestinian and Israeli
states living side by side.55 Therefore, some feel that the non-
State argument is merely a delay tactic, and a virtual non-issue.
On a more fundamental level, customary international law dic-
tates that Palestine has rights as a riparian state and should be
afforded inherent international and human rights to the aquifers
under their territory as well as the Jordan, Yarmuk, and Zerka
rivers that flow through the territories. 
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RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Under customary international law, riparian states are states
that “arise as an incident of ownership to land adjacent [to a]
river;”56 riparian states have inherent rights to the water that
adjoins their land. Riparian rights are derived from property
principles and generally include the rights to fish, to use and
receive water in its natural state, and to sue when water is divert-
ed, polluted, or otherwise harmed by upstream users.57
Although riparian law is essentially derived from English com-
mon law nuisance,58 it is an internationally recognized principle
that riparians own or occupy land adjacent to rivers, and there-
fore, have a say in how its
waters are used. There are two
main principles at the core of
riparian law. First, riparians
have rights to the use of “unal-
tered water.”59 Second, ripari-
ans do not have sovereign or
absolute rights to use common
waters in any manner they
wish.60 These principles stem
from the ancient property princi-
ple of sic utere tuo it alienum
non laedas,61 which maintains
that a riparian cannot use its
property in a manner which
would injure the property rights
of its neighbor.62
Under riparian principles,
the Jordan River should be equi-
tably allocated between all of its
rightful parties.63 Palestine and
Israel are downstream riparians
of the Jordan River. The U.N.
has promulgated its own interpretation of riparian rights through
General Assembly Resolution No. 3281.64 These riparian rights
include the following concepts:
• Upper riparian states do not have absolute sovereign
rights, but have sovereign rights in their respective
territories over the waters of the international water-
course;
• In their use of water, states should not infringe upon
the legal interests of the other riparian states
(expressed by various terms in the Convention, such
as Article 5/1);
• In their utilization of water, riparian states should not
substantially harm the other riparian states; this
notion is encompassed under the phrase “not to cause
significant harm” in the Convention, Article 7.65
These principles have been incorporated into the
Convention on the Non-Navigational Use of Watercourses. In
the Convention, the term “riparian” was replaced with the
phrase “watercourse state.” Yet the governing law retained the
basic language of the U.N. resolution, focusing on the rule that
a riparian state should not substantially or significantly harm the
rights of other riparian states.66
There are two notable international cases regarding the
application of riparian principles to disputes over river usage. A
recent case between Hungary and Slovakia under the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)67 affirmed the principle of
“equitable utilization” as presented in the Helsinki Rules. In this
case, the ICJ had to decide on the legality of a treaty involving
an agreement for a joint building of the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros
Barrage System on a section of the Danube between Hungary
and then Czechoslovakia. In 1989, Hungary terminated its
duties under the treaty, and in
response, the then newly
formed Slovakia dammed up a
portion of the Danube and sub-
stantially diverted its waters
away from Hungary. The ICJ
found that although Hungary
violated its legal obligations in
terminating the treaty, it had not
given up its “basic right to an
equitable and reasonable shar-
ing of the resources of an inter-
national watercourse,” and that
Slovakia had committed “an
international wrongful act.”68
The other case involved a
1957 dispute between France
and Spain69 and applied the sic
utere tuo doctrine to an arbitral
dispute over France’s use of
Lake Lanoux. This use required
the diversion of water from
Lake Carol to Lake Ariège.
Spain claimed rights as a co-riparian of both rivers, and while
the arbitration tribunal upheld France’s rights to divert the
rivers, it also acknowledged “the correlative duty not to injure
the interests of a neighbouring state” and the principle that “no
substantial change can be brought about by one riparian without
the consent of co-riparians.”70
OBSTACLES TO PALESTINE’S FULL RECOGNITION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The primary problem with using international law and ripar-
ian principles to support Palestinian water rights is that
Palestinian Territories may not qualify as a “state,” and thus, may
not fall under the purview of international water law. The ques-
tion thus remains whether the Palestinian Territories qualify as a
“riparian” for the purposes of claiming independent access to
waterways which also flow through parts of Israel. As noted pre-
viously, the argument can be made that because Palestine will
likely become a state, international laws should apply to the
water conflicts between Israel and Palestine. Gamal Abouali
notes Israel’s argument that because international law “regulates
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the relation between states and individuals,” it does not apply to
the Occupied Territories as its relation to Israel “differs from that
of democratic systems.”71 This argument follows Israel’s posi-
tion on the Geneva Conventions, the ICESCR, and the laws of
belligerent occupation. Ironically, Abouali notes that the Israeli
Supreme Court has rejected this argument, finding instead that
Israel is a belligerent occupier and must comply with interna-
tional human rights laws set forth in the Geneva Conventions,
the Hague Regulations, and presumably, other human rights and
humanitarian laws.72 Finally, the 2002 U.N. resolution recogniz-
ing the vision of a Palestinian state provides additional rein-
forcement to the notion that Israel must comply with internation-
al norms in its water policies towards the territories.
A secondary obstacle to full recognition of Palestinian water
rights is Israel’s justifiable need for “national security.”73 Israel
justifies a range of its policies towards Palestine, including its
diversion of needed water sources and inequitable distribution of
existing waters, by focusing on the security elements involved,
which in this case refers to “water security.”74 Israel claims that
water pipelines and wells in the Palestinian territories are fre-
quent targets of terrorist attacks and that Palestinians often
“steal” water meant for other communities in the Occupied
Territories.75 Furthermore, Israel is, perhaps reasonably, con-
cerned about the continuation of its own water sources as Israel
is also an arid desert and suffers chronic water shortages of its
own.76 Thus, Israel’s water policies towards the Palestinian ter-
ritories are guided, in part, by a need for self-preservation.
Finally, in all of the negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian authorities, Palestinian water rights have been con-
sistently labeled as a “final status negotiations” issue.77 Such
issues, like the right of return for refugees and border questions,
will not be negotiated until a final settlement of the entire Israel-
Palestine crisis is near completion. This semantic ambiguity has
made any solid agreement ineffective, especially in regards to
protecting Palestinian water rights to the Jordan River and the
Mountain Aquifers, or in regards to water distribution and
access. The “final status” label is a persistent delay tactic, which
excuses current practice with the hope of imminent solution.
However, this ambiguity has served to make a final resolution to
the question of Palestine’s right to water practically impossible.
CONCLUSION
The essence of the debate over Palestinian water rights
involves the following questions, addressed above: 1) whether
international laws and norms support the expansion of
Palestinian access to joint Palestinian-Israeli water resources; 2)
whether Palestine’s status as a non-state prevents the application
of international laws to the Palestinian-Israeli water dispute; and
3) whether the prospect of a future Palestinian state should
require that international water laws apply to the dispute regard-
less of Palestine’s current status.
The issue of Palestinian water rights is ambiguous and open
to interpretation from all sides. It is largely accepted that human
rights and humanitarian law should apply to the Palestinian
Territories as a peoples under the control of Israel. Yet, whether
customary water laws that normally apply to sovereign riparian
states should also apply to the occupied territories is a harder
question to answer. As discussed above, a range of internation-
al principles support the notion that customary water laws
should apply. 
First, customary international norms set forth in documents
such as the Helsinki Rules, the Basel Convention, and the
Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of transboundary water-
courses require that a riparian be given a reasonable and equi-
table share or utilization of its waters and that riparians not
cause appreciable harm to neighboring riparian states. These
two principles support Palestine’s access to sources such as the
Jordan River, and Palestine’s right to clean and sanitary water
that is not polluted by industrial effluent and settler wastewater.
Second, the sic utere tuo doctrine has applied not only to
sovereign states, but also to individual disputes between com-
munities and thus, could be extended to the Palestinian territo-
ries as a community within Israel. This principle permeates
throughout all customary international water law and is binding
on Israel in the form of the Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
Finally, these doctrines are supported not only by binding
and non-binding international documents but also by decades of
international case law. The Hungary v. Slovakia case affirmed a
riparian’s right to the “equitable utilization” of a waterway, and
the France v. Spain case affirmed the application of sic utere tuo
to the diversion of a waterway away from its rightful riparian.
Most recently, the inherent right to water has been recog-
nized by the ILA’s Berlin Conference Rules of 2004 (the “Berlin
Rules”), a controversial new set of international water laws.
Attempting to consolidate over forty years of water law devel-
opments since the Helsinki Rules, the Berlin Rules go beyond
customary focus on international drainage basins and incorpo-
rates rules regarding national waters as well. Although this
expanded scope has not, at this point, been accepted by the
majority of international water law practitioners, the ILA’s
adoption of these stances gives some additional support in
applying the international water principles discussed above to
the internal disputes between Palestine and Israel.
This article has surveyed the range of international laws in
the continuing debate over recognition of expanded water rigts
for Palestine. Customary international laws favor recognition of
these rights, despite Palestine’s ambiguous and unique status as
an occupied territory. Application of these laws indicates that, if
the final status issues preventing negotiation over water access
can be resolved, Palestine should be given greater control over
the use of waters located within its territory, as well as access to
additional water sources currently prohibited by Israel’s
inequitable water policies.
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INTRODUCTION
This article examines the current crisis regarding watershortage, access, and quality in Israel and the PalestinianTerritories as well as the most practical and effective
immediate responses to this situation. As the region’s population
not only grows1 but continues to be divided by political unrest,
the current water needs within the Palestinian Authority become
more and more difficult to facilitate. Large desalination plants,
international trade agreements, and water for peace treaties all
remain theoretical as both governing bodies and the internation-
al community remain reluctant to invest in costly infrastructure
until a peace agreement is reached to end the current Palestinian
Intifada (the uprising of Palestinian people in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip).
With these large scale, long-range avenues temporarily
stalled, the non-governmental (“NGO”) community has
assumed a critical role not only in addressing the area’s current
needs, but also in moving towards a more sustainable, and there-
fore stable, future. Since its inception coinciding with the first
Earth Day in 1970, Earth Day Network (“EDN”) has been a
leader in ushering in the modern environmental movement.
EDN has emerged as a pivotal role player in this movement,
encouraging and empowering communities to take active roles
in responsibly managing their own water use.
This article summarizes the situation in the water scarce
area of Israel and the Palestinian Territories in order to display
how the basic needs of Palestinian populations inside the West
Bank and Gaza require immediate action, which the governing
entities have in many cases failed to provide in light of the
region’s current political and social climate. This article then
illustrates how international and local NGOs have come to fill
this critical gap. Finally, it shows how the grassroots efforts of
THE ROLE OF NGOS IN ADDRESSING WATER
ACCESS IN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN
AUTHORITY
by Jonah Schein*
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tries, with over 100 organizations in 13 countries throughout the Middle East. Mr.
Schein welcomes comments at schein@earthday.net.
Founded by the organizers of the first Earth Day in 1970,
Earth Day Network (“EDN”) promotes environmental citizen-
ship and year round progressive action worldwide. Our mis-
sion is to build broad-based citizen support for sound, work-
able, and effective environmental and sustainable develop-
ment policies for all. 
Earth Day Network is a driving force steering environ-
mental awareness around the world. Through Earth Day
Network, activists connect, interact, and impact their commu-
nities, and create positive change in local, national, and glob-
al policies. EDN's international network reaches over 12,000
organizations in 174 countries, while the domestic program
keeps over 3,000 groups and over 100,000 educators coordi-
nating millions of community development and environmental
protection activities throughout the year. As a result, Earth
Day is the only event celebrated simultaneously around the
globe by people of all backgrounds, faiths, and nationalities.
More than a half billion people participate in our campaigns
every year. 
Earth Day Network's programs keep its partners on the
forefront of the environmental movement. EDN continues to
overcome global challenges by
maintaining the following set of
values: 
• Building Alliances – EDN
connects and partners with
organizations and agencies
to work towards common
goals of public and diverse
involvement in environmental policy. 
• Encouraging Citizen Action – EDN promotes action
around specific environmental issues and provides
resources, tools and direct assistance for imple-
menting successful events and campaigns. 
• Improving Environmental Education – EDN offers
tools for integrating a broad set of environment,
health, and community development issues into core
curriculum. 
By continuously developing progressive campaigns and
programs while remaining an inclusive organization, EDN has
helped to create a healthier, safer world.
EARTH DAY NETWORK
organizations such as EDN and our partners are helping to shape
a more stable and water efficient Middle East.
SCARCITY OF THE REGION’S WATER RESOURCES
Despite several heated conflicts regarding water access
throughout the region, it has remained a relatively quiet issue.
As J.A. Allan points out, the region’s countries have been able
to “easily access the surplus ‘virtual water’ in the global hydro-
logical system via trade.”2 In other words, countries with limit-
ed water resources are able to compensate by not engaging in
water intensive activities, such as certain agricultural crops,
instead relying on trade to meet these needs. The relatively suc-
cessful de-emphasis on the area’s water scarcity notwithstand-
ing, the situation has steadily worsened since the late 1960s
when Israel took over civil administrative functions in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip following the Six Day War in 1967. At
present, the question of water access and water rights is an
extraordinarily charged and potent issue.
According to the Israeli Water Commission, the combined
Israeli and Palestinian population of roughly 12 million people
requires a total of some 2,775 million cubic meters (“mcm”) of
water per year.3 This represents a per capita usage of just over
231 cubic meters per year. But estimates of basic requirements
for Middle Eastern countries, including drinking water, the
usage of water in food production, and other domestic needs,
typically range upwards of 1,000 cubic meters per year.4 Such a
low, efficient use of water is made possible by the importation
of “virtual water” and by the use of various agricultural, domes-
tic, and waste-water treatment techniques. However, assuming
an average year of rainfall (to say nothing of a drought year), the
total renewable resources of lakes, rivers, and aquifers con-
tribute just 2,400 mcm per year; despite relatively efficient use,
this rate of consumption still reflects a “deficit” (the amount of
water needed in excess of the natural annually renewable levels)
of some 375 mcm a year. Some of this deficit is compensated
through a number of costly alternative water resources such as
desalination and waste-water reclamation.5
In coming years, the current resources and methods of
expanding supply through non-traditional means will prove
inadequate to meet the region’s growing needs. While the area
is already struggling to balance its water usage, population
trends show that rapid growth in both Israel and in the
Palestinian Authority is causing the problem to worsen far
quicker than it is being solved. Even a modest estimate of pop-
ulation growth predicts that by the year 2050 the area’s water
deficit will exceed 3,000 mcm.6
THE ROLE OF NGOS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
While the pressures on the limited water supply are steadi-
ly worsened by the increasing population, the current Intifada is
also drastically altering the situation for the worst. Not only is
the violent conflict halting plans to increase available water
through desalination plants and new distribution systems, but it
is continuously disrupting the current infrastructure and other
supply mechanisms. Because this has made it more difficult for
government authorities to provide access to water, the local and
international NGO communities have played an extremely
important role in maintaining access throughout the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.
One of the most important roles of NGOs and other organ-
ized grassroots efforts is to effectively monitor and respond to
problems as they develop. The Palestinian Hydrology Group
(“PHG”), for instance, has monitored the impact of the conflict
on water access for the past two years. Their findings display
the severity of the situation and the necessity for a quick and
informed response. As shown in Figure 1, in September of
2004, when the Israeli military divided the Gaza Strip into
three segments to limit the mobility of militants, the PHG
observed the following disruptions as part of their ongoing
monitoring project.7
Without this type of careful monitoring, the impacts on
people living in the affected areas are often felt but not prop-
erly managed. By disseminating their findings, PHG helps to
ensure that relief organizations and government agencies
place resources where they are most needed at that point in
time (as opposed to where they were most needed the previ-
ous week or month).
Similar disruptions are continuously observed in the
Southern sections of the West Bank where many people depend
on mobile water tankers. Due to limited mobility, these tankers
are often delayed for hours at checkpoints, and sometimes are
prevented from entering the areas of service altogether. Since
the vast majority of these tankers are privately owned and oper-
ated, closed routes and delays at checkpoints mean that opera-
tors are more likely not to bother completing deliveries. This
leaves large portions of the population without access to their
chief water supply.8
In these parts of the West Bank, a number of international
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Figure 1
Community
Effects of Violent Conflict on 
Water Access
Deir Al Balah Twenty of the wastewater systems’ man-
holes were destroyed
Five hundred meters of the water network’s
pipes were destroyed
Al Qarya al
Badawiya
A facility conducting a French-Palestinian
research project on the reuse of wastewater
in agriculture was damaged
Al Mughraqa At least five rooftop storage tanks were
damaged 
100 meters of the distribution network’s
pipes were damaged, as well as 600 meters
of household connection pipes
agencies and NGOs participate in the Emergency Water and
Sanitation – Health (“EWASH”) Committee. The committee
serves as a means for sharing community resources and infor-
mation. Rather than having two organizations work in the same
village, the committee is capable of determining which group
works in which community, thus ensuring delivery of the maxi-
mum amount of aid to as many people as possible.9
EWASH has also taken steps to help with the quality of
drinking water. Since a large percentage of the Palestinian pop-
ulations in the West Bank receive their water supply from pri-
vate mobile tankers, it is untreated and unmonitored by the
Palestinian Water Authority (“PWA”). EWASH members have
worked together to distribute chlorine tablets and educate
households on their safe and effective use, thus drastically
improving water quality in these communities.10
ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES
No matter what population model is used, it seems clear
that at current rates of consumption, the naturally available
amount of water from annually renewable sources will not be
enough to meet the needs of those living in Israel and the
Palestinian Authority. Either the available amount of water must
be drastically increased, or the per capita rate of consumption
must be drastically decreased. The most likely scenario will see
both happening simultaneously.
Among the leading alternative water sources is the
prospect of desalination. Israel already utilizes desalination in
several places, both as a means of treating sea water and to
treat brackish (salty) ground water. Despite the intensive use
of energy required for desalination, Israel has plans to build
numerous plants along the Mediterranean coast. One of these
plants, located in the coastal Israeli city of Hadera, is slated to
deliver 50 mcm per year of desalinated drinking water to the
West Bank. The cost of water resulting from this plant accord-
ing to the Israeli Water Commission would be roughly $0.90
USD per cubic meter of water, a remarkably low figure for a
method once thought too expensive to have any large scale
practical use.11
A second alternative is water importation, or shipping
potable water from areas that have an excess supply. The like-
ly source for this imported water would be the Manavgat
River, which empties into the Mediterranean on the Southern
coast of Turkey. Under the proposed plan, fresh water would
be loaded onto tankers close to where the river meets the sea.
Using technology similar to that of oil tankers, the tankers
would then sail to an offloading station on the Israeli coast
where the water would be stored and distributed. Trade agree-
ments between Israel and Turkey have been signed, and the
Manavgat River plant was completed in 2000 for processing
and loading the water onto tankers.12 While it is nearly certain
that importation will play some role in the region’s future,
according to the Israeli Water Commission, the high cost of
purchasing, shipping, and storing the water (an estimated
$0.80 - 1.00 USD per cubic meter), combined with the uncer-
tainty that this will remain an uninterrupted supply, make this
a less than desirable option.
THE GRASSROOTS EFFORTS OF EARTH DAY
NETWORK
No matter which alternative water source is adopted, it is
certain that any water not obtained from the region’s natural
hydrological system will be very expensive. Although the region
will need to expand its water supply to a degree, further increas-
ing the efficiency of water usage is a far more cost-effective
response. For this reason, EDN, our partners, and other con-
cerned NGOs have led the way in encouraging conservation,
awareness, and improved education at the community level.
On Earth Day 2004, EDN with regional partner Friends of
the Earth Middle East (“FOEME”) celebrated with the openings
of the first two “Water Wise” schools as part of the Good Water
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“Water Wise School” in Talukarem, West Bank: The grounds keeper at the
girls’ high school in Tulkarem demonstrates the school’s new water-effi-
cient irrigation system.
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“Water Wise School” in Talukarem, West Bank: A student at the girls’ high
school in Tulkarem uses a sink recently hooked up to the grey water irriga-
tion system.
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Neighbors Project.13 The openings, one located in Tulkarem,
West Bank and the other in Abasan, Gaza Strip culminated the
three-year awareness project, which paired cities on opposite
sides of the border to encourage citizens to cooperate in con-
serving water resources. The schools feature rainwater collec-
tion systems, water savings fixtures, and grey-water irrigation
systems that recycle water from sinks and water fountains to be
used for irrigating school grounds. The school located within the
Gaza Strip, where salinity levels are far higher than World
Health Organization standards, also included a mini-desalina-
tion plant. Not only do the schools (eleven in all) help conserve
valuable amounts of water, they also save money by reducing
the often pricey water bill. In some cases, the systems have con-
served water so effectively that schools that previously only had
running water three days a week now have running water for the
entire school week.
In addition, the “Water Wise” schools are an excellent plat-
form with which to engage students in education that promotes not
only water conservation, but also awareness of shared resources,
and how their fate is tied to that of their neighboring communities.
Because most of these communities benefit from modern reticula-
tion systems with indoor plumbing and distribution systems, true
awareness of the water scarcity can be difficult to impress on peo-
ple in such a way that motivates them to conserve.
Awareness of the region’s water issues is not a challenge
faced only by residents of the region. The international commu-
nity must also develop an understanding of the problems that are
faced daily in the Middle East and other parts of the world
where water quantity and quality are issues. In 2003, as part of
the “10 Thirsty Children” Project,14 EDN visited neighboring
Jordan to spread the story of Hiba, a ten-year-old girl living in a
rural section of Jordan. Hiba told people of the daily challenges
facing her family because of lack of access to fresh water. Later
this year, EDN plans to spread the story of a Palestinian and an
Israeli child. Only by communicating the ways that water scarci-
ty affects people’s lives can the international community under-
stand and respond to this global threat.
CONCLUSION
NGOs have played a pivotal role in ensuring that access to
water is maintained in all areas during these years of limited
supply and violent conflict, and also have served as a valuable
tool in moving the region toward a sustainable future.
Government authorities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have
been unable to deal with all aspects of the region’s current water
crisis. While the current political circumstances make the situa-
tion even more desperate, they also make it more and more dif-
ficult for these authorities to respond.
Large, multi-million dollar plans to increase the water sup-
ply will clearly be needed as the region’s population and
demand for water grows. However, under a best-case scenario,
the relief that these projects will offer is years away. Under a
worst-case scenario, the Intifada will continue indefinitely, and
investment in the necessary infrastructure will prove too risky
to undertake anytime in the near future. While it would be
unwarranted to imply the local and national governments are
incapable of doing anything or that they do not already provide
any relief, it is fair to say that they are not fully able to accom-
modate the needs of the public. NGOs therefore play a signifi-
cant role in filling this gap and helping to maintain access to
water for populations of communities afflicted by heavy and
violent conflict.
Furthermore, it is clear that under any scenario, the cost of
expanding the available amount of potable water will be high
enough that it is only economical to develop a culture of con-
servation and efficient use. Here again, NGOs are playing and
will continue to play a key role in helping the region cope with
its growing demand for water. 
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INTRODUCTION
Few issues unify a community like the potential that alocal water source might be privatized, particularly by aforeign multinational water or energy conglomerate.
Communities across the globe react passionately to stop private
takeovers of publicly owned treatment works, whether it is an
operations and management contract, or the actual purchase of
the facility.  Commonly cited examples include the failed priva-
tizations in Cochabamba, Bolivia; canceled contracts in Manila,
Philippines and in Atlanta, GA; and the public outcry that halt-
ed a contract in Stockton, CA.  The
Bolivia contract is particularly relevant
to the U.S. trend toward private owner-
ship of water.  Bechtel held the rights not
only to provide water services, but also
to charge residents for rainwater collect-
ed from their roofs.  
In the U.S., private interests are
responding to water scarcity by investing
in water rights and land in order to sell it
to the highest bidder.  Generally this is a
transfer from agricultural use to munici-
pal use.  Citizens in the source communi-
ties are protesting these ventures that may
affect their access to water, the value of
their property, and the economic develop-
ment of their communities.  Government
officials are considering whether private
individuals should be allowed to sell
water (which is legally the property of the
state held in trust for the public good)
back to the public at a profit.
This paper examines how current
trends in private investment, including
investor rights and government obliga-
tions under international trade agree-
ments, may complicate public control of water supplies.  While
the free market approach to water management may be attractive
to states that either require more or have excess water to sell, the
economic and environmental effects of long-term transfers of
water control to the private sector are largely unknown.  Foreign
participation in delivering services and buying on the market
increases the likelihood that U.S. regulations will be challenged
under international trade agreement obligations.  With popula-
tion growth increasing demand, and improvements in technolo-
gy making long distance transfer of water feasible, it seems
unlikely that North America will be able to avoid water trade
conflicts.  A level of consistency between state law regimes could
mitigate the threat and expense of international conflicts.   
WATER SCARCITY COAST TO COAST
The United States is experiencing droughts from New York
to Texas, aquifers that drain faster than they can be recharged and
shortages in cities and farming regions.  Former Colorado
Attorney General Ken Salazar has predicted “the greatest water
war we have seen in decades and decades” if the state’s five-year
drought continues, since rivers that flow through six other states
begin in Colorado.1 Private companies
are responding to the expected scarcity by
obtaining leases to public and private
water rights.  The market for bulk water
transfers is already attracting municipal
consumers anxious to secure consistent
and long-term sources of water.  Farmers
are earning so much from selling their
water to municipalities and companies
investing in water pipelines that water is
often referred to as the “farmers’ 401K.”
However, the impact that water transfers
will have on the quality of farm land, the
environment, public health, and the econ-
omy of farming communities is largely
unknown. “[I]rreplaceable water is a pub-
lic safety issue,” said Texas Agriculture
Commissioner Susan Combs, “All eco-
nomic activity follows water – develop-
ment, jobs, houses, hospitals, nursing
homes – every single location depends on
water.”2 The U.S. will have to decide if
water allocation is best left to the supply
and demand of the open market or to a
coordinated government effort that allo-
cates resources in the public interest.
Because the two may not be mutually exclusive, balancing pub-
lic and private control will be a challenge in the near future.  
PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN WATER RIGHTS
Water transfers are not new but are changing in volume and
foreign participation.  Some investors buy land and water rights
THE NEXT PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC ASSETS:
DOMESTIC AND TRADE IMPLICATIONS RELATED TO WATER RIGHT
AND LAND ACQUISITION
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Farmers from South Dakota to Texas share the
Ogallala Aquifer and may be affected by withdrawals
hundreds of miles away or the neighboring field. The
aquifer is being depleted faster than it can recharge.
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specifically to benefit from the demand for water.  Others
already have rights vested through land ownership or historical
usage .  In either case, selling the rights to bulk transfer compa-
nies is becoming a popular option.  
Colorado transfers tens of thousands of acre-feet (“af”)
through private, voluntary actions every year.3 (An acre-foot is
325,581 gallons, which is enough to flood an acre one foot deep
or supply a family of four for a year).  The majority of these
transfers comprised less than 5,000 af, excluding government
reclamation projects.  In a single transaction, the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California agreed to purchase
250,000 af of water taken out of private farm production in the
central valley.  U.S. Filter (then owned by French water giant
Veolia, formerly named Vivendi) purchased 45,000 acres of
farmland in order to participate in the sale.4 Azurix, owned by
the largest private provider of water services in the U.S., the
German corporation RWE, offered at one time to pay for the
Florida Everglades restoration in return for rights to a portion of
the water that it would then sell water to cities.5
The increasing level of private and foreign participation
raises questions about the water management role of both the
U.S. Government and international institutions.  U.S. water
markets are maturing and many countries have expressed inter-
est in purchasing bulk water.6 However, questions remain
regarding the effect on U.S. trade obligations once it has
allowed water to be transferred between basins or countries.
Some suggest that once one U.S. state sells water for bulk trans-
fer, all U.S. states will be obligated to allow trading partners
access to bulk water.  Since Sitka, Alaska has contracted through
a vendor to sell 40 million gallons of water per year to cus-
tomers from Hawaii to Singapore and Saudi Arabia, this ques-
tion is ripe for discussion in the U.S. 
PRIVATE MARKETING OF BULK TRANSFERS
Bulk transfers between countries have been going on for
years, but only recently has demand and the cost of technology
made North American ventures affordable for buyers worldwide
and profitable for entrepreneurs.  Right after the North American
Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) was announced, Gerry White
of McCurdy Enterprises, a real estate firm in Newfoundland,7
offered to sell lake water to China in tankers; Canada has 20% of
the world’s fresh water.  However, many Canadians consider this
resource a part of their national heritage and are hesitant to sup-
port any commercial ventures to export water.  Although that
deal was not permitted, North America’s demand for water is
growing and will continue to put pressure on water-abundant
regions to sell.  In Mr. White’s opinion, “[t]rying to stop people
from selling water is like telling Saudi Arabia not to sell oil.”8
There are still some cost restraints to transoceanic water ship-
ments.  Many companies are investing now in the hope that
scarcity will drive the price up enough to make long distance
transfers a fiscally attractive option for cities in the U.S. market. 
T. BOONE PICKENS
Like other former oilmen, T. Boone Pickens has invested
heavily in the prospective water market.  Currently he has a per-
mit to pipe 200,000 af of water from under 90,000 acres9 to
cities around Dallas/Fort Worth.  The plan will require an initial
investment of $1.2 billion for the pipe structure and a sale price
of over $775 per af to make the transfer across hundreds of
miles profitable.10 (In comparision to $4 in Idaho, $596 in
Oklahoma and up to $900 in Southern California.)11 These
water transfers would reduce water available for irrigation in the
source community by 10% and use 50% of the water table in
four counties over the next 100 years.12 So far, Pickens has had
fewer takers than he expected, but he is confident that the mar-
ket will pick up.13 Other investors have demonstrated similar
confidence.  Stock analysts are pushing water as a great buy that
is sure to pay off due to the consistent profits in water industries,
the investment that will be required to update ancient or build
new drinking water systems to serve new growth, and the value
added by scarcity.  Indeed, water-related transactions are already
worth $400 billion per year.14
RIO NUEVO
There are more than 30 groundwater schemes proposed in
Texas as of March 2004.  One of the largest is a proposal to pump
50,000 af from six arid counties to cities in west Texas. 15 Rio
Nuevo, a limited liability company comprised of oil, gas, and
communications businessmen, is planning to mine water from
more than 640,000 acres.  Rio Nuevo has applied to lease
355,000 acres of state land in Texas and has obtained the water
rights to approximately 290,000 acres from hundreds of private
properties.  Public opposition to the venture is high, but the State
General Land Office (“GLO”) has made clear its interest in the
sale of state water.16 Through the GLO, Texas would earn roy-
alties similar to payments for coal or oil.  These revenues would
be earmarked for education budgets.  This has created conflict
between state and local officials in the Rio Nuevo case, though;
communities that neighbor the state lands and share the aquifer
are not convinced that the increase in state revenues is worth the
possible decrease in property value that may result from the
water mining.  Rio Nuevo has stated that it will only take as
much water from the ground as farmers would have used to irri-
gate their land.  Nevertheless, the volume worries hydro-geolo-
gist Marshall Jennings of Texas State University in San Marcos,
who says that the withdrawals will be unsustainable at two to six
times the recharge rate.17 Rio Nuevo demonstrated their lack of
water savvy in their first proposal by suggesting that they would
transport the water down the Rio Grande, which would cause a
good percentage of their investment to literally evaporate.
U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO GROWING
MARKETS
Water law in the United States is a prime example of feder-
alism at work. The criteria for awarding permits or changes of
use (generally from agriculture to municipal or environmental
use) vary by state, creating a patchwork of surface water and
ground water regulations.  Most western states follow systems of
prior appropriation or court adjudicated rights; whereas, eastern
states generally follow a common law riparian system.
Recognizing that the “reasonable use” standard of common-law
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riparian doctrine is too fluid to manage water withdrawals in a
market economy, many riparian areas (e.g. Florida, Virginia) are
developing more detailed water laws that codify historical use
within a permit system.18 While markets are often created for
efficient transfers during times of drought, a permit and registra-
tion system provides regulators a baseline for future allocations.
Similarly, a transferable-use system relies on defined property
rights provided by the permit system.19 Still, these state-level
property rights cannot conflict with federal law standards, which
include treaties, as laid out in the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.  Thus alterations to the permit and property regime
must conform to the 5th and 14th Amendment takings clause.  
TRADITIONAL REGULATION OF WATER RIGHTS
Water may receive less protection than other property in the
U.S. takings system because it is shared and re-used.  Generally,
real property rights or copyrights include the right to exclude all
others from use of the property.  However, water rights in the
United States are usufructory, meaning that the holder has the
right to use a certain volume of water but does not own that
physical unit of water outright unless it has been legally cap-
tured.  The holder of the water right is limited by obligations to
other right holders to use the water reasonably and return
enough of the water either downstream or to the aquifer to sup-
ply other approved uses of water.
Water is also distinguished from other property because of
the historical recognition that a water right is protected by rea-
sonable and beneficial use of water rather than by mere, unexer-
cised possession.20 In Hudson County Water v. McCarter,
Justice Holmes asserted that the public had an indisputable and
omnipresent interest in maintaining rivers at full capacity.21 The
exception, he wrote, was when water was diverted for a better
use, assuming it is restored afterward.  He reasoned that private
uses should be forbidden from diminishing “one of the great
foundations of public welfare and health.”22 Justice Holmes
made that proclamation in 1908 and clearly communicated the
position of the Supreme Court on the need to strike a balance
between private profit and public good.  Takings legislation is
largely focused on the reasonable expectation of the investor.
Both this and subsequent court decisions serve as notice to rights
holders that the property right in water is not absolute and may
be taken without compensation in certain circumstances.23 In
light of the new pressures to share water internationally, Holmes’
statement is informative as to the rights of downstream users.
Holmes not only speaks of reasonable use but also of the return
of the water for downstream users.  This theme is popular in U.S.
water litigation.  It would seem on its face that, at least for sur-
face waters, export would permanently deprive the downstream
user of use of the water.  If this deprivation of access to water
harms downstream users, they might be able to stop the with-
drawal.  Such issues may be common if bulk transfers of water
become more accepted through the market or treaty obligations. 
TEXAS
Texas has made great strides in water management in the
last ten years, including the creation of 88 groundwater man-
agement districts to track and permit water withdrawals and
use.  The Edwards Aquifer Authority set a 450,000 af cap on
withdrawals to make sure that the aquifer is not depleted faster
than it can be recharged.24 Texas has taken these steps to bet-
ter control diversions and water uses, since the Texas Water
Development Board has estimated that over the next 50 years
the state will have to conserve or find replacement water for 5
million af.25 However, in areas that are not controlled by a
groundwater management district, Texas still follows the rule
of capture.  The rule of capture allows landowners to take
unlimited quantities of water regardless of the impact on neigh-
boring wells.  An estimated 60% of the Rio Nuevo project is
from land governed by this common law system.26 In response
to this project, Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst created a state
Senate committee specifically to investigate state water leases.
This committee has commissioned a study to quantify the
groundwater available for transfer without environmental
harm.  Of note, Dewhurst rejected the Rio Nuevo project when
he was the land commissioner.27
WEST VIRGINIA
West Virginia passed its first water rights statute last year,
making some business groups concerned that they might lose
access to state water.28 The statute declares that all water not
privately owned or subject to a riparian right is “held by the
state in stewardship” for all citizens of the state.29
Additionally, the state is starting a registration system to track
current and future water use.  
GREAT LAKES
Congress amended the Water Resources Development Act
in 2000 to allow the Great Lakes to prohibit any diversion or
export from the lakes unless all eight Great Lakes governors
consent.30 Generally this would be considered a violation of the
dormant commerce clause since it limits the transfer of goods
(water) from the lakes.  The United States Supreme Court decid-
ed in Sphorhase v. Nebraska that a state could not consider out-
of-state transfers as a basis for denying a permit.31 The Great
Lakes are a special case due to significant sharing of the
resource with Canada.  The region has been co-governed under
the International Joint Commission just as the Mexico – U.S.
border water is governed by the International Boundary Water
Commission. In response to NAFTA as well as internal pres-
sures to sell water abroad, Canada placed a temporary moratori-
um on bulk water transfers and raised awareness of management
challenges with the U.S. Great Lakes region.
Since that time, the Council of Great Lakes Governors
(“CGLG”) has drafted the Great Lakes Charter Annex 2001
(“Annex”) that lays out an approval process for all withdrawals
from the lakes.32 The CGLG consists of the governors from the
eight states that border the lakes and the premiers of two
Canadian provinces (Ontario and Quebec). The goals of the
Annex are to preserve economic and social development and
environmental protection.  The Annex requires a supermajority
vote 33 to approve all diversions or consumptive uses over five
million gallons per day (“mgd”) with lesser quantities left to the
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states.  In order to measure the current use of lake water each
state must begin to register all withdrawals over 100,000 gallons
per day system within a year of the Annex going into effect.34
This will be a significant step toward greater control, since
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Indiana do not require permits or
registration at this time.35 Most relevant to this discussion is the
requirement that water withdrawn from the lakes must be
returned to the same basin or with special permission to some-
where else in the watershed.36 This restriction creates a prefer-
ence for local users since it makes long distance transfers more
expensive.  The Council of Canadians has raised concerns that
the Great Lakes plan is too permissive and will encourage
greater water use rather than sustainable levels,37 and business
interests have suggested that it is too strict and the thresholds for
regional review too low.38 Some of the legal opinions offered
to the CGLG suggest that this forward-looking undertaking is
likely to have trade implications.39
TRADE AGREEMENT CONCERNS
Although the United States has been a member of trade
agreements for most of its history, fiscal liability of the country
for domestic regulation is new.  The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) was created after WWII to avoid
trade wars and promote growth of the world economy.  The
treaty related to tariffs and customs provisions at the border.
During the last decade the U.S. has pursued several additional
multinational free trade agreements. The World Trade
Organisation was established in 1995 to oversee the GATT and
the new General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) to
which there are now 148 member countries.  GATS requires
governments to subject selected public services to open bidding
and restricts mechanisms that give government agencies a com-
petitive advantage.  GATS is relevant to the water debate, but is
outside the scope of this paper.40
GATT was a voluntary agreement prior to 1995.
Concurrent with the establishment of the WTO, the obligations
became binding and violations subject to retaliatory sanctions.
Disputes regarding the GATT and GATS are heard at the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”).  Three panelists hear the two countries and make a
binding decision.  The panel interprets the plain language of the
text using international common law standards, not the law of
either Party nation.
NAFTA was signed in 1993 by Canada, Mexico, and the
United States and created a status for foreign investor equivalent
to that of nation states.  These disputes are also heard by an
international tribunal either under ICSID or the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) rules.
NAFTA set new standards for governance of free trade agree-
ments subjecting non-compliant nations to significant fines.
NAFTA has been used as a template for bilateral investment
treaties and regional agreements, for example the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) and the Chile-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement.  
International trade agreements are designed to promote the
free movement of goods, services, and capital, and to limit gov-
ernment interference with the free market.  Current U.S. com-
mitments under goods and services treaties arguably limit gov-
ernment measures related to water management. The threat of
international disputes may impact environmental legislation and
conservation efforts or change the dynamic between the permit-
ting agencies and the applicants.  Some environmentalists fear
that trade agreements may allow Parties to export large quanti-
ties of water depleting local supplies for human consumption
and damaging the environment.41
WATER AS A “GOOD” 
The term “good” refers to a commodity that “can be valued
in money and so be the subject of commercial transactions.”42
former U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) Mickey Kantor
stated, “[w]hen water is traded as a good, all provisions of the
agreements governing trade in goods apply,” suggesting that no
special protection has been reserved for water.43 More recent-
ly current USTR Robert Zoellick reiterated this in the context
of bottled water, saying that “nothing in the WTO agreement
requires local authorities to permit bulk extractions of water
that would be contrary to sound resource management and con-
servation or that would create hazards to human health. Of
course, once local authorities decide to permit bulk water to be
extracted from an aquifer, bottled, and sold as an article of
commerce, WTO rules would likely apply to the sale of that
article of commerce.”44 Water was included as a good in the
voluntary GATT treaty45 and NAFTA adopted by reference the
GATT definition of water as a commodity and the GATT rules
for the non-discriminatory use of goods.46 In essence, for pur-
poses of international trade, water is considered a good and
could be treated like any other commodity. 
COVERAGE OF WATER UNDER FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS
There has been a debate about whether water is covered by
NAFTA and whether the trade agreement grants foreign
investors rights to export the resource.  In response to public
outcry, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico released a letter before the
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treaty was signed that may have created confusion by saying
that water is not included in NAFTA or any other treaty.47 This
conflicts with the text of GATT and statements from the USTR,
and illustrates the conflict between the popular demand that
water be given special consideration and the commodity status
of water in trade negotiations.  NAFTA not only adopted the
GATT language regarding water, but it broadened the scope of
the United States commitment.  Mel Clark, former senior trade
negotiator, interpreted NAFTA as stepping beyond GATT by
regulating exports as well as imports.48 Under GATT, a nation
could put high taxes on products or resources that were export-
ed.  GATT was focused on keeping import tariffs low and cus-
toms procedures at the border streamlined.49
After more than 50 years of negotiations, tariffs are at an all
time low.  The new generation of treaties includes services and
attempts to create a predictable, stable, and level playing field
by discouraging or eliminating government measures that are
non-tariff barriers to trade such as performance bonds, residen-
cy requirements, local resource content, and subsidies.50 Article
201 of NAFTA defines government measures as any law, regu-
lation, procedure, requirement, or practice.51 Regulations at all
government levels are presumed to be barriers to trade if they
restrict the free flow of goods, services, or capital.  The burden
is on the government to prove that a law is necessary rather than
enjoying the principle that laws are rationally related to the pub-
lic interest.  In order to provide the regulatory climate for this
strategy, the participating countries agree to a set of internation-
al guidelines that limit the powers of national and sub-national
discretion in lawmaking.52
CAUSES OF ACTION: EXPROPRIATION AND NATIONAL
TREATMENT VIOLATIONS
Expropriation
Trade agreements have historically contained an investor
chapter ensuring that Party countries would not nationalize
investments made within their borders.  Conflicts were resolved
diplomatically between countries.  NAFTA included a novel
form of dispute resolution that gives investors access to an inter-
national tribunal instead of the U.S. or trading Party’s court sys-
tem.  Investors can bring Party nations into arbitration if a gov-
ernment measure interferes with the profits expected from an
investment.  Changes to water permits or the ability to transfer
water after a foreign investor has bought water rights might be
considered “expropriation” if the change interfered with the
return on an investment in the U.S.  If a community levied
export taxes on water to discourage transfers from the basin, it
might be interpreted as an expropriation by a dispute panel.
NAFTA Article 314 specifically prohibits export taxes since
these taxes interfere with the free flow of goods; so the export
tax allowed under GATT as a management option may carry
trade liability.53 It should be noted that although the U.S.
reserved the right to limit the export of logs, it made no explic-
it exception for water.54
Expropriation is similar to the U.S. takings law, but proper-
ty is broadly defined to include market share and future profits,
and compensation may be awarded for partial losses of profit or
loss of a particular use.  There is no clear formula that explains
how such losses might be calculated, but it is clear from past
dispute awards that partial takings will be rewarded.55 Loss of
value due to regulations is not recoverable in the U.S. courts if
value remains and other economic uses exist.  The trade agree-
ment text and past decisions indicate that the arbitration panels
may treat land use planning, the character of ownership rights,
and obligations to share natural resources with participating
nations significantly differently than domestic courts.
National Treatment
NAFTA Chapters 3 and 11 may obligate the Parties to give
each other access to natural resources by requiring “national
treatment,” meaning Party nations must treat foreign investors’
property rights at least as well as domestic investors, or the
nation may have to pay for the right to discriminate.  Any gov-
ernment measure that gives domestic users a competitive advan-
tage might be a violation of national treatment.  The Great Lakes
Annex, for example, may be exposed to some risk due to the
requirement to return water withdrawn to the basin, which effec-
tively bars bulk transfers from the basin.  
THE EXCEPTION FOR EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES
NAFTA also adopts by reference the exception for govern-
ment measures enacted primarily to conserve “exhaustible natural
resources,” which may include water.56 The term is not defined
in either trade instrument, and it has been argued in the literature
that water is recyclable and therefore would not fit in this catego-
ry.  If water is not considered exhaustible then government agen-
cies would not be able to use the exception to justify special treat-
ment for water resources and might face trade sanctions. 
The exceptions to the trade rule recognize a government’s
right to take measures “necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health.”  However, obligations to other Parties qual-
ify that right to regulate.  The exhaustible resources exception
states clearly that these measures may include regulations
“essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in gener-
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"The NAFTA creates no rights to the
natural water resources of any Party to the
agreement …nothing in the NAFTA would
oblige any NAFTA party to either exploit
its water for commercial use or begin
exporting its water in any form.  Water in
its natural state in lakes, rivers, reservoirs,
aquifers, water basins and the like is not a
good or product, it is not traded, and
therefore is not and never has been subject
to the terms of any trade agreement.”   
1993 Joint Statement by the Governments of
Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
al or local short supply,” but goes further to say that “all coun-
tries are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply
of resources.”57 The exception further requires that any restric-
tions to conserve exhaustible resources must be applied equally
to domestic and foreign producers and consumers.  A three-part
test measures the legitimacy of the regulation by considering
whether (1) domestic restrictions are equal to the foreign restric-
tions; (2) the objective is primarily conservation related; and (3)
the land involved is within national jurisdiction.58
If water were defined as an exhaustible resource, NAFTA
Articles 309 and 315 requiring “proportional sharing” of traded
goods would apply.  Like national treatment, proportional shar-
ing severely restricts a government’s right to limit exports in
natural resources once trade has been established.  For example,
if bulk exports of water are allowed up to a certain amount, the
average amount of the previous 36 months would have to be
continued regardless of changes in the availability of water.59 A
country would have to grant a foreign investor continuing
access proportional to the continued access of domestic users
(i.e. a 10% decrease for one must be matched by a 10% decrease
for the other).  These requirements are not assuaged by any
mechanism allowing for changes in circumstances in the export-
ing country.  As a result, a community may choose to restrict
foreign access to water, but the U.S. might have to pay com-
pensation to disappointed investors or service providers that
lose business.  
WATER DISPUTES UNDER TRADE AGREEMENTS
Most NAFTA claims are filed against domestic environ-
mental laws.  Sun Belt, Inc. a U.S. company that had contracted
to move Canadian water to northern California, claimed that a
temporary moratorium on water transfers was an expropriation
of their investment.  While their Canadian partner settled out of
court for several hundred thousand dollars, Sun Belt chose to
file a claim under NAFTA for $10 billion, representing scarcity
profits over time.60 While the case has not proceeded, planners
and regulators would benefit from understanding the conditions
that made such a claim appealing.
BECHTEL V. BOLIVIA
Obtaining an investor-to-state dispute settlement is very
valuable to multinational companies (“MNCs”) that do not
trust the local court systems in the countries in which they
invest or want a lower threshold for takings compensation than
the host country law provides.  As part of its legal strategy,
U.S.-based Bechtel incorporated its subsidiary, Aguas del
Tunari, in the Netherlands when it signed a contract with
Bolivia to provide water and sewerage services.  This action,
taken two years before the dispute arose, earned Bechtel access
to file a $25 million claim61 for compensation under a treaty
between the Netherlands and Bolivia.  The U.S. did not have an
investment treaty with Bolivia that would have forced Bechtel
to sue in the Bolivian courts had it not registered a subsidiary
in the Netherlands.  Bechtel’s sophisticated use of the trade
arena is an important lesson that is sometimes overlooked.
This technique of “forum shopping” creates obligations to
investors from countries that were not negotiated or ratified by
both Parties.  Bolivia made a commitment to the Netherlands,
not the U.S.  Bolivia may have made a different choice had this
loophole been evident at the time of the agreement.  Similarly,
most international arbitration has been between private MNCs
and governments unfamiliar with the international laws inter-
preted by the arbitration panelists.  
RIO GRANDE VALLEY IRRIGATORS V. MEXICO
August 27, 2004 marked the first time a government agency
filed notice to submit a claim under NAFTA Chapter 11 on
investment. Citing frustration with the U.S. State Department’s
slow diplomatic negotiations with Mexico, seventeen irrigation
districts representing farmers, ranchers and landowners, 29
independent water right holders, and a water supply company
came together to demand $500 million from Mexico for expro-
priating their investments in water.62 Private property attorneys
are representing the group in their claim that Mexico illegally
withheld over one million af of water owed to the U.S. under a
1944 treaty. They claim that Mexico diverted the water to help
its farmers increase productivity while driving Texas farmers
out of business through man-made drought.  This kind of
favoritism is a violation of the investor protections of NAFTA,
and the claim alleges both national treatment and expropriation
claims.  At the time of this printing, the parties are within the 90-
day waiting period between the “Notice to Submit a Claim” and
the actual filing.  The dispute settlement rules require a 90-day
cooling off period in hope that the parties will settle the dispute
without arbitration.  If successful, the claimants will receive
compensation from Mexico.  
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF WATER TRANSFER
Though many states and regions are proactively developing
permit and registration systems (e.g. the Great Lakes Annex, the
Florida/Georgia/Alabama river compact, and Texas
Groundwater Districts), many questions surrounding the effects
of water transfers have not been adequately researched.  Little is
known about the economic and environmental impact of the
source or destination communities.  In addition to the obvious
conflict between in-stream water levels for the fishing industry,
communities may lose terrestrial recreation revenues from game
hunting and other ecotourism.  There is also likely to be a mul-
tiplier effect on farming communities that lose employed farm
hands, feed stores, mechanics, and restaurants to water farmers
who remove their land from production.  As Rex Buchanan of
the Kansas Geological Survey observed, there is “an amazing
ripple effect because of the water.  Without water, you don’t
have corn.  Without corn you don’t have feedlots.  And without
feedlots, you don’t have meat packing plants.”63 As a Culberson
County, Texas man faced with the Rio Nuevo project noted,
“when our windmills don’t pump water then we have no value,”
which in turn leads to devaluation of the land, lower tax rev-
enues, and smaller budgets for schools and public services.64 It
is more than a question of prioritizing between using 6,000 af of
water to grow one acre of melons or supplying 6,000 families
with water for a year.
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CONCLUSION
Trade agreements encourage free markets for goods and
services and discourage government interference.  Bulk water
transfers under these conditions require a more coordinated
approach to water management.  There has not been enough
focus on the long-term effects of inter-basin bulk water transfers
or water exports.  By allowing and encouraging increased trans-
fers from agricultural to municipal uses as well as the purchase
of bulk transfers, governments are setting precedents for future
investors.  The cost of the transfers on the open market may be
used to value takings cases when laws are put in place later due
to data suggesting that environmental harm is occurring in
source areas.  Foreign investors might invest without under-
standing the usufructory property status of water or the authori-
ty of the government to manage water for the public good.
Ambiguity in water laws might lead to claims brought under
trade agreements that undermine state and local efforts to
responsibly manage the resource.  In 2005, the administration
plans to sign at least four bilateral investment treaties and two
regional trade agreements with investor-state provisions.  States
and localities would benefit from having a coordinated water
strategy before investment increases and expectations of permit
approvals create compensable takings claims in the U.S. or the
international arena.  
Funding for this research was provided by the FORUM on
Democracy and Trade and the Doris Duke Conservation Fund.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, during the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto,Japan, Koichiro Matsuura, Director General of the UnitedNations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(“UNESCO”), called for the creation of a World Cooperation
Facility.  The Facility, comprised of a network of organizations,
would help resolve water conflicts and aid in transboundary
water governance.1 Director General Matsuura’s proposal came
in response to the increasingly complex and multifaceted system
of global water management, a system sorely needing regula-
tion.  As transnational corporations have become involved in
water privatization projects worldwide, their actions often gen-
erate intense criticism from the affected local communities as
well as numerous organizations around the globe.2
Sweden, long considered one of the strictest environmental
regulators among European Union member countries,3 never-
theless possesses no mechanism to regulate the activities of its
own multinational corporations working abroad.  As a result,
several Swedish-based corporations are involved in water priva-
tization projects outside of their country – projects that would
never be allowed within Sweden.  This article will discuss the
controversy surrounding the privatization of water resources
and the argument that increased regulation is needed, and out-
line the activities of two Swedish corporations which illustrate
the difficulties of maintaining a sustainable water policy in the
face of privatization.
PRIVATIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES
In November 2004, at the Institute for Water Education in
the Netherlands, UNESCO met to organize the World
Cooperation Facility.  UNESCO planned to select an advisory
board, draft the Facility’s goals, and assign tasks to specific par-
ties.4 As of November 2004, there were many uncertainties with
respect to the proposed Facility.  For instance, it was unknown
which of the major players involved in water distribution will be
active in the organization.  It was also unknown whether the
organization will have sufficient authority to resolve global water
distribution and management issues.  What was currently appar-
ent, however, was the need for a powerful authority to regulate
responses to the world’s growing water crisis, including the
increasing use of privatization projects in developing countries.
Without a centralized regulatory body, transnational corporations
involved in privatization are free to operate without fear of reg-
ulation within their home country or abroad.
International Financial Institutions (“IFIs”) support pri-
vatization as a solution to water management issues and pro-
vide arguments in support of privatizing water systems, such
as the following:
• The private sector is more likely than the government
to adequately maintain natural resources because it
possesses sufficient financial resources;
• The private sector has the technical expertise and
aptitude to efficiently manage resources; 
• Financial incentives are built into private sector con-
tracts to encourage better performance and service; 
• Increased investment in resources would improve
access and availability, particularly in rural areas; 
• A consumer user fee encourages responsible usage of
scarce resources.5
There are equally powerful arguments against privatization,
however, such as:
• Those funding privatization projects may not ade-
quately plan for sustainability, leaving poverty strick-
en rural areas suffering because long-term investment
in resources becomes infeasible and unprofitable;
• Increased prices of essential resources can lead to
increased social conflict and unrest; 
• The commercialization of resources and operations
can lead to increased risk of corruption;
• Requiring the poorest members of society to pay for
essential resources rather than providing it to them
based on need is fundamentally unfair and unjust.6
The support of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) for
increased privatization of natural resources is illustrated by the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), effective as
of February 1995, which requires the “progressive liberaliza-
tion” of services such as education, health care, and water dis-
tribution.7 Proponents of GATS claim that privatization will
benefit the poor by putting services into the free market thereby
increasing competition and decreasing costs.  Many opponents
to privatization argue, however, that privatization can actually
lead to increased costs and many impoverished communities are
no longer able to afford these services.8 The shift to corporate
control of services, like water distribution, may ultimately lead
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to taxpayers having to pay higher fees to the corporation for the
services, higher taxes to the government to subsidize the corpo-
ration’s investment, or higher taxes to clean up the environmen-
tal damage often caused by the corporations.9
Many argue that it is inhumane of the WTO and IFIs to
enable multinational corporations to capitalize on a basic
human need.10
SWEDEN – A CASE STUDY
The following examples discuss two Swedish corporations
that are involved in water privatization activities.
ABB
In 1988, ABB formed out of a merger between the Swedish
company, Asea, and the Swiss company, Brown Boveri.  The
firm’s activities are engineering and technology, one aspect of
which is power generation, including hydropower.  ABB’s divi-
sions act as primary equipment suppliers for many dams around
the world, and ABB plants currently account for about 20% of
the total world hydroelectric capacity.11
ABB claims a commitment to sustainable development.
The corporation asserts that it meets or exceeds the local envi-
ronmental legislation in the countries where it operates.
Contrary to ABB’s assertions, however, it often falls far short of
meeting these standards.  One example is ABB’s involvement in
carbon-offset trading.12 The corporation constructs hydropow-
er plants in the global south and then trades the carbon emis-
sions saved by hydropower with countries in the global north,
thereby allowing them to continue operations without reducing
their own carbon emissions.  The result is the global south being
forced to suffer the effects of dams and carbon sinks, while the
global north makes no effort to reduce carbon emissions.13
Another example of ABB’s controversial projects is the
Bakun Dam in Malaysia.  ABB’s involvement with the Bakun
Dam included a contract to supply all necessary electrical equip-
ment, including six 420 megawatt generators costing a total of
$3 billion – the largest contract in ABB’s history.  Records show
that ABB failed to consult its own environmental impact panel
before bidding on the contract, even though the potential for a
severe environmental impact was apparent.14 Furthermore,
ABB failed to discuss the effects of the dam with local commu-
nities and refused to allow access to the company’s environ-
mental impact report.15
Opposition to the dam was pervasive.  Within Malaysia, a
collection of 40 groups joined to form the Coalition of
Concerned NGOs (“Coalition”) to oppose the dam.  The
Coalition attempted to meet with ABB representatives to deliv-
er a memorandum outlining their concerns about the dam, but
ABB refused to meet with the group.  As a result, the Coalition
claimed that ABB violated their own policy of open communi-
cation with parties interested in ABB projects.  That led the
Coalition to question ABB’s business ethics, and prompted the
Coalition’s statement below: 
Sweden, which is ABB’s registered home country, has
long abandoned large-scale hydroelectric projects
because of the detrimental environmental and social
effects of such dams.  In the light of this policy, how
does the company justify dumping such unacceptable
technology onto Malaysia? The Prime Minister has
often highlighted this sort of unethical practice of
Western multinational companies. It is clearly not in
our best interests to accept such discarded technology
by the West.16
In addition to local opposition, ABB’s involvement in the
Bakun dam brought widespread international protest.  Human
rights and environmental groups around the world advocated for
ABB’s withdrawal from the project, accusing the corporation of
hypocrisy and of violating its own commitment to sustainability
and transparency.17 These actions ultimately led the project
developers to withdraw ABB’s contract,18 and the dam project is
currently on hold while it is reviewed for economic viability.19
ABB’s activities in Malaysia illustrate what many argue is
one fundamental problem with privatization.  The company
would not have been able to operate in a similar fashion had this
project been in Sweden, and there is no regulatory mechanism
in place to control their activities abroad in order to prevent
environmental harm.  
SKANSKA
Skanska, founded in 1887, is currently the largest
Scandinavian construction group.  A few of the corporation’s
shareholders include Industrivarden, Inter IKEA, and
Swedbank.  In recent years, an average of 70 percent of
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Sweden, long considered
one of the strictest
environmental regulators
among European Union
member countries,
nevertheless possesses no
mechanism to regulate the
activities of its own
multinational
corporations working
abroad.
Skanska’s operations occurred outside Sweden.  Net sales in
1998 were $7.5 billion.20
Skanska makes broad claims to its environmental friendli-
ness.  For example, Claes Bjork, Skanska CEO, commented
regarding Skanska’s selection of projects: 
In some cases, Skanska should refrain from participat-
ing in a project.  This may be true, for example, when
we believe that a project’s negative environmental or
social consequences will be too large.  In recent years,
we have refrained from bidding on a number of proj-
ects for these and other reasons.  When we decide to
submit a tender and receive an assignment to carry out
a project, we must be able to accept this responsibility.
We cannot hide behind official permits or the terms of
our contract with the client.21
This comment, however, is inconsistent with Skanska’s
business activities.  Like ABB, Skanska has been involved in
the construction of controversial dam projects around the
world, such as its recent bid on the contract to construct the
Ilisu dam in Turkey, which will require the resettlement of at
least 25,000 people.22
Recently, Skanska has also been involved in another highly
controversial project, the privatization of the Ghanaian water
system.  Pursuant to the World Bank’s policy, one of Ghana’s
loan conditions mandates preparations for the handover of water
management in the nation’s large urban areas to the private sec-
tor.23 Nine firms from Sweden, Britain, France, and the
Netherlands bid successfully on the project.  Skanska was one
such bidder.  However, Ghanaians are refusing to sell their water
without a fight.24
In 2001, Accra, Ghana hosted the National Forum on Water
Privatization.  This meeting of concerned organizations and
individuals produced the Ghana National Coalition Against the
Privatization of Water (”the Coalition”).  The Coalition drafted
the Accra Declaration, which criticized the World Bank’s man-
date and called for numerous groups such as the government,
civil rights organizations, and the Ministry of Health to help
block the impending privatization. 
Statistics show that 50 percent of Ghanaians earn less than
$1 per day and 40 percent live below the national poverty
line.25 In addition, thirty-five percent of Ghanaians lack
access to clean drinking water, while poor households in sever-
al communities in Accra spend up to 25 percent of their income
on drinking water.26 Many argue that privatization may actu-
ally worsen this situation, given the possibility of increased
prices and decreased access. 
Thus far, the Coalition has managed to fight the project,
force several of the bidding companies to withdraw their sup-
port, and block privatization. In response to the massive public
outcry, the World Bank has come forward with a new proposal,
one that would offer the bidding corporations a three-year serv-
ice contract as opposed to a ten-year lease.27 The Coalition
argues, however, that a service contract is even more dangerous
than a lease.  While a lease would be based on the project’s suc-
cess, a service contract would require the government of Ghana
to assume all of the risks by guaranteeing payment to the
investing corporations. 
Skanska’s involvement in such a controversial project
seems contrary to the company’s professed commitment to envi-
ronmentally and socially sound investments.  In the case of the
Ghana project, the World Bank is actually bearing the brunt of
the protests, which enables Skanska to avoid both regulatory
action at home as well as negative publicity.  
FUTURE ACTION
Sweden has long been considered as a strong example of
fair environmental practices. As such, the Swedish government
should take steps to increase the regulatory control it has over
Swedish companies engaged in privatization projects abroad,
many of which could cause significant environmental harm.
Additionally, Swedish citizens can take steps to demand greater
accountability of its corporations for their activities abroad.  The
following steps could be taken by the government and citizens
of Sweden – of any country with similar concerns – to influence
global water policy: 
• Swedish shareholders in corporations such as ABB
and Skanska can demand increased information about
the company’s investment projects abroad and possi-
bly demand that the company refrain from acting; 
• Swedish citizens can demand increased transparency
of all participants in privatization projects, including
governments, IFIs, and corporations;
• As a donor country to the World Bank, Sweden can
demand that the Bank stop using the privatization
requirement as a condition on loans; 
• Sweden can support the recommendations of the
World Commission on Dams;28
• Sweden can support the requirement of obtaining
prior informed consent from communities that will be
affected by privatization policies. 
CONCLUSION
When addressing concerns about water privatization,
accountability must be emphasized. Whether it is through gov-
ernment regulation, shareholder pressure, or World Bank policy,
the private sector cannot be permitted to take over and manage
water resources in a manner that will not be sustainable. 
The U.N. General Assembly has declared the years from
2005-2015 as the International Decade for Action, “Water for
Life.”29 The establishment of a Water Cooperation Facility will
promote dialogue and consensus among those actors involved in
water management and distribution.  The creation of this Water
Cooperation Facility lends hope that the global water crisis may
ultimately be averted, and that the world is capable of moving
towards equitable and sustainable water polices. 
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INTRODUCTION
Increasing access to water, a Millennium DevelopmentGoal, can have a substantial impact on education, health,and economic livelihoods. Increasing access to water can
also increase access to other basic needs such as food. With such
a wide range of potential impacts from the water sector, it is crit-
ical to expand decision-making to include constituencies for the
poor and for the environment. A more open and transparent
process for involvement in water decision-making processes
would better identify appropriate goals for effective water man-
agement and conservation. 
In 1992, over 170 governments assembled at the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro and affirmed the importance of pub-
lic access to information, participation, and justice in decision-
making in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development. Ten years later, governments of the world
reaffirmed this commitment at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (“WSSD”). Although many govern-
ments have developed laws related to access to information,
public participation, and access to justice, implementation of
these rights has been weak. 
The absence of information or mechanisms for participation
and redress can result in decisions that adversely impact,
exclude, and are consequently opposed by, affected communi-
ties. Such decisions are rarely effective and are frequently ille-
gitimate and unjust. They undermine the ability to integrate envi-
ronmental concerns into development processes. As the experi-
ence with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making, and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters (“Aarhus Convention”) in Member States indicates, no
country has fully developed policies or the organizational capac-
ity to implement all of the pillars of Principle 10.1
Assessments using a common framework of indicators can
help identify critical gaps. Civil society organizations can col-
lect and analyze the necessary information on the status of the
whole system, both in terms of policy development and organi-
zational capacity. However, the results of the assessments will
not lead to policy or organizational change at a national level
without a broad national constituency, and at the international
level without a global constituency, and mechanisms for coop-
eration, assistance and accountability. The Access Initiative2
and the Partnership for Principle 103 are potential vehicles for
both identifying the shortfalls in water governance and engag-
ing all stakeholders in a constructive dialogue on ways to build
good governance through a collaborative approach.
IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS ISSUES
IN THE WATER SECTOR
Over the past decade, many countries have begun to rethink
how their utility sectors are organized, including whether or not
to open their sectors to market competition and foreign invest-
ment. The water sector is one such utility, with significant social
and economic importance. With an estimate that close to one-
half of the world’s population will live under conditions of
water stress or scarcity by 2025, conflicts and potential human
rights abuse over water are expected to increase dramatically.
Already, conflict over privatization of water has led to violent
protest in several countries. And in the first round of national
assessments undertaken by The Access Initiative (“TAI”),
access to information about water quality emerged as a key area
for improvement in most countries.4
The water policies that countries adopt determine whether
private investment will result in projects and technologies that
improve water efficiency and expand water services to the rural
and urban poor. For this reason it is critical to develop mecha-
nisms that citizens and public interest groups can use to keep
governments accountable for the decisions they make about a
sector that delivers basic human services. 
Increased civil society engagement can serve as a vehicle to
integrate social and environmental goals in approaches to water
management, and as an instrument of accountability. It will help
ensure involvement and ownership of decisions by local popula-
tions and address the needs of the poor, the people whose opin-
ions and ideas are most often muted in development decisions.
Broad access to information about water management
allows people to find out whether they can use the water avail-
able to them for drinking, swimming, irrigating their crops, or
fishing. With that knowledge, people can make informed choic-
es and protect themselves from harm. 
Information about water may also mobilize public opinion
and urge polluters and governments to reduce pollution and to
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improve water quality. Initial TAI research found that the public
rarely has easy access to useful information about the quality of
drinking and surface water.5 As a result, individuals and com-
munities cannot protect themselves from contaminated water or
monitor the improvement of its quality. 
ASSESSING ACCESS ISSUES
The current TAI toolkit of indicators measures both law
and practice in decisions that affect the environment.6 Table 1
lists the categories of indicators that teams may use to assess
access to information and public participation under the cur-
rent methodology.7 The World Resources Institute is beginning
to develop an indicator methodology for civil society coali-
tions to assess information disclosure, transparency, and
accountability specifically in the water sector based on the TAI
methodology. 
This paper is based on the assessments carried out under the
current TAI methodology8 in two ways. First, a number of the
current indicators assess access issues in the water sector, such
as access to information from systems to monitor water quality.
Second, teams may choose water-related case studies when they
assess the practice of access to information, public participation,
and access to justice. TAI-Hungary, for example, selected a
water case for evaluation of information disclosure in environ-
mental emergencies. The case study is included below to pro-
vide a glimpse into an entire process, including the myriad
points at which public access to information is important.
INITIAL TAI RESULTS IN THE WATER SECTOR:
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
As Table 2 shows,9 the TAI pilot teams assessed eight cases
to evaluate the quality and accessibility of information on water
quality. The assessments revealed considerable differences in
the performance of government agencies in providing informa-
tion to the public about drinking or surface water quality.10
Collectively, performance in providing water quality infor-
mation scored weak. This should be contrasted to assessment of
information disclosure and public participation regarding air
quality found to be strong by the assessment teams.11 The 2004
TAI assessment of Estonia revealed that dissemination of drink-
ing water data is not very developed if compared to air moni-
toring data.12 The TAI-Estonia team considered that one of the
reasons is perhaps that air monitoring belongs to the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of the Environment (where several trainings and
projects have been carried out to implement the Aarhus
Convention), but drinking water falls under the control of the
Ministry of Social Affairs.13
The TAI pilot teams found that the quality of the system for
providing water quality information depended on how the moni-
toring networks are coordinated. Monitoring systems can cover a
single urban area, as in Mexico or Indonesia; entire countries, as
in Hungary and Thailand; or large regions within a country, such
as the state of California in the United States. The Hungarian and
Thai experiences indicated that unified and integrated systems
provide a more coherent picture of water quality and present less
of a challenge to obtaining information.14
Information technologies can facilitate public access to
information. Websites increasingly provide an opportunity for
the public to learn more about water quality monitoring issues.
In California, for example, a website for the Environmental
Justice Coalition for Water encourages citizens to become
involved in monitoring the water quality in their communities.
Teams in five countries (Hungary, India, Mexico, Thailand, and
Uganda) found no active dissemination of data on drinking
water quality for the public on the Internet or in the press. In
Mexico and Uganda, teams could not obtain the data at all; in
India, data could be obtained only through a personal contact.15
However, it is important to bear in mind that Internet access
is not universal. Governmental agencies that provide informa-
tion only through the Internet are in fact reaching a very limited
number of people. In most countries, for example, only 10% or
less of the public may access the Internet.16
In addition, providing information through the Internet does
not guarantee that the information is complete or is the type of
information needed by citizens to make important decisions for
themselves and their families. For example, the TAI-Ukraine
team17 studied a case involving groundwater pollution in five
settlements of the Pervomaysk district of the Mykolayiv oblast
caused by a number of extremely toxic chemical agents in 2000
(the so called “Accident in Boleslavchik”). Among all of the
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TABLE 128
CATEGORIES OF ACCESS TO
INFORMATION
AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Information about environmental emergencies: Questions on the timeliness
of public notice; breadth, quality, and content of information distributed; and
investigation and monitoring aimed at preventing future incidents.
Information about water quality: Questions on the comprehensiveness of
monitoring, as well as distribution and accessibility of monitoring data.
Information about environmental performance of industrial facilities:
Questions on legal mandates for reporting, including compliance reporting;
standardization, periodicity, and specificity of reporting; availability of
exemptions for confidential information; release and transfer data manage-
ment; and dissemination.
CATEGORIES OF ACCESS TO DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
Policy-Making Decisions
Participation in the formulation of Sector or Regional Policies, Plans, and
Programs: Questions on the timelines and scope of public notice; breadth of
consultation in drafting and formulation; lead-time for public comments on
proposals; feedback and transparency in communication of final decisions;
and accessibility of performance monitoring and review procedures.
Project-Related Decisions
Participation in Concessions, Facility Siting, and Environmental Permitting:
Questions on the accessibility of rules governing award procedures; timeli-
ness and scope of notice of intent to award concession or permit; degree of
consultation or input in selection/award criteria; transparency of award
process and final decision on award; accessibility of performance monitoring
and review procedures; and accessibility of close-out or remediation plan.
indicators, the highest score was given to the presence of
information about environmental emergencies on the
Internet. This type of information is freely located on the
website of the Ministry on Emergencies of Ukraine.
However, the public had no access to on-line information
about the impact of this environmental emergency on
people’s health and environment, particularly about its
effect on the quality of drinking water.18
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
In addition to assessing access to information, the
TAI pilot teams applied indicators to evaluate a number of
characteristics of public participation in specific decision-
making cases.19 The overall findings from the TAI pilot
tests on public participation are in
Table 3. 
In developing the methodology,
TAI concluded that three types of
legal instruments and interpretations
form the basis for participation: (1)
constitutional guarantees supportive
of public participation in decision-
making; (2) provisions for notice and
comment in sectoral policy-making;
and (3) public participation provisions
in environmental impact assessments
(“EIAs”). Table 4 summarizes how
well the TAI pilot countries articulat-
ed participation rights in constitution-
al and legal frameworks.20 Among the
nine pilot countries, only Thailand
and Uganda provided an explicit con-
stitutional right to public participa-
tion. The constitutions of the other
seven pilot countries did not contain
explicit guarantees of participation in
decision-making. Legislation in only
four of the pilot countries—Indonesia,
Mexico, South Africa, and the United
States—contained provisions estab-
lishing public notice and comment in
decision-making for sectoral policies.
The absence of public participation
provisions for sectoral policies in the
remaining pilot countries inhibits the
integration of environmental concerns
into decisions on policies and plans in
such sectors as water and other infra-
structure development.21
The TAI pilot tests indicated that
given the weakness of legal provisions
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TABLE 2 CASE SELECTIONS EVALUATING QUALITY ANDACCESSIBILITY OF WATER QUALITY INFORMATION29
Country Case Selection Quality30 Accessibility
Hungary31 Information from four networks:
KoFe – the Environment Inspectorate has 12 regional
institutes that monitor surface water quality
ANTSZ – County Health Officers Service Network
has 19 institutes and supervises drinking water quality
VIZIG – Water Management Directorate
RIV – regional emission analyzing stations cover
entire country
Intermediate Weak
India Information from the rivers network (“MINARS”) as
well as Ministry of Environment and Forests, Central
Pollution Control Board and 11 state Pollution Control
Boards.
Assessed drinking water supply in municipalities of:
Gwalior, Chiplun, Chandigarh
Intermediate Weak
Indonesia32 Information from the Jakarta Clean River Program
monitoring the Ciliwung River, a primary source of
water for Jakarta.
Weak Weak
Mexico33 Information from the Lerma-Cutzamala Monitoring
System, the principal water supply for Mexico City.
Strong Weak
South Africa Information from RandWater, a national supplier of
drinking water.
Intermediate Intermediate
Thailand Bottled water information from the Food and Drug
Administration.
Tap water information from: Metropolitan Waterworks
Authority, Provincial Waterworks Authority, Universal
Utilities, a private water supply company in
Chachengsoa province
Weak Weak
Uganda Information from a system monitoring the wastewater
discharged into the Rukoki River (A source of water
for local communities and their livestock) by the
Kasese Cobalt Company Ltd., which extracts cobalt
from pyrite about 400 km from Kampala.
Information from a drinking water monitoring system
in Kampala.
Weak Weak
United States:
California
Information from the California Department of Health
Services, Division of Drinking Water and
Environmental Management, which oversees
8,700 public water systems; 35 county health
departments cover smaller systems.
Intermediate Strong
TABLE 3 ACCESS TO PARTICIPATIONSCORECARD34
Type Quality Access ib i l i ty Over All
Legal guarantees and provi-
sions for participation
Intermediate
National policy-making on
environmental issues
Strong Intermediate Intermediate
Regional, state, or local deci-
sion-making (state or local
planning efforts)
Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate
Specific projects with or with-
out an EIA process
Weak Weak Weak
National policy-making outside
the environment
Weak Weak Weak
for participation, practice can also be expected to be weak or, at
best, intermediate. It is also likely that there are differences in the
performance of different line agencies, since common standards
for participation in sectoral policy-making are generally absent.22
In the original pilot tests, the TAI South African team used
a water case study at the national level. They found that the
water catchment maps and policy documents were both pub-
licly accessible in physical locations. In South Africa, all
regional water authorities posted draft maps and demarcations
of water catchment areas for public comment and feedback.
Considerable efforts were also made to consult with affected
communities and public interest groups, and sufficient lead-
time was provided for public comment, so South Africa scored
strong on both quality and accessibility.23 This may be attrib-
uted to the South African government’s identification of water
as a priority area.
Across all project cases in the TAI pilot assessments,
regardless of whether or not they included an EIA, most public
authorities scored weak regarding accessibility in communicat-
ing to affected communities or public interest organizations that
plans or processes were under way to grant an operating license,
award a concession, or approve a development activity. The
national teams also found that the difficulty of obtaining the
rules on how permits, concessions, or operating licenses are
awarded varied considerably—some were accessible on the
Internet, while others require individuals requesting the infor-
mation to justify their need for such information. Consequently,
opportunities for the public to define the scope or
parameters of particular projects or development activi-
ties were generally absent. In some cases, the failure to
actively engage affected populations early on in the def-
inition of individual development activities generated
serious social conflicts. The Thai national team record-
ed severe and drawn-out conflicts among the govern-
ment, project sponsors, and local communities regard-
ing the approval of the Klong Dan wastewater treatment
plant. The Thai analysis indicates that the absence of
any public input when the national government defined
the scope of the project and alternatives is at the root of
ongoing conflicts about the plant’s siting and operation.
Overall, most project-level cases failed to engage exter-
nal stakeholders in the definition of the scope of the
project, the identification of mitigation measures, or the
exploration of alternatives.24
Recent TAI assessments indicate weaknesses in
public participation in the water sector. For example,
TAI-Estonia evaluated the inclusion of the public in
drafting water management plans for nine sub-basins in
Estonia. In the case of the Pandivere basin, the TAI-
Estonia team found that the public was invited to partic-
ipate in drafting the water management plan, was given
reasonable time for commenting, and was incorporated
into the final decision. However, from the perspective of
engaging the minorities, the opportunity for public par-
ticipation was negative. No special efforts were made to
invite Russian-speaking people (approximately 5% or
less of the population in the basin) to participate in the plan’s
development. Although the law prescribes conditions for partic-
ipation (e.g., time for commenting, number of meetings, etc.),
the law does not require any measures to involve minorities.25
In evaluating other sectors having significant impacts on
water, initial results show access to public participation is weak-
er than access to information. In conducting an assessment in
2004, the TAI-Ukraine team found it difficult to obtain empiri-
cal material related to public participation for the chemical sec-
tor. The team focused on the role of the public in the develop-
ment of the National Environment Health Action Plan and the
January 10, 2002 Law of Ukraine “On drinking water and water
supply system.” The team found that there was no public partic-
ipation in developing the above documents for the chemical sec-
tor, however, all of the documents were available and accessible
to the public.26
CASE STUDY: 
A WATER EMERGENCY FOR HUNGARY
The TAI-Hungary team’s27 case study in assessing access
to information and public participation in Hungary focused on
the cyanide pollution of the River Tisza. The disaster occurred
on January 30, 2000 near Baia Mare in Romania when a strong-
ly poisonous, high concentration cyanide compound used dur-
ing the preparation of ore entered into the tributaries of the Tisza
River from the non-ferrous metal mine of the Australian-
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TABLE 4 ARTICULATION OF PARTICIPATION RIGHTSIN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS35
Indicators Weak Intermediate Strong
Constitutional
guarantees to
public
participation
Constitution does
not explicitly
guarantee right to
public participation
in decision-making:
Chile, Hungary,
India, Indonesia,
Mexico, South
Africa, United States
No value offered:
only two indicator
choices were
“strong” and “weak”
Constitution
guarantees the right
to public
participation in
decision-making:
Thailand, Uganda
Comprehensivene
ss of notice and
comment in
different types of
decision-making
processes
Types of policy- and
project-level
decisions requiring
public notice and
comment are not
specified:
Indonesia, Thailand
Types of project
level decisions
requiring public
notice and comment
are specified, but
types of policy-level
decisions are not:
Chile, Hungary,
India, Uganda
Types of both
policy- and project-
level decisions
requiring public
notice and
comment are
specified: Mexico,
South Africa,
United States
Public notice and
comment
requirements for
EIAs
No requirement for
public notice and
comment for EIAs:
Thailand
EIAs require public
notice and comment
at final stage:
Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Mexico,
Uganda
EIAs require public
notice and
comment at various
stages: Chile, South
Africa, United
States
Source: Access Initiative National Team Reports
Romanian joint venture Aurul SA Baia Mare Co. There was a
breach in the tailing dam as a result of the pressure of accumu-
lated ice. The leaking water and slime fell over the protection
dam of the trap pool for almost two days. Interventions to
reduce the pollution were unsuccessful. The pollution proceed-
ed from the stream to the Szamos, then to the Tisza River, reach-
ing the Hungarian border on February 1,2000. The cyanide pol-
lution devastated the entire Tisza in Hungary until only a dead
river and a mass of dead fish remained.
A month later in the middle of March, several dams burst at
Baia Borsa, Romania, resulting in different metals (e.g., copper,
lead, and zinc) entering the rivers. This pollution series was the
most serious environmental disaster that ever occurred in
Hungary. The “bed washing” effect of the following all-time
high flood wave fortunately diminished significantly the extent
of the damages.
The TAI-Hungary team selected this case study because
the pollution affected the sphere of authority of all the public
administration bodies, with all of them playing a role in assess-
ing and mitigating the damage and informing the public. The
Government Commissioner’s Office coordinated all of this.
A half-day before the “cyanide wave” reached Hungary, the
regional water management directorates were informed of the
emergency first. The Romanian authorities sent the first meas-
uring results in the afternoon of January 31, 2000 to the Upper-
Tisza-Region Environmental Inspectorate. The first sign arriv-
ing from the Romanian part came on characteristically informal
channels: both the disaster relief and the water management
authorities consulted each other first confidentially, by tele-
phone. A “higher level” official notification arrived only days
later. It was extremely difficult to determine who was informed
and how information was disseminated about the emergency. 
The disaster relief organs immediately took the necessary
measures in order to inform the population and to prevent acci-
dents. With the help of local mayors, the local civil defense
offices informed the public by loudspeaker about the necessary
precautionary measures and about the water-withdrawal, usage
of wells, and fishing prohibitions that entered into force. The
press communicated these same warnings the following day.
The effectiveness of information dissemination is inferred from
the fact that no one came into contact and fell ill from the con-
taminated water.
The water management and the environmental authorities
disseminated information to the public about the extent of the
pollution and its consequences. The Upper-Tisza-Region Water
Management Directorate communicated the daily water-quality
measuring results. The director of the Upper-Tisza-Region
Environmental Inspectorate decided to publish all of the infor-
mation while at the same time reserving the right to make state-
ments for himself alone, thus securing the control of authentici-
ty of outgoing information. 
A number of agencies took action. For example, the county
health officers measured the quality of drinking water while the
Fish-breeding Research Institute examined the survival of indi-
vidual fish species. However, they played less of a role in
informing the public. Non-governmental organizations estab-
lished their own information dissemination system.
A coordinating discussion took place on February 2, 2000 at
the National Disaster Relief Chief Directorate with the participa-
tion of competent experts from the Ministry for Environment, the
National Water Management Chief Directorate, the National
Health Officer’s Service, and the National Disaster Relief Chief
Directorate about the situation and the necessary measures. The
authorities reacted quickly and professionally, according to the
unanimous judgment of the public administration experts inter-
viewed by the TAI-Hungary assessment team. While at the local
level, the TAI-Hungary assessment team found the cooperation
among the partner institutions working on the same field appro-
priate as well. This was also confirmed by the non-governmental
organizations. Coordination problems appeared instead at the
higher public administrative level. In particular, the Minister of
Environment tried to reduce the seriousness of the situation in
the first few days.
In addition, in the first few days, the public and non-gov-
ernmental organizations considered the information confused
and unsatisfactory. One could not assess exactly what type and
what magnitude of pollution existed; governmental statements
appeared to contradict the pictures showing masses of dead fish.
The Ministry of Environment’s website had data on the situation
but at some point, for unknown reasons, the information was
removed from the site.
On February 15, 2000, the government appointed a Tisza
Government Commissioner to strengthen coordination among
the responsible departments. However, from the beginning, the
new office could not carry out its task, as it did not have clear
authority or financial resources. In terms of territorial insti-
tutes, it was unclear who was responsible for reporting; for
example, the inspectorate was informed that the Ministry
reports to the government commissioner’s office, but in spite
of this, the office expected them to give reports.
Simultaneously, the new institute was always open and helpful
to non-governmental organizations. In contrast to the quick
and adequate measures of public dissemination of the disaster,
there was little information after the disaster and concerning
lifting the restrictions. This was partly caused again by the
unclear state of the spheres of authority, but by this time also
the interest of the press diminished.
The Ministry for Environment controlled the assessment of
the consequences and the longer-term effects. The Ministry
ordered studies directly from VITUKI (Water Management
Scientific Research Institute), and partly supported those car-
ried out by non-governmental organizations and research insti-
tutes. Once prepared, however, the materials remained the
Ministry’s intellectual property and the research results were
not published. The Government Commissioner’s Office even
had difficulty obtaining the VITUKI study. It was not published
despite repeated requests by non-governmental organizations.
Through their own channels, the environmentalists tried to
spread the results—information that they obtained only through
personal contacts.
38WINTER 2004 
39 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
1 REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER, SZENTENDRE, HUNGARY, DOORS TO
DEMOCRACY: PAN-EUROPEAN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT TRENDS AND
PRACTICE IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS (June
1998).
2 The Access Initiative (“TAI”) is a global coalition of civil society
groups dedicated to promoting the implementation of Principle 10 and
closing the gaps between international commitments to information and
participation and national laws and practices. TAI helps civil society
organizations generate national-level assessments and monitor govern-
ment performance through the use of an indicator toolkit developed by
TAI partners. The interactive CD-ROM toolkit, Assessing Access to
Information, Participation and Justice for the Environment: A Guide
(Version 1.1), helps non-governmental organizations and governments
identify ways that their countries can improve public access to informa-
tion, participation and justice. National assessments of law and practice
for access were conducted in nine pilot-test countries with launches
occurring in at least 20 more countries in 2004-2005. More information
is available at www.accessinitiative.org.
3 In creating the Partnership for Principle 10 (“PP10”), civil society
organizations joined with governments, regional and global organizations
at the World Summit on Sustainable Development to translate the results
of TAI assessments into improved policy and practice. The PP10 builds on
TAI, but is a distinct entity. While TAI is a civil society coalition focused
on independent assessments of the access principles at the national level,
PP10 works with a wide range of stakeholders including governments,
international organizations, UN agencies, and civil society to review poli-
cy recommendations and translate the results of the assessments into law
and practice. More information is available at www.pp10.org.
4 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, CLOSING THE GAP: INFORMATION,
PARTICIPATION, AND JUSTICE IN DECISION-MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
(2002).
5 Id.
6 Practice is assessed through case studies that national NGO coalitions
select. The methodology specifically measures the following: comprehen-
siveness and quality of the general legal framework for access to infor-
mation, participation, and justice; degree of available access to selected
types of information about the environment; degree of public participa-
tion in decision-making processes in selected sectors by actors in the
development process at various levels; the accessibility of justice, both
redress and remedy; and, comprehensiveness and quality of capacity build-
ing efforts to encourage informed and meaningful public participation.
7 In 2001-2003, TAI conducted pilot assessments in nine countries to test
its methodology and identify needs for improved access. The results
described here are taken from the assessments found at www.accessinitia-
tive.org and the publication Closing the Gap, supra note 4. TAI has
developed draft access to justice indicators that are being pilot tested in
countries across the globe. Results will be available in early 2005.
Finalization of the indicators will be carried out in 2005 as well as their
incorporation into the TAI tool-kit.
8 This paper highlights the water-related results from the pilot tests. This
paper also provides information from more recent TAI assessments car-
ried out in 2004 by TAI teams in Ukraine and Estonia, and a repeat
assessment in Hungary.
9 For the complete TAI assessments, more information is available at
http://www.accessinitiative.org.
10 Supra note 4.
11 Id.
12 Stockholm Environmental Institute-Tallinn led the TAI-Estonia assess-
ment. The team assessed access to drinking water monitoring data in a
small town in Southeast Estonia, where drinking water problems are
known to exist and these problems represent the case of the whole
region. The town is also representative in the terms of administrative
capacity. The team found that there is a strong legal mandate for drinking
water monitoring, but there is a problem with making this data public.
The Ministry of Social Affairs has initiated a project for disseminating
ENDNOTES: Improving Water Governance
The main task of the Tisza Government Commissioner’s
Office was to prepare an international convention about similar
cases with a sphere of authority covering the whole catchment
area. Neither they nor other institutes made a comprehensive
retrospective evaluation about the measures of the “acute” peri-
od. A number of departmental authorities carried out evaluations
of the case. However, none of these materials were assembled
into a consistent system. In addition, no common action plan
was prepared for the future.
Information and information dissemination problems arose
in terms of the long-term management of water. It was never
made clear when the disaster was over and what further precau-
tionary measures the local population might need to observe.
The Ministry for Environment kept the studies analyzing the
long-term ecological effects from the public referring to its
intellectual property right. Heated protests by non-governmen-
tal organizations arose as a result of the situation.
CONCLUSION
The TAI assessments carried out thus far to assess access
to information and public participation in decisions affecting
the environment indicate weaknesses in the quality and acces-
sibility of information and participation opportunities in the
water sector. Once the TAI water governance indicators are
developed and used by civil society organizations across the
globe, more information will be available identifying specific
gaps in information disclosure, transparency, and accountabili-
ty. This information will enable civil society, utility managers,
and policy makers to gain systematic understanding of good
process in the water sector, while identifying areas of strength
and relative weakness in governance structures. This will also
enable a dialogue among representatives of government, civil
society, and the private sector in effective water governance as
a means to move beyond the debate over privatization to one
that centers on governments and international/regional institu-
tions implementing good governance practices in the water sec-
tor. The recent case involving the lack of information dissemi-
nation about lead in the water supply of Washington, D.C. indi-
cates that there is much work to be done even in developed
countries to build good governance to ensure healthy water for
people and nature. 
ENDNOTES: Improving Water Governance Continued on page 48
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INTRODUCTION
On December 15, 2002,
1 the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued the final rule2 for
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations3 (“CAFOs”)
under the Clean Water Act. The Clean Water Act has been cred-
ited for significant improvements on water quality,4 but dis-
charges from animal feeding operations and other agricultural
production continue to pose a problem for the nation’s waters.5
A National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”)
permit is required under the Clean Water Act for the addition of
any pollutant from a point source into U.S. waters.6 Under the
NPDES permit requirement, all point sources emitting pollu-
tants must include controls reflecting application of technology-
based requirements and any more stringent controls needed to
meet water quality standards.7 CAFOs, also referred to as feed-
lots or factory farms, are defined as point sources under the
Act,8 but the 1976 CAFO regulation only minimally covered
animal feeding operations and therefore did not adequately pro-
tect water quality.
The 2002 CAFO rule was envisioned to be more stringent
on animal feeding operations than the 1976 CAFO regulation.
Despite this, the Waterkeepers Alliance, the Natural Resources
Defense Council, Sierra Club, and the American Littoral
Society (“environmental petitioners”) have filed a lawsuit that
claims the new CAFO rule violates the Clean Water Act,9 and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may decide the
case as early as Spring of 2005.10 This paper will focus on the
complaint made by the environmental petitioners that the
CAFO rule does not adequately allow for public participation
in the permitting process, particularly in connection to the land
application of animal wastes.11 Wastes from CAFOs are often
applied to adjacent crop fields, which might not be a problem
if the nutrients were applied in amounts that could be utilized
by crops. If wastes are over-applied, however, the residual
wastes are carried away as runoff and can potentially impact
the surface and groundwater. The environmental petitioners
contend that the public is denied access to information related
to the management of land application wastes. Public partici-
pation is especially important to the many residents, often
from low-income and minority populations, who live near
these CAFOs. The water quality degradation associated with
CAFOs can have significant adverse effects on the health and
quality of life of area populations. As every citizen should be
entitled to access to clean water, this paper explores why it is
important to have community residents be active participants
in reviewing the actions of feedlot operators and be an integral
part of the decision-making process on issues that directly
affect their lives.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTS
OF WATER QUALITY DEGRADATION RESULTING
FROM CAFOS
It has been documented that CAFOs cause water quality
degradation through spillage and seepage from the lagoons stor-
ing animal waste12 and from over-application of untreated waste
on adjacent croplands for use as fertilizer.13 CAFOs can house
hundreds to thousands of livestock,14 which produce many tons
of animal waste.15 The nutrients found in these waste products,
particularly nitrogen and phosphorous, are among the leading
contributors to water quality impairment.16 The introduction of
nitrogen and phosphorous into water bodies can lead to eutroph-
ication, depriving fish and other plant and animal life of life-sus-
taining oxygen.17 One of the worst cases illustrating the destruc-
tive impact of excess nutrients is the lagoon spill in North
Carolina that released approximately 22 million gallons of ani-
mal waste and killed massive numbers of fish.18
Salts and heavy metals found in manure, via the animal
feed consumed by livestock, can also make their way into
groundwater and surface water.19 Maintaining the integrity of
groundwater is vitally important as it is the nation’s source of
freshwater and supplies drinking water for 46% of the U.S. pop-
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ACCESS TO CLEAN
WATER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAFO RULE
by Ayako Sato*
*Ayako Sato is a J.D. candidate, May 2007, at American University,
Washington College of Law. Ms. Sato wishes to thank Mr. Julian Inasi for con-
structing a map identifying CAFOs using aerial photography. She also wishes to
thank Mr. and Mrs. Edwards for their help and support.
This map/aerial photo highlights three hog CAFOs in Duplin County, North
Carolina. Two of the CAFOs are situated within a population comprised of
20-30% minority, while the surrounding area has a population of 0-10%
minority. The third CAFO is situated within the area of 0-10%, however, it
borders two areas that have a higher minority representation. For example, a
Census block immediately above this CAFO has a population comprised of
greater than 40% minority.
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ulation.20 Salts and heavy metals can have devastating impacts
on ecosystems and drinking water.21 For instance, metals such
as mercury can bioaccumulate and move up the food chain,
affecting both aquatic and avian wildlife.22 Other pollutants
found in manure include organic matter, solids, pathogens,
volatile chemicals, antibiotics, pesticides, and hormones.23 As
livestock are routinely administered antibiotics and hormones to
increase growth and prevent illnesses, numerous antimicrobal
agents are also making their way into U.S. waterways.24 This is
problematic, as an increase in antimicrobal agents can lead to
the development of antimicrobal-resistant bacterial strains.25
In addition to their potentially devastating effect on
wildlife, CAFOs can also harm human health. Manure can con-
tain more than 150 types of pathogens posing serious risks to
human health.26 Some of these pathogens can be directly trans-
mitted from animal waste to humans via contaminated water.
Most of the documentation on pathogen transmission has been
in connection with occupational studies, such as studies show-
ing how leptospira species (Weil disease, canicola fever, dairy-
worker fever, swineherds disease) are commonly transmitted
through occupational exposure.27 Although there have not been
extensive studies to directly connect CAFOs with public infec-
tion, outbreaks of E. coli, leptospirosis, and cryptosporidiosis
have been linked to water contamination.28
Nitrogen in drinking water can also impact human health in
a number of ways. It can lead to miscarriages and has been asso-
ciated with stomach and esophageal cancers,29 as well as with
methemoglobinemia, or what is more commonly known as
blue-baby syndrome. Infants can succumb to blue-baby syn-
drome when they ingest nitrate-contaminated drinking water,30
possibly resulting in the infant developing a blue-gray skin color
and potentially leading to coma and even death.31 Nitrogen in
drinking water is especially problematic because it cannot be
removed through conventional drinking water treatment.32
Other health threats caused by manure-polluted waters include
human health impacts associated with shellfish consumption
and recreational contact.33
COMMUNITIES SITUATED NEAR CAFOS
No one wants to live near a CAFO. Not only do they con-
tribute to water quality impairment and affect the health of res-
idents, they produce foul odors, decrease property values, and
generally reduce the quality of life for residents who live
around them. Living near a CAFO is a reality for many people,
however, especially for low-income and minority (in particu-
larly African-American) populations. 
A study examining the spatial location and demographics of
67 industrial hog operations in Mississippi found that there are
almost three times as many hog CAFOs in African-American
and low-income communities throughout the state of
Mississippi compared to communities that had very little low-
income and minority populations.34 Studies of hog CAFOs in
North Carolina also documented high populations of low-
income and African-Americans situated near CAFOs.35
Living near a CAFO has very serious consequences for
communities already burdened by other economic, social, and
health inequalities and disparities. In terms of health, the North
Carolina study found that residents living near hog CAFOs
reported headaches, runny nose, sore throats, excessive cough-
ing, diarrhea, and burning eyes more frequently than a control
group.36 These findings supported other research suggesting
that residents living near CAFOs are impacted by airborne emis-
sions from hog operations.37 Regarding water quality, hog oper-
ations can potentially increase pathogenic microbal contami-
nants,38 and many households near intensive hog operations
rely on well water as a drinking water source.39 People who rely
on well water are also at greater risk of nitrate poisoning
because they are often not required to have the same monitoring
and treatment requirements as public water sources.40 These
potential health impacts are especially troubling when one con-
The hog industry and other CAFOs are a vital partto North Carolina’s economy.1 In 1995, NorthCarolina suffered six spills from CAFOs result-
ing in 30 million gallons of animal waste spreading into
the state. Five out of the six spills came from hog oper-
ations. A single swine facility was responsible for 22
million gallons, causing the owner of the site to be fined
$104,000. In the wake of the spills, the Governor
ordered thousands of animal waste storage lagoons
inspected. As a result, 124 lagoons were identified
throughout the state as threats due to a high risk of over-
flow or other problems. The state legislature passed a
permitting system along with tighter requirements for
animal feeding operations. These restrictions include
inspections to ensure safe facilities and nutrient levels in
the storage lagoons.2 Nonetheless, the state experienced
another large spill in 1997. After a period of heavy rain-
fall, runoff from a CAFO amounted in 25 million gal-
lons of wastewater flowing into the New River. This
resulted in 10 million dead fish and the degradation of a
17-mile stretch of the river. 
ENDNOTES:
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2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency/Office of the Inspector
General, Animal Waste Disposal Issues (April 21, 1997), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oigearth/reports/1997/hogtable.htm (last visited
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siders that African-Americans are less likely to visit physicians
than whites,41 low-income and minority populations are less
likely to access medical care due to costs,42 and these popula-
tions often lack adequate health care coverage.43
CAFOs can also have socio-economic impacts on commu-
nities. For instance, CAFOs can socially and financially depress
an area. Studies indicate that proximity to CAFOs and the
amount of manure produced on a CAFO can decrease property
values.44 At the same time, proximity to a CAFO can increase
rental rates because of the influx of meatpacking workers.45
Another blow to these communities is the vertical integration of
CAFOs that expand the size of corporate operations while small,
independent farmers disappear. One study suggests that the
harm caused by CAFO growth and consolidation is especially
great for African-American independent farmers.46
BACKGROUND ON THE CAFO RULE AS IT
RELATES TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
As environmentalists, health professionals, EPA officials
and others began to recognize the significant environmental and
public health impacts that CAFOs pose, the hope of the 2002
CAFO rule was that it would curb the amount of pollutants dis-
charged into U.S. waterways. The new CAFO rule, as compared
to the 1976 CAFO regulation, calls for sweeping changes, and
this section will provide background information on the areas of
the new rule that have direct implications on the public partici-
pation requirements of the Clean Water Act. This section is not
meant to be a comprehensive synopsis of the CAFO rule as a
whole, but only as it relates to public participation. Therefore,
the discussion will center on the land application effluent limi-
tation guidelines (“ELGs”) and the Nutrient Management Plans
(“NMPs”) which are the central focus of the environmental peti-
tioners’ argument regarding lack of public participation.
First, there will no longer be an exemption for CAFOs to
obtain NPDES permits if they only discharge in the event of a
25-year, 24-hour storm.47 Under the 1976 CAFO regulation an
animal feeding operation that only discharged during cata-
strophic storm events with a maximum 24-hour precipitation
and a probable recurrence once in every 25 years would not be
considered a CAFO subject to regulation under the rule.48 With
the new CAFO rule, all CAFOs have a mandatory duty to apply
for an NPDES permit even if they only discharge during a large
storm event.49 In other words, CAFOs are required to apply for
an NPDES permit if they have the potential to discharge, not
only if they actually discharge.50 This change will result in more
CAFOs being covered under the NPDES permit system. As part
of that system, ELGs for land applications are set, establishing
the appropriate nutrient uptake of crops by the permitting
authority and requiring that CAFOs develop an NMP.51 Feedlot
operators must develop their NMPs in accordance with the
ELGs.52 The NMP must “appropriately balance the nutrient
needs of crops and potential adverse water quality impacts in
establishing methods and criteria for determining appropriate
application rates.”53
Second, land application of wastes produced on CAFOs
must be covered under the NPDES permit if they enter U.S.
waters. This expansion of the permit system recognizes that
crop fields adjacent to the animal feeding operations are part of
the larger CAFO.54 There had been much debate and confusion
over this given that the Clean Water Act recognizes CAFOs as a
point-source, but at the same time, agricultural run-off is exempt
from the NPDES permit requirement.55 Feedlot operators would
often apply the wastes generated on the CAFO to adjacent crop
fields, but the application of these wastes was not covered due
to the agricultural run-off exemption. The new CAFO rule is
meant to remedy this apparent loophole. The NPDES permit
will cover discharges from both the animal confinement area
and the land application area, however, the rule may still exempt
land applications that are done “in accordance with the site spe-
cific nutrient management practices that ensure appropriate
agricultural utilization of the nutrients.”56 In other words, as
required by the NPDES permit, the feedlot operator prepares an
NMP, and if that operator applies waste in accordance with the
NMP, any discharge resulting from the land application is con-
sidered agricultural run-off.
The environmental petitioners have a problem with this
framework for several reasons. First, the feedlot operator or their
technical consultant will prepare the NMP – the rule does not
require that certified experts be involved in the NMP’s prepara-
tion or review.57 Second, the NMP does not have to be reviewed
or approved by the permitting authority because it is not part of
the permit application.58 A permit application only requires cer-
tification that an NMP has been completed and will be imple-
mented.59 The actual NMP must be kept on-site at the facility
and the feedlot operator must make the NMP available to the
Administrator upon request.60 The environmental petitioners
argue that there is nothing to ensure that NMPs are properly pre-
pared to ensure ELGs will be met,61 and essentially, the CAFO
rule allows discharging feedlots to self-regulate. The worst case
scenario is that the NMP can become an automatic defense for
feedlot operators because if any major discharge occurs, they are
protected from enforcement through the agricultural stormwater
exemption as long as they have a certified NMP on-site.62
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This 2002 U.S. Department of Agriculture/National Agricultural Statistics
Service map highlights, on a national level, the practice of animal waste
application to adjacent crop fields. This practice appears to be most prevalent
in the Mid-Atlantic and Mid-Western states.U
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LACK OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The Clean Water Act specifically requires that a “copy of
each [NPDES] permit application and each permit issued shall
be available to the public.”63 The CAFO rule does not deny pub-
lic access to NPDES permits, but vital information that relates
to the NPDES permit, namely the NMPs, is not made available.
As described in the previous section, NMPs are not required as
part of the permit application process, and therefore, the permit-
ting authority does not necessarily have a copy of the NMP to
make available for public review. Also, because the NMPs are
not a part of the permit and therefore are not government docu-
ments, a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request will not
guarantee that a private citizen can gain access to the NMPs
since private documents cannot be obtained through the FOIA
process. As mentioned previously, the environmental petitioners
argue there is no assurance that feedlot operators are preparing
NMPs so as to prevent over-application of waste on adjacent
crop fields. Without public access to such documents, there can-
not be meaningful public participation since citizens are not
given all of the relevant information regarding the permit. 
In their brief, the environmental petitioners compare the
2002 CAFO rule to the final rule for storm sewer runoff
(“Phase II Rule”) in Environmental Defense Center v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.
2003). Environmental petitioners in that case argued that the
Phase II Rule amounted to a program of self-regulation and
failed to provide adequate public participation.64 The Phase II
Rule allowed small municipal separate storm sewer systems to
fill out a Notice of Intent (“NOI”) as a way of acquiring per-
mission to discharge under a general permit scheme.65 Much
like the CAFO rule, the NOI under this scheme did not have to
be reviewed by EPA, because EPA claimed that NOIs were not
part of the permit and thus not subject to public review.66 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that EPA contra-
vened the Clean Water Act by failing to require NOIs, which
they found to be functional equivalents to NPDES permits, to
be made publicly available for review.67 The environmental
petitioners in the present case claim that the CAFO rule simi-
larly allows feedlot operators to self-regulate and denies appro-
priate public participation.68
As implied by the environmental petitioners, public partic-
ipation serves an important enforcement tool. Their primary
argument is that there is no way for government agencies to
ensure that feedlot operators are preparing their NMPs in such a
way as to protect water quality without the assurances that ade-
quate public participation and scrutiny can provide.
Government agencies have limited resources to enforce envi-
ronmental regulations; only a fraction of emitting and polluting
sources are monitored, and this may not be enough to protect
communities and their environments.69 Because communities
living around emitting facilities are the first to be impacted, they
have a stake in regulatory enforcement at those facilities.70
However, these citizens must be armed with full and open infor-
mation about the environmental issues concerning their health
and environment before they can serve as effective enforcers.
Transparency of information and process are integral compo-
nents to public participation, not only for adequate enforcement
but also to ensure better environmental decision-making.
Public participation not only serves as an enforcement tool,
it also gives the community a sense of contributing to the per-
mitting process in a meaningful way. Having an informed, and
thus empowered, community benefits the government since
communities considering themselves active participants are less
likely to use adversarial tactics to effect change. Conflicts
among stakeholder groups, such as environmentalists, feedlot
operators, and community members can be especially high
when it involves CAFOs. A conflict resolution study done in
Pennsylvania researched CAFOs and Pennsylvania’s Nutrient
Management Act,70 and found that stakeholders’ perceived loss
of control in the decision-making process was the primary
source of conflict.72 The study further found that community
residents are more likely to take legal action and engage in
protest if they feel that they have been treated unfairly.73 People
generally react to loss of control through the use of defensive
mechanisms that they believe will restore a sense of lost con-
trol.74 These feelings are against a backdrop of existing percep-
tions of mistrust towards government officials whom the com-
munity residents feel are aligned with feedlot operators.75 If
community residents are denied access to NMPs, the likelihood
that they will feel left out of the permitting process is surely
guaranteed and perceptions of unfair treatment in the decision-
making process are likely to fester. 
As low-income and minority communities are often situat-
ed near CAFOs, an added dimension to the public participation
debate is presented. Environmental justice76 advocates have
long stressed that low-income and minority communities have
been excluded from meaningful public participation, and
“improving the capacity and opportunity for community groups
to participate in the permitting process is an almost universally
identified step toward achieving environmental justice.”77 In
response to the concerns surrounding lack of community par-
ticipation, the National Environmental Advisory Council
(“NEJAC”)78 created the “Model Plan for Public
Participation.” One of the core values and guiding principles
that the NEJAC developed is the idea that the “public partici-
pation process provides participants with the information they
need to participate in a meaningful way.”79 This principle is
consistent with Executive Order No. 12898 calling on each fed-
eral agency to conduct its programs, policies, and activities in
a manner that does not exclude citizens from participation in
the programs, policies, and activities that affect them.80 The
Memorandum to the heads of all departments and agencies that
accompanied the Executive Order is even more specific about
the need for public participation, as it requires agencies to “pro-
vide minority communities and low-income communities
access to public information on, and an opportunity for public
participation in, matters relating to human heath or the envi-
ronment.”81 The Memorandum further instructs agencies to
provide communities with “public information relating to
human health or environmental planning, regulations, and
enforcement when required under the Freedom of Information
Act.”82 As full and open disclosure of information is a vital
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component in public participation, the CAFO rule violates the
essential core element of meaningful public participation when
it allows NMPs to be excluded from public review.
CONCLUSION
Because of the very serious impacts that CAFOs can have
on the environment, particularly on water quality and public
health, it is critical that government officials engage communi-
ty residents situated near CAFOs in the NPDES permitting
process. Community residents can serve as environmental
enforcers if they are properly equipped with information
regarding the environmental and public health issues within
their community. Public participation not only empowers com-
munity residents by making them a part of the decision-making
process, but also helps to alleviate the mistrust that community
residents feel toward government officials. When community
residents feel that their contributions to the decision-making
process are fully considered, they are less likely to use adver-
sarial tactics to effect change. Moreover, because low-income
and minority populations are often situated near CAFOs, the
importance of ensuring meaningful public participation takes
on added meaning. Environmental justice advocates have been
concerned about the overall lack of public participation in
many environmental policy decisions, and the CAFO rule illus-
trates this concern by not providing full and open public par-
ticipation. Community residents should have meaningful pub-
lic involvement in processes that directly affect their lives, and
they should have a right to shape the policies that relate to their
access to clean water. When reaching their decision in this case,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should consider all
of the possible ramifications that denial of meaningful public
participation might have. 
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24 See Enzo Campagnolo et al., Antimicrobal Residues In Animal Waste
and Water Resources Proximal To Large-Scale Swine and Poultry Feeding
Operations, 299 THE SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT 89 (2002). The
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Despite advertisements suggesting that bottled waterscome from crystal clear springs found deep insideforests, removing water is likely to affect the
resources of surrounding communities. In December 2000,
Ice Mountain, a subsidiary of Nestle, located a water source
for their bottled water factory on the edges of Mecosta
County, Michigan.1 They began an operation that pulled 400
gallons per minute, or 210 million gallons a year, from a
spring that contributes to the Little Muskegon River, which
feeds into Lake Michigan.2
Though Ice Mountain was pleased with their situation,
in September 2001, a lawsuit was filed by Michigan Citizens
for Water Conservation and plaintiffs R.J. and Barbara
Doyle and Jeff and Shelly Sapp against Nestle Waters North
America, Inc., formerly the Perrier Group. The plaintiffs
claimed that Ice Mountain’s withdrawal of water was dimin-
ishing Mecosta County’s wetlands. Water, they argued, was
a common resource, to be held in public trust and managed
with public benefit in mind.3
In the lower court decision, on November 23, 2003, the
Circuit Judge, Hon. Lawrence C. Root, identified the issue,
a matter of first impression in Michigan courts, as to what
extent the right to use water is limited by the rights of oth-
ers to use the same resource.4 In the end, Judge Root found
that the plaintiffs had shown sufficient evidence that wet-
lands had been affected by Ice Mountain’s withdrawal of
water,5 and ruled that “riparian rights are superior to the
diversion and sale of groundwater.”6 Based on these find-
ings, he ordered Ice Mountain to stop removing water from
the spring. 
One month later, while asking for an injunction against
the lower court’s order to stop bottling water, Ice Mountain
argued that current wetland water levels were comparable to
levels before Ice Mountain began taking water from the area
and that in the months leading up to the trial, rainfall was
below average, affecting the data the judge had viewed.7
Since Judge Root’s decision, the case has been appealed to
the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Appeals Court has
granted an injunction against Judge Root’s order, and will
allow Ice Mountain to continue to pump water until the
lower court’s ruling is reviewed.8 The Plaintiffs hope the
Michigan Court of Appeals will hear their case by Spring or
Summer 2005.9
ENDNOTES:
1 Keith Schneider. Perrier vs. The People, GRIST, Oct. 30, 2002, available
at http://michiganimc.org/newswire/display_any/583 (last visited Nov. 24,
2004).
2 Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, Judge’s Ruling on Water
Rights Case, Nov. 25, 2003, available at
http://michiganimc.org/newswire/display_any/3913 (last visited Nov. 24,
2004).
3 Supra note 1.
4 Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters, No. 01-
14563-CE, at 41 (Mich. 49th Jud. Cir. filed unknown), available at
http://www.envlaw.com/decisions/MCWC%20decision.pdf (last visited
Nov. 24, 2004).
5 Id at 13, 15.
6 Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, Court Orders Nestle to Pay
Plaintiff Fees, May 7, 2004, available at
ftp://aquaman:100yellow@waterissweet.org/nestle/nestle_fees.html (last
visited Nov. 24, 2004). 
7Bottled Water Web, Ice Mountain Files for Stay of Injunction; Notifies
Employees of Potential Lay-Offs, Dec. 8, 2003, available at
http://www.bottledwaterweb.com/news/nw_120803.html (last visited Nov.
24, 2004). 
8 Bottled Water Foe Lauded for Devotion, THE DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 29,
2004, available at http://www.detnews.com/2004/metro/0409/29/c10-
287609.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2004).
9 Email from Terry Swier, President, Michigan Citizens for Water
Conservation to Rachael Moshman, author (Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with
author). 
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This photo is used by Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation to illus-
trate how mudflats are reappearing due to the continued pumping by Ice
Mountain. M
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INTRODUCTION
This personal account discusses the McNutt family’s con-nection to Saboba, Ghana and the process of creating aproject to develop a well and other necessities in Saboba.
WHY GHANA? 
In early October of 1948, Mel and Marita McNutt moved with
their family to Saboba, Ghana to build a community hospital.1
The Saboba region consisted of many small settlements and
villages.  The people are mainly subsistence farmers who culti-
vate maize, millet, and guinea corn.2
The McNutts learned of the need for increased access to
basic life necessities, such as food, sanitary waste disposal
facilities, and clean water.  Access to sanitary water was a
major concern for the McNutts because of the limited rainfall
and lack of sanitary ground level water, which came from wells
or catch basins contaminated with Guinea Worms.  In order to
have continuous access to clean water, the McNutts had to plan
their water usage in advance.  During the rainy season, they
collected water from the roof of their house with barrels that
caught the run-off.  When there was no rain, the McNutts and
their hospital construction crew drove a truck and trailer to a
river located two kilometers away.  After a year of work, the
hospital opened. It is still in operation today – now a fifty-bed
hospital with a medical doctor and a hospital staff.  Because of
the experiences, stories, and memories of the McNutt’s work in
Saboba, the McNutt children wished to honor their parents by
developing a well to provide a continuous and sanitary source
of water for the Saboba region. 
WHY WATER?
Access to water is critical for both the health and liveli-
hoods of rural African communities.  In remote regions there is
a growing demand on a limited amount of water, and the supply
is constantly under the threat of abuse and contamination.  The
Ghanaian government cannot meet the needs for water access in
remote regions, forcing many communities to live without an
adequate supply of potable water.3 Inhabitants of the Saboba
region generally rely on the River Oti as their major source of
water.4 To obtain water from the river, women often travel over
three kilometers outside of town.5 Further, the water in the river
is not sanitary during the rainy season and often dries up during
the dry season.6 Some villages rely on hand-dug wells, ponds,
and perennial streams, but, like the rivers, these sources are
unavailable during the dry season.7 These surface water sources
are also susceptible to pollution from farms and waste disposal.
The impurities in the surface water often expose people to
water-borne diseases such as typhoid.8
The shortage of sanitary water sources directly impacts the
health of those living in the region.  In most rural communities
the majority of the productive working age group is infected
with Guinea worms or other water-borne diseases.9 The death
rates for children are significantly higher in rural than in urban
areas, particularly for children under the age of five.10
INITIATION OF THE PROJECT
In August 2004, we decided to initiate a well project in
Saboba, Ghana.  According to initial inquiries with World
Vision, a nonprofit charitable organization, a $12,500 donation
is sufficient to fund a community development package.11 As
part of the package, a 200-foot borehole is drilled and a latrine
is also installed.  There is also a community supervisory struc-
ture established to guarantee the sustainability of the project.  At
this early stage, because our family was unable to pay for the
entire project in personal donations, I decided it was best to
attempt to join an existing project.  There were very few proj-
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ects in Saboba, though, and it took over two weeks of steady
research to find an organization operating in the region.  
During my first phase of contacts, I contacted numerous
organizations, including both large government funded organi-
zations and small private firms, stating that I was a student
working on a water development project in remembrance of my
family’s experiences living in Saboba.
The USAID response, received only a day after I contacted
them, offered to meet to discuss possible assistance for the proj-
ect.  The World Bank’s response stated in part, “I have invited a
Ghanaian national who lives in the USA to lunch next
Wednesday at the World Bank who might be of some help to the
objectives you want to achieve. . . You may want to join us for
lunch at the World Bank on that day and to listen in while he dis-
cusses with me.”
During the next week, I spoke with several individuals who
previously worked on development projects in Africa.  The gen-
eral consensus was that it was a waste of my time to contact
organizations such as the World Bank, which typically do not
work with individuals.  As it turned out, the day of the meeting
arrived without a reply from the World Bank regarding the time
of the lunch.  I called the representative, who told me the lunch
had been cancelled because the Ghanaian national was out of
town on another engagement, but I was still welcome to come
to lunch.  I told him about the project, and he replied that he was
going to be in Ghana next week and it may be better to meet
after his return.  I agreed and left it at that.  
It took about another week before I was able to arrange a
meeting with the representative of USAID.  In the interim, I
researched USAID involvement in well-projects.  They were
actually in the process of expanding their presence in Ghana.
USAID is part of a consortium of organizations, called the West
Africa Water Initiative (“WAWI”), which is seeking to develop
sustainable projects in Ghana and throughout West Africa.12
WAWI focuses on providing water and sanitation to rural areas.13
A few days after scheduling the meeting with USAID, I
received a response from the only NGO that I had found operat-
ing in Saboba.  The organization runs a clinic in Saboba and is
seeking to do additional water development in the region.  Their
Water Development Proposal outlined their plan to drill ten bore-
holes each year for the next five years at a cost very close to our
budget.  When I first read this proposal, it appeared to be the best
way to proceed, because the organization was able to provide the
needed services for a fraction of World Vision’s cost. 
When I met with USAID, however, I was told that the
estimates I had received from the small NGO were much too
low.  According to the USAID water development contacts,
the estimate might have been enough to drill the well, but it
was not enough for the mandatory sustainability assessments.
As the USAID officers pointed out, when a project is imple-
mented it must be done in such a manner that the project
would last for generations.
After this meeting, I determined it was best to work through
USAID and WAWI.  They were interested in my proposal and
had mentioned the possibility of bringing it to the next WAWI
meeting.  Even though the cost was substantially higher than
that provided by the small NGO, USAID would be able to
ensure sustainability for the project.  My research revealed that
similar well projects were often successfully drilled, but failed
because of the poor quality of construction, neglected mainte-
nance, and contamination of the water.  In Saboba, in fact,
another project had drilled a well in a town, but the well-pump
broke down many times and the water became contaminated.
Each time the pump broke, the government took months to
make repairs.  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT
After the meeting with USAID, I produced a list of our con-
tacts with the WAWI partners, particularly those at World Vision
who promised to match our donation.  I prepared a list of con-
tacts at World Vision, our contacts at the World Bank, the loca-
tion of the hospital,14 and contacts at the hospital.  
Recently I received a confirmation from my contact at
USAID that WAWI agreed to place a well at the hospital in
Saboba.  According to the confirmation notice, the hospital is
within an existing WAWI target district and WAWI considered it
suitable for a well under the existing parameters.  The WAWI
partners are conducting hydrologic studies of the well-site.
They are also determining the technology most suitable to the
needs of the surrounding population, such as whether the well
should have a mechanized or hand pump.  The well will be
drilled by February 2005.  I am working directly with World
Vision, who interacts with donors on behalf of WAWI, to see the
project to its completion.  Once the well is completed, WAWI
will maintain the well and do periodic tests on the water.
So far I accomplished many of my goals, but I hope to have
many future successes.  Even when individuals are not able to
assist in the project, they give me numerous referrals to organi-
zations with similar goals.  There is a very large network of
organizations and individuals with a desire to assist, and all that
is needed is to join partnerships together with a single goal.  My
connection to Saboba has grown, and soon the community of
people who had such a lasting influence on my grandparents
will have a clean, reliable source of water.
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1 Saboba covers a large area in the northern part of the country. For more
information about the Saboba district in Ghana, see the Health-Aid web-
site, at http://www.health-aid.org/eng/saboba_eng.html (last visited
November 3, 2004).
2 Id. 
3 See Ghana Country Profile, World Vision International website, at
http://www.wvi.org/wvi/country_profile/profiles/ghana.htm (last visited
November 3, 2004).
4 Proposal for Well Construction in Saboba, Ghana by J. Ross Weber (on
file with author). 
5 Id. 
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See Ghana Well Opening, the Christian Children’s Fund website, at
http://www.ccfcanada.ca/Where_we_Work/Ghana/ghanawellopening.html
(last visited November 1, 2004).
9 World Vision, Water a Precious Resource, at p. 2, available at
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, lawyers and politicians havepaid increased attention to the role that social analysisin general, and Social Assessment in particular, can
play in drafting and evaluating legislation and regulations.
Social analysis provides an alternative to external forces impos-
ing successful laws from one country on another country with-
out analyzing whether these laws will fit within the legal, social,
or political frameworks of the country.1 When external forces,
such as international institutions, assume institutional, cultural,
or political realities that are not present in the target country,
these transplanted laws often are rejected and fail because they
are not appropriate for the country, lack legitimacy, and do not
benefit the country.2 Social assessment replaces these assump-
tions with research-based knowledge, resulting in more situa-
tion-specific legislation, regulation, and projects.
Luzius Mader3 distinguishes eight different analytical steps
in legislative methodology.  He has termed the seventh step as
the “sociology” of legislation.4 While not every law is “an
attempt to solve a problem by changing the behavior of those to
whom it is addressed,” most laws (1) assume a certain under-
standing of the attitudes and behavior of various stakeholder
groups directly or indirectly affected; and (2) attempt in their
enactment to satisfy generally accepted criteria about what
makes good legislation which, according to Mader are:
• Effectiveness – Has  a law both during its preparation
and implementation correctly taken into account the
attitudes and behaviors of affected stakeholders;
• Efficacy – To  what extent have the objectives of a
law been achieved; and
• Efficiency – What are the material and non-material
costs and benefits of the legislation.
The social sciences, with their broad range of qualitative
and quantitative methods and techniques, on occasion may con-
tribute to the development of legislation and, once enacted, to an
evaluation of its impact.  For example, Anne and Robert
Seidman suggest that, to evaluate a proposed project, bill, or
legislative action, the legislator should ask the following four
questions: (1) whether the legislation will alter or eliminate the
problematic behavior;  (2) whether it will provide a complete
legislative system to resolve the problem;  (3) whether the evi-
dence show that the legislation will be cost-effective; and (4)
whether it will positively affect the majority of people’s quality
of life, and will it help the poorest and most vulnerable individ-
uals.5 Social sciences can play a crucial role in developing
answers to these questions.  
However, those involved in developing legislation do not
systematically use social analysis, nor do they assess the impact
of legislation through a process of social impact monitoring.  This
may be unsurprising since there are few guides as to what areas
of the social sciences may or may not be appropriate to use.6
This article investigates one methodology in the social sci-
ences, and in social analysis in particular, that may be useful in
the preparation and evaluation of legislation: Social
Assessment. This framework has been useful in the past because
development practitioners in institutions such as the World Bank
have used Social Assessment to bring together social analysis,
institutional and social organizational analysis, participation of
affected stakeholders, and monitoring of stakeholders.  This arti-
cle defines social assessment and its main elements, and then
analyzes its utility by investigating the use of social assessment
in relation to a water project in the Republic of Uzbekistan.
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SOCIAL ASSESSMENT DEFINED
Social Assessment is:
• A tool to uncover social causes and impacts associat-
ed with development projects, regulation, and legis-
lation;
• A process through which project implementation
agencies understand how a country’s or a communi-
ty’s social, cultural, political, and institutional con-
text influences social outcomes;
• A means to enhance equity in the distribution of ben-
efits to affected communities and to strengthen social
inclusion; and
• A mechanism through which social cohesion can be
built, accountability and transparency can be promot-
ed, and the poor and other vulnerable groups can be
empowered.
The details in a law’s substantive provisions, form, and
structure determine how effective a law will be.7 To make a law
effective, it must be grounded in “an analysis of the place – and
time – and the specific causes of the behaviors that create the
social environment which the law or regulation hopes to modi-
fy.”8 “The usefulness of the Social Assessment process derives
mostly from its concrete and situation-specific nature.”9
The Social Assessment process incorporates four principal
analytical elements or pillars, each of which is constantly revis-
ited during the life of a development project.10 The pillars are:
• Identification of key social development issues.
This pillar addresses social issues relevant to the
project or program.  Issues are identified within a nar-
rowing context, generally going from a national and
sectoral perspective to specific project sites.
Depending on the situation, the issues may include
poverty, equity, social diversity, gender, social capi-
tal, social exclusion, etc.
• Stakeholder identification and the formulation of
the participation framework.  This pillar identifies
major stakeholders11 in the project and their particu-
lar interests.  Stakeholders may range from individu-
als to specific social groups, authorities, and local,
national, and international organizations.  A major
product of the analysis is the development of a par-
ticipation framework designed to ensure active par-
ticipation of key stakeholders in product design,
implementation and evaluation;
• Institutional and social organization analysis. This
pillar concerns the structure of social relationships
and behavior.  The analysis identifies institutions,
both formal and informal, which establish the “rules
of the game” in the project context, and the incentive
structures, which affect the extent to which the rules
are either followed, undermined, or ignored.  The
product of the analysis is a series of recommenda-
tions on the institutional development or reorienta-
tion that is needed to achieve project objectives;
• Establishment of a monitoring and evaluation
framework This pillar develops a monitoring and
evaluation framework for project implementation,
focusing on aspects relevant to the social develop-
ment objectives of the project.  The purpose of this
analysis is to establish mechanisms to measure social
changes and social impacts during implementation to
inform stakeholders about mid-term corrections
needed to ensure that social development objectives
are achieved.12
The tools used for Social Assessment are many and depend
on the specific context, but consist of a mixture of quantitative
and qualitative methods, such as surveys, focus groups, individ-
ual interviews, and traditional research.  These tools are usually
iterative processes where findings from one method are
explored further or checked using other methods. 
But how beneficial is the Social Assessment process, par-
ticularly in very different fields of endeavor and in answering a
variety of complex questions?  These questions may range from
the very broad – what kinds of institutions do people prefer to
regulate their lives – to the more narrow – what kinds of stan-
dards and norms do people prefer in everyday life.  The Social
Assessment process also raises questions relating to the robust-
ness of the findings and the utility of the process in the sociolo-
gy of legislation.
The world of development finance specializes in funding
projects in many sectors and affecting a multiplicity of stake-
holders in a broad range of developing countries around the
world.  The World Bank and its regional partners, committed to
increasing the involvement of stakeholders in decisions affect-
ing their lives, use Social Assessment as part of their modus
operandi.  Their use of Social Assessment presents an opportu-
nity to assess the instrument’s effectiveness, efficacy, and effi-
ciency, and its potential for use in creating and reviewing legis-
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A young boy drinking water from an open water source in Uzbekistan. 
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lation.  The use of Social Assessment by the World Bank in
assisting the Government of Uzbekistan to prepare a project in
the water sector was chosen as a case study because it dealt with
(1) many different aspects of Social Assessment by actors in
development finance who had very different view points; and
(2) a sector that is essential to human survival and the subject of
great debate on many levels.
The water sector, in general, provides a particularly good
example of how the Social Assessment process can lead to a
more sustainable project, and by analogy, to better legislation.
There are many differences in ideologies and practices sur-
rounding the water sector beyond the universal agreement that
the sector affects all parts of society and that access to clean and
healthy water is a priority throughout the world.  For example,
there must be actions taken to conserve water and to recognize
and appreciate the importance of implementing measures to
reduce the consumption and waste of water.  One of the main
ways to do this in a market-oriented economy is by charging
fees for water.  However, many individuals, especially those
from countries like Uzbekistan that heavily subsidize certain
economic and social activities, particularly those dealing with
education and health, also feel that water should be free, or near-
ly so.  The organization of the water sector, whether it should be
publicly or privately owned and whether communities should
control water resources or this should be more centrally done, is
also very controversial.  By looking at the water sector, one can
see why close attention must be paid to individual community
structures and issues, including working environments, living
arrangements, use and waste patterns, and general attitudes
about water.
A CASE STUDY ON THE WATER SECTOR IN
UZBEKISTAN
Discussions between the Government of Uzbekistan and
the World Bank in the early 1990s, shortly after the Soviet
Union dissolved and Uzbekistan became an independent coun-
try, began with two clear conditions: (1) that Uzbekistan knew
very little about the World Bank or about the principles of a
market economy and was wary about “policy” discussions with
external agencies like the Bank that might be perceived as
infringing on “sovereignty”; and (2) that the World Bank knew
very little about Uzbekistan, but generally advocated a more
“private” sector approach in “command” economies.  Moreover,
while all of the newly independent countries of the former
Soviet Union talked about “transitioning to a market economy,”
some were moving faster than others.  Uzbekistan was among
the more cautious of the new republics.
Both Uzbekistan government officers and World Bank offi-
cials have strongly-held, and often divergent, opinions and
interpretations what each thought were the “facts.”  The first
funding from the World Bank to Uzbekistan, as for most of the
other newly independent former Soviet countries, was a balance
of payments and budget support loans with very few policy con-
ditions, and as a consequence, with very little opportunity for
disagreement.
The Bank then looked for other areas where it could pro-
vide assistance, in particular in traditional “project” lending,
which provided ample opportunity for disagreement over the
many aspects of common project analysis.  The first sectors
assessed were agriculture, an historically important economic
area for Uzbekistan, and water supply and sanitation, which was
a problem for many Uzbeks and which has been an important
sector of World Bank lending around the world because of its
important role in reducing poverty and upgrading living condi-
tions.13 Water was a special challenge in Uzbekistan, which
was also suffering from the Aral Sea environmental crisis,
which affected the water and soil quality in much of the coun-
try.  Over the previous two decades, two large rivers were
diverted to expand the area of cotton production.  Eventually,
the rivers dried up and the lake shrank by 66 percent.14 As a
result, salinity in the water increased, soils became waterlogged,
and the area’s fish spawning grounds and fisheries dried up.15
The land was also severely affected.  The winds picked up salts
and pesticides from the dry lakebed, and caused salt and pesti-
cide storms.  These storms damaged the productivity of the
land.16 The regional climate also changed, harming the area’s
cotton.  In short, there was little water for drinking in many
areas, and what water there was, often was of poor quality.
As the Government and the World Bank began discussions
about the water sector, it was clear to both parties that appropri-
ate legislation, an institutional framework, and a water supply
infrastructure project that operated in the interests of consumers
were essential for improving the water sector.  The project had
to: (1) be accepted by the people who consumed the water, an
important stakeholder group and the primary beneficiaries; (2)
operate within a good legal and regulatory system; and (3) be
assured that legislation and regulation could be enforced.
Finally, the project, legislation, and enforcement had to fit with-
in the “social” environment.  All of this had to be based on ade-
quate background knowledge about the people that the laws
would govern and the current social situation. 
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The Uzbekistan Water Project provides a good example for
understanding how Social Assessment can help fill in knowledge
gaps, including having the right legislation at the broadest level
over the water sector.  A stark example of this is that the govern-
ment of Uzbekistan had legislation that was ready to be passed
that would have legislated free water to the entire country.
However, through the Social Assessment process associated with
the Project, the government learned that precious water would
not be conserved, the project would not be financially viable and
as a result, the poorest members of society might not receive ade-
quate water and would have to continue to purchase it from water
vendors for up to four times the amount that the middle-class
paid for piped water.  As a result, the legislation was changed.  In
addition, the Social Assessment process looked at many other
areas to determine people’s willingness to pay, technical stan-
dards for the salinity of the water, the amount of required water,
and whether a rural piped-water project should exist. 
It is only through a good understanding of the linkages
between legal reform, the regulatory framework and enforcement,
as well as a good understanding of people’s behaviors, value sys-
tems, customs, physical structure, and social structures that an
appropriate and comprehensive program could be developed.  
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE WATER
PROJECT IN UZBEKISTAN
Uzbekistan requested World Bank assistance in improving
its water supply, sanitation, and health in the two regions of
Uzbekistan17 – the Republic of Karakalpakstan and the
Khorezm Oblast – that were affected the most adversely by the
Aral Sea crisis.  As a result of this crisis, the availability of water
suitable for drinking was limited.18 People in the region knew
that the water quality was bad due to the existence of particles,
the color and smell of the water, and learned of the water quali-
ty by word of mouth and through the media. 
The initial process of Social Assessment on the role of
water in general and the subsequent focus group meetings with
stakeholders potentially affected by the proposed project
revealed that the inadequacy of the water supply stemmed from
a variety of factors, only one of which was the lack of external
financing, the major contribution of the World Bank assistance.
The Social Assessment process concluded that further investi-
gations were needed to reach an adequate understanding of the
“real” problems.  Both rural and urban areas experienced bad
water quality, including suspended solids and high salinity lev-
els.  Urban areas also experienced poor levels of service, poor
quality of piped water supplied by the water utilities, including
problems with hot water and unavailability of cold water.  These
areas suffered from excessive leaks in the piped water supply,
broken taps, flooding in the basements of apartment buildings,
and pressure problems resulting in piped water failing to reach
many upper-floor apartments.19
The Uzbekistan water project began as an effort to deal
with water availability in rural areas by providing piped water.
However, the Social Assessment found that a project supplying
piped water could not be successfully implemented in these
rural areas as envisaged for technical and economic reasons.
After finding that the urban areas’ water supplies were also in
poor condition, the project then focused on urban areas.  As the
technical, economic, financial, and institutional aspects of proj-
ect preparation proceeded, it became evident that there were
substantial differences of opinion among stakeholders on a
diversity of issues, not just cost recovery and the level of user
charges.  There were also divergent opinions on technical stan-
dards, such as the quality of water, and on the institutional
framework for management of the water. 
Through Social Assessments the main partners, the World
Bank and Uzbekistan, gained enough information to create a
workable project and benefited from it in three ways.  First,
because of numerous differences of opinion and conflicting the-
ories and ideologies between the partners, more verifiable fac-
tors were needed on which to base project decisions.  These
facts allowed the partners to focus on providing for the needs of
the people rather than debating ideology.  Second, the partners
needed more factual information so that they could design a
project capable of providing water sustainably.  Third, the part-
ners needed to consult with individuals to understand the needs
of the people so as to ensure that the partners met these needs,
and met them in the most efficient way possible. 
As a result of the overall Social Assessment process, a bet-
ter-defined project was created that resulted in substantial
investment, saving in excess of  twenty million dollars, and
resulting in lower user fees for beneficiaries: better service at
lower prices.  
THE SOCIAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS IN THE
WORLD BANK’S WATER PROJECT IN UZBEKISTAN
The Social Assessment process included a variety of
research, simulations and pilot projects, surveys, focus groups,
and interviews on the behavior and attitudes of stakeholders and
beneficiaries, ranging from very broad needs assessments to very
specific issues such as the taste of water and how close the water
utility organization should be to consumers.  The entire Social
Assessment process for Uzbekistan’s water sector has been sum-
marized20 and this article only will cover certain issues arising
out of the following aspects of the Social Assessment process: 
1) A Social Needs Assessment of households in the
rural areas of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm Oblast;
2) The Urban Areas Social Assessment that confirmed
that water waste is high in urban areas, thus justify-
ing a project component addressing water demand
management and loss reduction; 
3) The Water Vendors / Willingness to Pay Survey,
which revealed that people are willing to pay for
improved water service in return for reliable service;  
4) The Salinity Taste Tolerance Assessment, which
helped establish water quality standards, in particu-
lar the acceptable salinity levels in drinking water; 
5) The Needs Assessment and Hand Pumps
Assessment, which revealed that hand-pumps are a
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major water source, especially in rural areas, and
people are generally satisfied with hand pumps
when the water is clean.  
The World Bank initiated the social assessment process in
May 1995 and the fieldwork portion of the assessment lasted
from June to August 1995.  Scientists from the Academy of
Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Karakalpakstan and
Khorezm branches of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic
of Uzbekistan, the Union for the Defense of the Aral Sea and the
Amuderya River (a nongovernmental organization), and scien-
tific staff of the EXPERT Sociological Center directed and car-
ried out the field work for this assessment.21
AVAILABILITY OF WATER AND PROJECT DESIGN
The rural and urban Social Assessments helped to establish
where people get their water and showed the areas with the
greatest deficit and the highest cost.  These areas included
households that used “coping” mechanisms such as water ven-
dors because there was inadequate public water supply.  These
surveys also showed that there was a wide disparity between the
levels of service in urban and rural areas.  For example, in rural
areas in Karakalpakstan, piped water was available for only
three hours each day and for 4.8 hours each day in Khorezm
Oblast.22 In major urban areas, however, 70 percent of house-
holds had running piped water 24 hours a day in summer and 85
percent of the time in winter.23
These Social Assessments also showed that there was a
high level of satisfaction with the hand pumps and hand-dug
wells, as well as very low levels of household incomes in rural
areas.  These findings led to a major change in project design,
because they showed that it would be more appropriate to
increase the access to hand pumps and hand-dug wells in the
rural areas instead of supplying piped water at a significantly
greater investment and operating cost, as had been proposed
originally.24 Developing an extensive piped-water system in
these rural areas would not have been economically sustainable.
TECHNICAL PARAMETERS – WATER SALINITY LEVELS
A Social Assessment was used to determine an important
technical standard for the project: salinity levels.  A stakehold-
ers’ workshop in September 1995 found that consumers in the
region were concerned about the quality of drinking water.25
The technical dispute concerned the salinity standard for the
water, one factor that affects drinking water quality.  The water
supplies in the project area had high salinity levels, with the
salinity of the Aral Sea itself reaching 30 grams per liter (g/l) at
the time of the report.26 The salinity of the piped water supply
was at an intermediate level of 0.6 – 1.5 g/l, and the salinity of
hand pump and hand-dug well water was at a higher level of 1.5
g/l – 2g/l.  
The Government of Uzbekistan originally set the accept-
able salinity level for drinking water at one g/l, a level adopted
for “taste” concerns rather than for health reasons. This salinity
level was more stringent than the World Health Organization’s
healthy salinity level standard of 1.5 g/l.  The scientific research
found no evidence that health would be negatively impacted by
salinity levels that are tolerated by people’s taste.27 Making the
investment in reducing salinity to one g/l would have signifi-
cantly increased the cost of the project, and therefore, would
have increased the burden on consumers through water tariffs or
on the Government through subsidies.  
Instead of engaging in debates about appropriate salinity
levels, the project performed a survey of the population to deter-
mine what salinity level would be tolerated.28 The objectives of
the survey were to “(1) identify an upper level or range of salin-
ity in drinking water acceptable to people living in the region;
(2) survey the quality of water currently being used by house-
holds from different sources; and  (3) identify the water quality
parameters that were of most concern to these households.”29
The survey found that the salinity levels tolerated by the
communities were more relaxed than the levels proposed by
government.  People tolerated a salinity level up to 2.0 g/l.
Furthermore, the salinity of the hand pumps and hand-dug wells
was more constant throughout the year, so consumers could tol-
erate a higher level of salinity coming from these sources.
Because of these results from potential consumers, the
Government agreed that the project should adopt a less rigorous
salinity requirement of 1.5 g/l for piped water and 2.0g/l for
hand-pumped water.  The change was estimated to have saved
about USD $20 million in investment costs and therefore
reduced the need for higher user fees.
INSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS – ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE
The Social Assessment also addressed the organizational
structure of the project.  The affected communities initially
expressed a preference for a self-managed, de-centralized water
supply management scheme.30 The community believed that if
the “centralized” water utility installed and managed the water
system, it would result in insufficient attention to consumers and
a poor level of service.31 However, when the community was
informed of the costs and benefits of various schemes, and that
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the decentralized structure would result in higher costs and user
fees, focus groups showed that the communities would agree to
a more centralized structure as long as the water authority estab-
lished a consumer relations department so that community voic-
es could be heard.  As a result, there was a significant reduction
in costs.32 By involving the community in this decision, instead
of making the decision without its involvement, the project was
able to convince the community of the merits of a centralized
system and helped create a partnership between the community
and the water utility.33 The essence of the partnership approach
in the second pillar of Social Assessment is for agents of change
(governments, donors, and civil society organizations) to work
with users and communities to develop practical proposals,
working from existing rights systems and management practices,
based on peoples’ attitudes, behavior, and expressed views.
TECHNICAL PARAMETERS – AMOUNT OF WATER
REQUIRED
The Social Assessment also encouraged community partic-
ipation in the design of the pilot water projects implemented as
part of project preparation.  By doing this, the community had
the opportunity to see the trade-offs of different technical and
operating standards, including options on water consumption
and the resulting investment and operating costs based on per
capita water consumption.  Because the communities were
asked to bear some of the cost of providing water supply serv-
ices, members of the community began pressuring local author-
ities to give greater attention to the scale and costs of the proj-
ect and started questioning design criteria.34
For example, in one of the towns, the community agreed to
lower the 350 liters per capita per day requirement for water
supply to only 150 liters per capita per day,35 thereby scaling
down the investment cost of the project and lowering user fees.
By allowing people to participate in sharing the decision-mak-
ing as well as the costs, people were able to influence how much
they were charged for water rather than having this determined
by external forces.  The Social Assessment bridged the gap
between the provider and the consumer and created the oppor-
tunity for people themselves to alter social attitudes and reduce
water consumption. 
FINANCIAL PARAMETERS – HOW MUCH ARE PEOPLE
WILLING TO PAY
The debate is ongoing around the world about the appropri-
ate level of payments for water, especially for the poor.  These
debates exist among experts as well as among governments and
financial institutions.  In 1993, the World Commission on Water
highlighted the stress that the world’s water resources will
undergo in the future.  As a result, it suggested that decisions
about water should include a holistic approach, participatory
mechanisms, full-cost pricing with targeted subsidies for the
poor, institutional, technological, and financial innovations, and
various degrees of privatization.  It also emphasized the need for
major attitudinal and behavioral changes by all actors.  
The 1990 Montreal International Forum, “NGOs Working
Together,” outlined several potential improvements to supplying
drinking water and sanitation.  Included in this list of improve-
ments were wider access to potable water and sanitation, user
participation and consultation, reliance on local community
resources, improvement and repair of existing systems, and a
policy of comprehensive water resource management integrat-
ing environmental and economic considerations.36 At least one
World Bank policy paper suggested that there should be a new
water project approach that recognizes water as a scarce
resource that is subject to many interdependencies in con-
veyance and use.37
There has been great debate about the pricing of water.38
Critics have argued that socially sustainable solutions must be
locally relevant, grounded in social reality, and formulated by
the local communities themselves.  However, there has been
great concern about supporting “low” user fees.  Low fees
eventually could lead to large reconstruction costs if there is
insufficient money for maintenance and repair, causing sys-
tems to fail.  Also, with low fees, consumers use water ineffi-
ciently and high water usage drives up investment needs.  A
vicious circle is established in which insufficient fees lead to
poor maintenance and high water wastage, requiring more
investment that only can be supplied through public subsidy,
often ending up in poor water service when the subsidies do
not materialize.  As a result, customers are less willing to pay
and the utility will depend even more on state subsidies.
Managers lose their autonomy and incentives to perform and
efficiency drops.  The water utility service may lack the
resources even to pay wages and other operating costs.
Motivation and service will continue to deteriorate and the
system will fall apart.  Eventually, this downward spiral will
result in huge reconstruction costs.39
Local authorities in Uzbekistan were originally apprehen-
sive about increasing user fees, assuming that the local popula-
tion believed that the provision of clean water was the govern-
ment’s responsibility and should be provided at lower prices
through government subsidies even if these subsidies did not
always materialize.  The various surveys, especially those deal-
ing with water vendors, allowed a clearer understanding about
where people obtained water, at what cost, and at what quality.
In short, the surveys demonstrated “real” behavior and attitudes
about water.  
The broad Social Assessment conducted from April through
December 1995 showed that, in some areas surveyed, many
people relied on water vendors to obtain water due to the inad-
equacy of piped water, at a higher price and of lower quality
than would be the case under the project.40 This was factual
evidence that appropriate user fees could be charged under the
project that would actually, in many cases, be lower than “fees”
currently paid to vendors. “Willingness to pay” studies help
clarify people’s ability and willingness to pay for delivered
water supplies and provided one set of facts for prioritizing the
project’s investments.41
However, there was a difference in willingness to pay,
depending on whether people were currently connected to the
water supply.  For connected households, 81.4% of households
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were willing to pay an average amount of 3.6 percent of month-
ly household income for water system improvements.  The pay-
ments for water at the time of the survey were two percent of
monthly household income.  However, significantly fewer
unconnected households were willing to make monthly pay-
ments for improvements in water supply, as only 56.6 percent
were willing to pay for improvements.  On average, those will-
ing to pay would pay 3.85 percent of their monthly household
income for water supply improvements.42
An interesting finding was that, in many cases, the poor
were paying a higher percentage of their income for water than
the wealthy, often because many of the poor depended on
expensive private water vendors while the wealthy were more
often served by subsidized public water.  In some places, a poor
individual paid more than ten times what a middle-class person
paid for a liter of water.43 According to the Water Vendor
Survey, water purchases from water vendors accounted for 9.4
percent of the household’s average monthly income during the
summer and 6.7 percent during the winter.44
Generally, the poor were found to be willing to pay for
water services when the services were reliable.45 When servic-
es were not reliable, then the poor usually would “pay more for
less;”46 and usually this money went to street vendors.47
Moreover, street vendors’ water was generally of lower quality
since the government did not regulate the activities or water
quality of the street vendors.48
The Water Vendors Survey found that 75 percent of people
were dissatisfied with the quality of their water and would be
willing to pay up to five sums, or $0.17 per 100 liters of good-
quality drinking water.49 Generally, households suffering from
lower quality water were willing to pay more for improvements
in the quality of the water.50
The Hand Pump Monitoring Survey concluded that the
water from hand pumps was the best quality drinking water.  In
some areas, 85% of people used hand pump water for drinking
purposes, of whom 82% were satisfied with the quality of the
drinking water, 99% found the hand pumps easy to use, and
81% considered hand pump water the cheapest water source.51
Unfortunately, water from the hand pumps with which people
said the quality satisfied them had an average salinity level of
1.9, near the maximum level of salinity that is “considered” fit
for drinking.  However, most respondents stated that only at lev-
els of 2.2 did the water have a salty taste, and at 3.0 that it had
a bad taste.52 The survey concluded that there was no correla-
tion between the overall level of satisfaction and the actual qual-
ity of the water from the hand pumps.  The report associated
people’s preferences for hand-pump water with its convenience
and low cost and reliability, even though it had a poor quality.53
Overall, the consulted households demanded more reliable
levels of services and higher quality of water, and expressed
their willingness to pay a much higher price for these improve-
ments than what the local authorities expected.54 As a result,
the local authorities were less apprehensive about user fees and
were supportive of this demand-driven approach because it
demonstrated the need and willingness of people to pay for the
service.55 Because of the community consultations, the local
authorities found it much easier to increase water user fees as
they could explain the reason for the increase more accurately.56
A PROCESS OF PERMANENT SOCIAL
IMPACT MONITORING
The aforementioned examples of the impact of Social
Assessment in Uzbekistan all dealt with the period during proj-
ect preparation.  However, the impact of a project on people, and
the impact of legislation, really only begins with its implemen-
tation.  For this reason, the fourth pillar of the Social
Assessment process deals with a permanent process for  social
impact monitoring, so that the real impact of a project on peo-
ple’s lives can be monitored to provide regular information on
whether project objectives are being realized, and at what cost,
so that redesign can become a standard feature of implementa-
tion and a useful management information tool.
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL ASSESSMENT ON WORLD
BANK-FUNDED PROJECTS
World Bank-funded projects provide an example of the
trend towards including the Social Assessment process and the
resulting impacts of this trend.  In 1993, the World Bank water
sector policy started to systematically incorporate its focus on
social sustainability.  After 1993, 67 percent of Bank-funded
water projects involved community participation, 75 percent
involved gender concerns, and 66 percent used Social
Assessment.57 As a result, many of the conclusions and infor-
mation that these processes revealed have been incorporated
into project design, while the regulations and laws have been
implemented by the country in support of the project.  Overall,
there has been an increase in social development issues in water
sector projects after water sector policies began to be concerned
with social sustainability and comprehensive, holistic approach-
es.  There have also been more institutional mechanisms estab-
lished to target the poor58 and an increased number of benefici-
ary assessments carried out.  Gender issues were addressed,
community participation considered, mechanisms established to
monitor poverty, budgets set aside for monitoring overall pover-
ty and for project specific social impact monitoring, and social
impact monitoring indicators identified.  
The involvement of social scientists in preparing water
projects has increased. The World Bank’s quality assurance
reviews found that if social analysis is used in a project, the
supervision quality of social development issues increases from
51 percent to 74 percent satisfactory.  This percentage rises to 91
percent in relation to projects with social analysis and opera-
tional support from social development specialists. 
The Uzbekistan Water and Sanitation Project provides an
example of how Social Assessment can lead to better project
design and to the broader universe of law making.  In
Uzbekistan, the issues that the Social Assessment addressed were
at various levels: fundamental project design, the overall institu-
tional structure, government standards that would impact the
project, and operational procedures.  The results of the Social
Assessment process inform all of the various bodies involved in
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designing and implementing the project and should be used by
the water company, World Bank, and the borrowing country.
However, the Social Assessment process is only slowly
being incorporated into project design and implementation and,
more generally, into lawmaking.  One of the main obstacles to
selling the Social Assessment process as a benefit to develop-
ment projects and law-making and policy-making processes is
not having a clear and simple guide for performing a full Social
Assessment.  Currently, there is no legal requirement for Social
Assessments to be performed by all countries or for them to be
required by financial institutions.  However, Social Assessments
remain a critical part of the project system, allowing for:
• The project to be better aligned with the real needs of
the people;
• The project to fully weigh the options according to
costs, benefits, and the likelihood of various plans to
work;
• Project decisions to be based more heavily on facts,
rather than theories; and
• Priority can be given to specific target groups such as
the poor, the vulnerable, women, and the elderly in
ways that are tailored to their attitudes and behavior.
Another reason for the slow pace of its inclusion into leg-
islative methodology and project formulation, is that there is an
assumption that it is simpler, and therefore cheaper, to do with-
out the Social Assessment process.59 As the case study shows,
the social assessment process can help save significant amounts
of money.  In essence, the process is a market and feasibility
study forcing development projects to undergo the same scruti-
ny that a new business venture would go through.
Without Social Assessments, there will always be large
gaps between what we “think” is occurring and what is actually
occurring in people’s beliefs, attitudes, and actions.  Social
Assessments help align public needs with the project goals and
align national regulations with implementation and project suc-
cess.  The process significantly reduces the risk of failure for
projects and legislation.  By understanding the basic principles
of the Social Assessment process, countries can begin to under-
stand the importance of a thorough understanding of the social
background and can begin to implement Social Assessment in
their planning, legislation, and enforcement measures.
CONCLUSION
The Social Assessment process, as it has been practiced in
the World Bank, has proven to be a successful tool that will help
financial institutions and clients of financial institutions realize
successful and sustainable projects.  The process also has been
successful in gathering facts on which governments can make
more sound decisions, destroying myths and replacing them
with reality, and allowing different stakeholders to have a basis
of qualitative and quantitative instruments on which to make
decisions.  Social Assessment accomplishes these goals by pro-
viding knowledge about the social environment, including cur-
rent conditions, current attitudes, and the problems facing the
communities in the project area.  Once the Social Assessment is
performed, the clients and financial institutions can develop
projects and corresponding measures that will fit with the reali-
ty of social conditions and attitudes.
From a legal perspective, the greatest challenge in the soci-
ology of legislation is to remain focused on the people who are
either the beneficiaries or victims of legislation, or both.
Remaining focused on specific situations and groups of people
obligates legislators to fully understand people’s needs, under-
stand how to fulfill these needs, and pay particular attention to
those individuals who are most at risk.  Only then will legisla-
tors be able to make use of the appropriate mechanisms to
ensure that the legislation is fulfilling its goals. 
As seen through this Uzbekistan case study, even the
noblest of ideologies, such as providing water for free, must
undergo strict analysis to ensure that the results of the project
will be met, and that the objectives can be met within the cur-
rent social situation.  Furthermore, where ideological differ-
ences exist pertaining to the nature of the project, such as in
the water sector, Social Assessment can help opponents move
past strict ideologies and focus on larger objectives and suc-
cessful resolutions of disputes.  In all of these ways, the ele-
ments of Social Assessment that can improve project perform-
ance should be able to play the same role in establishing and
evaluating legislation.  
The four-pillar approach of Social Assessment, and its use
in Uzbekistan’s water sector, shows the extent of this possibili-
ty for the establishment and evaluation of legislation and regu-
lation anywhere in the world.  The Uzbekistan Water Project
provides an extreme example of a situation where the World
Bank had very little knowledge of or experience with the coun-
try, and the government of that country was weary of the
changes proposed by the World Bank.  The Social Assessment
process helped lay the foundation for negotiating the final
details of the project.  It also has a role in projects where there
is a long working relationship between the World Bank and the
host country, where there is a prior basis of knowledge, and also
where there is general agreement between the government and
the World Bank about broad policies and ideologies.
Furthermore, Social Assessment has the potential to expand into
legislation and regulation outside of the context of project
development.
A time, location, and specific basis of knowledge for every
project and every law will ensure that that the project or law
remains focused on the wants and needs of the people.  Social
Assessment will help countries accomplish these goals by prop-
erly including stakeholders, exploring the assumptions inherent
in the project design, and exploring available alternatives.  The
Social Assessment process makes business sense and will help
lead to the achievement of more efficient and effective project
designs and legislation.    
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INTRODUCTION
The South African Constitution, founded on a number of
values including “human dignity, the achievement of equality
and the advancement of human rights and freedoms,”1 recog-
nizes a vast array of social, economic, and cultural rights, includ-
ing the right to have access to “sufficient water.”2 In ensuring
this right, the government must take “reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the pro-
gressive realisation of each of these rights.”3 The Constitution
places general limitations on the Bill of Rights under Section
36(1) only to the extent that “the limitation is reasonable and jus-
tifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dig-
nity, equality and freedom.” Inadequate resources in South
Africa may also limit enforcement of socio-economic rights.4
Each person in South Africa is guaranteed 25 liters of free
water each day, which is a little more than the minimum neces-
sary for life.5 Despite the formal recognition of the right to
water and the promise of a basic water supply, many people
throughout South Africa live without safe, accessible, and suffi-
cient amounts of water. In 1998, some South African provinces
began to privatize the water industry and charge users full cost
recovery fees,6 in an effort to promote efficient water use.
Because many South Africans could not afford to pay for water,
they were forced to look elsewhere for this basic right.7 Thus, in
February 2002, more than 100,000 people fell victim to a ten-
month cholera outbreak after the water utility disconnected the
tap, and people were forced to find water in polluted ponds and
streams.8 As a result, lack of access to water creates a new kind
of apartheid in South Africa by separating those who can afford
the increased price of water from those who cannot.9
Although the Constitution requires state actors to respect,
protect, promote, and fulfill the right to water,10 many private
entities argue that they are immune from many of these obliga-
tions. Through an examination of the South African Constitution
and relevant legal jurisprudence, this article argues that state and
non-state actors have various constitutional obligations to
ensure the progressive realization of the right to water and
argues that, where water is publicly or privately supplied, the
government must provide the necessary oversight and take pos-
itive steps to ensure compliance with these duties. 
ANALYSIS
Despite the problems associated with water privatization,
little legal precedent exists to help determine the necessary
obligations imposed on both state and non-state actors with
regard to the right to water. However, as corporate advisors and
other institutions lobby for water privatization,11 an analysis of
these important obligations becomes especially crucial. South
African courts have an important role in enforcing these vari-
ous obligations and, at the least, must ensure that state and non-
state actors desist from impairing or preventing the right of
access to water.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
The formal recognition of the right to water remains a
“paper promise” without mechanisms to enforce the right.12 The
South African Constitution mandates that both the South
African Human Rights Commission (“Commission”) as well as
the South African Constitutional Court have a special duty to
ensure the realization of economic and social rights. The courts,
for example, are obliged to ensure that the Bill of Rights is pro-
tected and fulfilled.13 The South African Constitutional Court
may decide on “any issue involving the interpretation, protec-
tion or enforcement of the Constitution.”14 Unlike many consti-
tutional courts around the world, the South African Court takes
progressive steps to enforce the Constitution. The Court in Fose
v. Minister of Safety and Security held that:
[p]articularly in a country where so few have the means
to enforce their rights through the courts, it is essential
that on those occasions when the legal process does
establish that an infringement of an entrenched right has
occurred, it be effectively vindicated. The courts have a
particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to
‘forge news tools’ and shape innovative remedies, if
need be, to achieve this goal.15
The Constitutional Court therefore is an important mecha-
nism for granting the necessary remedies and for forging new
tools when rights have been infringed upon. 
As recognized in the South African Constitution, the
Human Rights Commission must “require relevant organs of
state to provide the Commission with information on the meas-
ures that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in
the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water,
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social security, education and the environment.”16 The
Commission, therefore, acts as a monitoring tool to assess the
realization of these rights. Moreover, the Commission and the
courts in South Africa often work in conjunction with one
another in the enforcement of these rights.17
The government has a wide margin of discretion regarding
appropriate measures in realizing the right to water. In
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, for example, the Court con-
cluded that the government did not violate the Constitution
when it failed to provide complete access to dialysis treatment
for those who did not have a chance of recovery, and instead
limited access to the treatment for those with the greatest chance
of recovery.18 Because the Court recognized that resources are
limited, it held that this was a reasonable allocation of the
resources. The Court noted that it “will be slow to interfere with
rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and
medical organs whose responsibility it is to deal with such mat-
ters.”19 Therefore, in the context of a citizen’s right to water, this
case indicated that the government has discretion in how water
will be allocated to its citizens. 
Although the Court acknowledges that available resources
may limit government action, it does require a duty of reason-
ableness, which should ensure
that the government devotes some
of its resources to the poor and
most desperate.20 Although the
immediate recognition of socio-
economic rights would be impos-
sible, the Court has the duty to
ensure that the government pro-
gressively realizes these rights
through various measures that are
designed to guarantee that the
poor are protected and their rights
are realized. The Court must
ensure that, at the least, “the State
and all other entities and persons” abide by “a negative obliga-
tion . . . to desist from preventing or impairing the right to
access” socio-economic rights.21
In determining the reasonableness of government and pri-
vate action, the Constitutional Court looks to relevant interna-
tional law, the interconnection of the rights, and the social and
historical context of the rights when interpreting the
Constitution.22 The South African Constitutional Court decides
on matters concerning “any issue involving the interpretation,
protection or enforcement of the Constitution.”23 The
Constitutional Court has a variety of approaches for interpreting
the Constitution to ensure the interpretation is “generous” and
“purposive” and “gives expression to the underlying values of
the Constitution.”24
The South African Constitution requires a court to consider
international law when interpreting its Bill of Rights. Section 39
of the Constitution states that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum . . . must consider internation-
al law; and may consider foreign law.” The Constitutional Court
recognized that international and customary law provides a use-
ful framework for interpreting the South African Bill of Rights.25
Access to water is a fundamental human right recognized in
treaties, declarations, and international law.26 In 2002, the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights issued General Comment No. 15, which declared the
human right to water and held that safe drinking water is a “pre-
requisite for the realization of other human rights.”27 The U.N.
General Comment requires that member states provide “suffi-
cient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable
water” to their citizens.28
The U.N. General Comment requires each ratifying country
to ensure immediately that everyone enjoys the right to water and
mandates that governments respect, protect, and fulfill their obli-
gations.29 Although the U.N. General Comment does not pro-
hibit water privatization, it does require that water be treated as
a social, and not necessarily as an economic, good. Water should
also be free from arbitrary disconnections, unaffordable price
increases, and contamination of water supplies affecting human
health. The U.N. General Comment obliges states to ensure equi-
table distribution of water to disadvantaged groups.30
Any persons or groups denied their basic right to water
should have access to legal or
other appropriate remedies.31
Where domestic or foreign cor-
porations or third parties operate
the water systems in certain coun-
tries, the U.N. General Comment
requires governments to ensure
that third parties distribute safe
and accessible drinking water
without discrimination.32 The
U.N. General Comment further
mandates that water should never
be used as a means of asserting
political or economic pressure.
Although the U.N. General Comment does not prohibit third
party participation in the water sector, it does mandate that gov-
ernments ensure equitable access to water.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court looks to the inter-
connectedness of the various rights. According to the
Constitutional Court in Government of the Republic of South
Africa v. Grootboom, the interconnectedness of the Constitution
requires that various rights must be “taken into account in inter-
preting the socio-economic rights, and, in particular, in deter-
mining whether the state has met its obligations in terms of
them.”33 The right to water remains inextricably linked to South
Africa’s basic democratic principles. Those in need of water will
generally not focus on participating in politics or vote in local
elections, rights that are guaranteed each citizen under Section
19(3) of the South Africa Constitution.34 According to the
World Health Organization (“WHO”), poor water quality and
lack of access to water also affects the right to an education
under Section 29 of the South African Constitution. Moreover,
the WHO states that access to safe water in schools increases
The formal recognition of
the right to water
remains a “paper
promise” without
mechanisms to enforce
the right.
student attendance and reduces drop-out rates.35 Furthermore,
as noted in Grootboom: “realizing socio-economic rights
enables people to enjoy the other rights in the Bill of Rights and
is the key to the advancement of race and gender equality and
the evolution of a society in which men and women are equally
able to achieve their full potential.”36
Rights, that are of particular importance as they relate to
access to water, are included in Section 11, which requires that
“every person shall have the right to life” and Section 9, which
requires that “every person shall have the right to equality
before the law and to equal protection of the law.” The
Grootboom Court also interpreted the right to adequate housing
in Section 26 to include the right to have access to services, such
as water and sewage.37 Therefore, in analyzing the various pro-
visions, the right to water is necessary for the realization of
other rights, including, among others, the right to food, health,
and adequate housing. 
Finally, the Constitutional Court considers the social and
historical context of each right when interpreting the
Constitution. The demand to remedy the gross injustices of
South Africa’s past has shaped the recognition of various rights
within the South African Constitution. Thus, the Constitution
should be interpreted with intent to transform the vast social
injustices of the past.38 Chief Justice Chaskalson in
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal) stated:
We live in a society in which there are great disparities
in wealth. Millions of people are living in deplorable
conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of
unemployment, inadequate social security, and many
do not have access to clean water or to adequate health
services. These conditions already existed when the
Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address
them, and to transform our society into one in which
there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies
at the heart of our new constitutional order. For as long
as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will
have a hollow ring.39
The Constitution includes various social and economic
rights, including the right to water, aimed to counter apartheid
and South Africa’s history of gross disparities along social and
economic lines.40
During apartheid, access to safe water was limited to the
rich, white landowners who owned the water on their land.41
Because of this link between land ownership and water, millions
of South Africa’s poor were left with polluted, contaminated
water. Even today, despite the formal recognition of the right to
water, many people throughout South Africa, especially the
poor, live without safe and accessible water.42
OBLIGATIONS OF STATE ACTORS TO RESPECT,
PROTECT, PROMOTE, AND FULFILL THE RIGHT TO
WATER
Although the national government can decentralize its
power, it remains responsible for realizing socio-economic
rights. Therefore, if the national government chooses to contract
with private water companies, it cannot contract away its obliga-
tions under the Constitution. These obligations continue whether
water services are privately or publicly provided. Section 8(1) of
the Constitution binds the state by mandating that the Bill of
Rights “applies to all law, and binds . . . all organs of state.”
Under Section 7 of the Constitution, the state is required to
respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the Bill of Rights. The
Constitution imposes both negative and positive obligations
upon the spheres of government, including the national govern-
ment, the provincial government, and the local government.
Under the Constitution, these spheres are obligated to cooperate
with one another by, for example, assisting and supporting one
another and by coordinating their actions and legislation.43
According to the Grootboom Court, “[l]ocal governments have
an important obligation to ensure that services are provided in a
sustainable manner to the communities that they govern.”44
However, the national government bears the ultimate responsi-
bility to ensure compliance with the state’s obligations.45
The Duty to Respect
In looking to relevant international law, the U.N. General
Comment lists examples of ways in which governments must
refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the right to
water. These include the obligation to refrain from: (1) “engag-
ing in any practice or activity that denies or limits equal access
to adequate water;” (2) “arbitrarily interfering with customary
or traditional arrangements for water allocation;” (3) “unlawful-
ly diminishing or polluting water;” or (4) “destroying water
services and infrastructure as a punitive measure, for example,
during armed conflicts in violation of international humanitari-
an law.”46 The U.N. General Comment also states that a viola-
tion of the obligation to respect occurs where a government
adopts discriminatory or unaffordable increases in the price of
water, or arbitrarily or unjustifiably disconnects or excludes cit-
izens from water services or facilities.47
The duty to respect requires that the government not inter-
fere with citizens’ access to safe and sufficient water.48
Therefore, in the context of water, the state may be in violation
of its duty to respect where it has enacted policies that deny cit-
izens access to water. Some South African provinces have
adopted discriminatory and unaffordable increases in the price
of water and unjustifiably disconnected citizens from water
services through their cost recovery programs. Certain legisla-
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During apartheid, access
to safe water was limited
to the rich, white
landowners who owned
the water on their land.
tive measures support the exercise of cost recovery programs,
including the White Paper on Water Policy, which states that
charging the full price for water would promote the efficient use
of water.49 However, full price charging has led to a 300 to 600
percent increase in the cost of water that leaves those who make
less than $2 a day without access to water because they are
unable to pay their bills.50 Cost recovery programs, therefore,
are not generally reasonable if the government does not also
“devise, fund, implement and supervise measures to provide
relief to those in desperate need.”51
Where water is privatized, the government is in violation of
its duty to fulfill its obligation to citizens if it allows private
water companies to arbitrarily disconnect water taps or to adopt
discriminatory or unaffordable increases in the price of water.
Cost recovery programs may unconstitutionally interfere with
the enjoyment of the right to water if such programs leave those
who cannot pay without safe and accessible water.
The Duty to Protect
The duty to protect requires that the government adopt leg-
islative and other measures to protect the poor and other vulner-
able groups against private and public entities that violate their
rights. Because private and public water companies tend to
overcharge consumers and cut off water to those who cannot
afford to pay the increased prices, the government must provide
the necessary oversight to ensure compliance with its constitu-
tional obligations.52 Currently, many South African citizens are
encountering disconnection to water services because they can-
not afford to pay their water bills. 
The Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa
conducted a survey that revealed more than ten million people
have been affected by water cutoffs since the end of apartheid.
One Johannesburg woman noted that “[t]he problem is not that
we do not want to pay for water . . . The problem is we cannot
pay.”53 Some argue that people should not be charged for such
a basic necessity. One veteran of the anti-apartheid movement
noted that “[t]he government promised us that water is a basic
right. But now they are telling us our rights are for sale.”54
These frustrations are common throughout much of South
Africa as people are forced to drink polluted water because pri-
vate companies and local municipalities have denied them this
basic resource necessary for survival. 
The U.N. General Comment states that the duty to protect
the right to water “requires State parties to prevent third parties
from interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the right to
water.”55 Third parties include individuals, groups, corpora-
tions, and other entities as well as agents of these entities.56
States must therefore adopt “the necessary and effective legisla-
tive and other measures to restrain, for example, third parties
from denying equal access to adequate water; and polluting and
inequitably extracting from water resources, including natural
sources, wells and other water distribution systems.”57 Where
water is privatized, the U.N. General Comment requires that:
State parties must prevent them from compromising
equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient,
safe and acceptable water. To prevent such abuses an
effective regulatory system must be established, in
conformity with the Covenant and this General
Comment, which includes independent monitoring,
genuine public participation and imposition of penal-
ties for non-compliance.
To ensure the protection of the right to water, the govern-
ment should provide independent monitoring, regulation, and
public participation. The government may be required to ensure
that the private water supplier provides accurate information to
consumers regarding water pricing and accessibility.58 Section
195(1) of the South African Constitution requires that
“[p]eople’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be
encouraged to participate in policy-making.” 
Moreover, WHO states that the government must protect
citizens and ensure that water is accessible, safe and acceptable,
and affordable. In one recent estimate, WHO found that “the
poor pay on average 12 times more per litre of water than their
counterparts with a municipal supply.”59 The WHO argued that
government must ensure the affordability of water by matching
prices with what people can actually pay.60 When third parties
are controlling the water, the government must ensure that the
private companies offer various price ranges to avoid water cut-
offs. Water disconnections to the poorest in South Africa, who
are unable to pay their water bills, are unjustifiable restrictions
on the right to sufficient water. Thus, the government has failed
to protect the right to water where it allows or fails to enact rea-
sonable legislation to prevent private or public entities from
denying equal access to adequate water.
Duty to Promote and Fulfill
The duty to promote and fulfill requires that the state “take
positive measures to ensure that those persons who currently
lack access to the rights gain access to them.”61 The U.N.
General Comment explains that the duty to promote the right to
water requires that the state promote appropriate education con-
cerning the hygienic use of water, protection of water sources,
and methods to minimize water wastage.62
Grootboom also requires that government measures must
be reasonable both in their conception and in their implementa-
tion. The Grootboom Court held that a housing program, which
did not provide for a short-term, low-income housing shelter for
homeless people, violated Section 26 of the Constitution, which
guarantees the right to have access to housing. In the context of
water, the government is required to take “reasonable legislative
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realization” of the right to water.63
The government is also required to take steps to achieve the
intended result, and “the legislative measures will invariably
have to be supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and
programmes implemented by the executive.”64 The Court held
that it must determine whether the measure is implemented rea-
sonably by being “sufficiently flexible to respond to those in
desperate need in our society and to cater appropriately for
immediate and short-term requirements.”65 In addition, the
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measures must make appropriate provisions that ensure compli-
ance with short, medium, and long terms needs.66 A measure
will not meet the reasonableness requirement if it ignores the
needs of the most poor and desperate.67
The South African government has enacted measures that
seek to progressively realize the right to water. For example,
The Water Services Act requires that everyone have a right of
access to basic water supply and that “[e]very water services
authority must, in its water services development plan, provide
for measures to realize these rights.”68 Moreover, any proce-
dures for limiting the water supply must be “fair and equi-
table.”69 Any discontinuation must not result in a person being
denied access to basic water services because he or she is unable
to pay.70 Water tap disconnections constitute a potential breach
of constitutional and legislative obligations. 
In Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v. Southern
Metropolitan Local Council, the Court held that constitutional
justification was required where the Council disconnected the
water supply because users failed to pay. The Court held that a
disconnection of this sort constitutes a prima facie breach of the
Council’s constitutional obligation to respect the right to water.
The High Court noted that “water supply may not be discontin-
ued if it results in a person being denied access to water servic-
es for non-payment, where that person proves, to the satisfaction
of the relevant water services authority, that he or she is unable
to pay for basic services.” The municipalities have the burden of
proving that they are justified in disconnecting the water.71
Despite the Water Services Act, water throughout South
Africa is being disconnected both by municipalities and by pri-
vate water companies. Although immediate access to water to
everyone remains impossible, the government is obligated to
take steps toward the full realization of the right. In
Soobramoney the Court acknowledged that the government
might be limited by available resources when adopting new
measures to progressively realize various socio-economic
rights. It stated that:
What is apparent from these provisions is that the obli-
gations imposed on the State by ss [Sic] 26 and 27 in
regard to access to housing, health care, food, water
and social security are dependent upon the resources
available for such purposes, and that the corresponding
rights themselves are limited by reason of lack of
resources.72
The Court in Grootboom also noted “the State is not
obliged to go beyond available resources or to realize these
rights immediately.” 
However, as more and more municipalities opt to privatize
their water infrastructure, regulations play a vital role in ensur-
ing the right to water. The government must provide the means
for citizens to access water, including free water services, even
if it means providing access to water to those who cannot afford
to pay.73 According to U.N. General Comment, governments are
obligated to provide water when individuals are unable to “real-
ize that right themselves.”74 States must adopt necessary meas-
ures that may include “appropriate pricing policies such as free
or low-cost water.”75 Where companies seek to impose cost
recovery programs, governments should ensure that every citi-
zen could afford, and gain access to, the water supply on a
nondiscriminatory basis.76 Governments are allowed some flex-
ibility when dealing with limited resources. However, after
Grootboom it remains clear that, at minimum, state actors must
ensure that their measures provide “temporary relief for people”
with no access to basic socio-economic rights, such as water.77
The state must ensure that water is provided on an equitable
basis and not merely to those who can afford the increasing cost
of water. Approximately 78 percent of South Africa’s water is
used by industry and only 12 percent by the general con-
sumers.78 Statistics reveal that a mere 27 percent of South
Africans have tap water in their homes. Moreover, while South
Africans consume about 12 percent of the country’s water,
blacks generally consume only one tenth of that amount.79
Pursuant to the Constitution, which aims to achieve “[h]uman
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of
human rights and freedoms,”80 the state is in violation of its
constitutional obligations where it allows private water compa-
nies or local governments to adopt cost recovery programs that
separate those who can afford the water from those who cannot.
OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
Throughout South Africa, non-state actors are supplying
basic services central to human survival. The actions of private
entities have profound implications for the human right to water,
making it necessary for these entities to comply with their con-
stitutional obligations. The South African Constitution is not
directed solely to the public sphere; instead it obliges horizontal
application of its Bill of Rights to non-state actors. Section 8(2)
of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Bill of Rights applies to
all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and
all organs of state [and] binds a natural or juristic person if, and
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature
of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”
This provision therefore binds natural and juristic persons,
including the private sphere. However, despite this
Constitutional mandate, some commentators argue that the right
to access to sufficient water should not impose positive burdens
on private agencies. 
Critics of horizontal application argue that constitutions
regulate the public rather than the private sphere. This argument
seems rooted in the notion of natural law, which prohibits gov-
ernment interference with private activities.81 However, this
notion of natural law allows non-state entities to violate basic
human rights without accountability.82 Because globalization
has led to a growing amount of corporate control over some of
the most basic human needs, human rights obligations should
apply to the private sphere.83 In other words, “[i]f a bill of rights
is there to create a ‘culture of justification’ by those who wield
political power, one would question the wisdom of letting those
who wield other forms of power akin to state power, or of a
nature resulting in violations of individuals’ or group rights,
escape similar accountability.”84
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The argument against horizontal application of the
Constitution to the private sphere would render many constitu-
tional provisions superfluous. The increased number of private
actors supplying water and other basic rights would be free to
ignore the basic rights recognized under the Constitution with-
out consequence. Because water privatization is becoming
increasingly common throughout South Africa, the argument
against horizontal application to private actors undermines the
basic values underlying the South African Bill of Rights and
International Law.
The Grootboom Court indicated that private entities have a
duty to respect socio-economic rights. According to the Court,
Section 26 of the South African Constitution mandates, “at the
very least, a negative obligation upon the state and all other enti-
ties and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right
to access to adequate housing.”85 The Court also stated “it is not
only the State that is responsible for the provision of the houses,
but that other agents within our society, including individuals
themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures to
provide housing.”86
A Look to International Law Concerning Obligations
of Non-state Actors
International law specifically mandates various obligations
to non-state actors. Danwood Chirwa, in his article Obligations
of Non-state Actors in Relation to Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights under the South African Constitution, looks to interna-
tional law and emerging jurisprudence in determining the various
direct and indirect obligations of non-state actors. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, for example, explicitly mandates
certain obligations on non-state actors. The Declaration’s pream-
ble states that “every individual and every organ of society” must
promote respect for the rights and take progressive steps “to
secure their Universal and effective recognition and obser-
vance.” As Chirwa noted, “[n]either ‘organ of state’ nor ‘indi-
vidual’ can be said to exclude corporations.”87
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man also
oblige non-state actors to take positive steps to ensure the vari-
ous recognized rights.88 Additionally, the preamble to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
states that an individual, “having duties to other individuals and
to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility
to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant.”89 Other international declara-
tions such as the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination and the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance, among others also rec-
ognize the positive and negative obligations required of non-state
actors. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the U.N. General
Comment requires indirect obligations on private actors where
the state must ensure that third parties do not interfere in any way
with the realization of the right to water.90
WHO posits that all individuals and stakeholders must com-
ply with government plans, policies and laws intended to respect,
protect, and fulfill the right to water. Specifically, national and
multinational private service providers should work to ensure
equity in reliability of services, give priority to supplies for the
most marginalized communities, and advance provisions direct-
ed toward an increase in the number of people served.91
Specific Obligations of Non-state Actors
Because market forces cannot adequately regulate private
water service providers, these non-state actors should be held to
many of the same standards as applied to government service.92
Many private companies supply and maintain a monopoly over
water. Because these companies provide goods that people can-
not live without and because they face little competition in the
process, market forces will most likely not protect consumers.93
Moreover, many of the major companies that provide water
have vast amounts of power, both in the form of political power
and in overall capital.94 This creates a dangerous imbalance
between the provider and the consumers, potentially leaving the
consumers powerless to defend their interests. Therefore, to
ensure the progressive realization of the right to water, private
entities should abide by specific constitutional obligations.
The Constitution explicitly recognizes some duties that
may be directly applied to private actors. Section 9(4) provides
that “[n]o person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirect-
ly against anyone.” Furthermore, Section 26(3) mandates that
“[n]o one may be evicted from their home, or have their home
demolished, without an order of court made after considering all
the relevant circumstances.” Section 29(3) also states that
“[e]veryone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own
expense, independent educational institutions that do not dis-
criminate on the basis of race.” Although not explicitly directed
toward private actors, many of the constitutional provisions list-
ed above would be rendered superfluous if private actors could
simply ignore constitutional mandates and unfairly discriminate
against anyone without consequence, evict people from their
homes without court orders, or discriminate because of race in a
private school. 
The various obligations required of non-state actors depend
on the nature of the private actor’s participation in activities typ-
ically reserved for the state.95 Section 8(2) of the Constitution
states “the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person . . .
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature
of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”
Chirwa argued that South Africa should use the “state action”
law criteria as used in the United States to determine the obli-
gations of various private actors.96 In other words, Chirwa
argues that, as in the United States, a plaintiff must establish that
the private actor is providing a traditionally public service to
prevail. Therefore “private actors exercising the functions of the
state would be held liable for human rights violations . . . [and]
would be responsible to bear the relevant socio-economic rights
obligations that the state would have borne.”97 Where a private
actor is supplying water services, it would be required to carry
out the same obligations the Constitution imposes on the state
with regard to the human right to water. In other words, it would
be required to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the right to
63 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
64WINTER 2004 
water. Thus, as mandated by domestic and international law,
where the government decides to privatize its water services,
non-state parties are required take affirmative steps toward the
realization of the right to water. 
CONCLUSION
Public and private policies that allow for the disconnection
of water to those who cannot pay their bills violate the South
African Constitution and international law. Such disconnections
create a new kind of apartheid that separates those who can
afford to pay their water bills from those who cannot. One of the
basic values of the South African Constitution seeks to eradicate
this type of unequal treatment. Where water is publicly or pri-
vately provided, the Court should act to ensure that the govern-
ment respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the right to water.
Furthermore, the government must enact reasonable legislation
that ensures access to water to the most desperate in South
African society. Although the government remains ultimately
responsible for gensuring the right to water, private water com-
panies that engage in the water services sector must also ensure
this right. Without the enforcement of these duties, the
Constitution will be a paper promise, allowing the gross injus-
tices of South Africa’s past to continue into the future.
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On October 31, 2004, more than sixty percent of theUruguayan people voted to amend their constitutionand make water a human right – a decision that
guarantees public management of water services for
Uruguay in the future.1 Further, the executive branch deter-
mined that the constitutional amendment would be retroac-
tive, that all current water companies in Uruguay are no
longer legally authorized to do business in the country,2 and
that an “orderly, fast, and fluid” retreat of the water compa-
nies would be organized.3
At least twelve companies in Uruguay will be affected
by the water plebiscite.4 The State Sanitary Works (“OSE”)
will take over the provision of water services5 and
announced that it is prepared to be responsible for the 60,000
households that will now require service.6
The referendum to make water a constitutional right
was promoted by a coalition of social and political organiza-
tions calling themselves the National Commission in
Defense of Water and Life (“CNDAV”), united under their
opposition to water in Uruguay.7 Reasons for opposition
included unaffordable, low quality services that were bur-
densome on the state economy, and environmental harms
caused by the private companies.8
Civil society opposition to water privatization is com-
mon throughout Latin America. The most famous incident of
civil society resistance to water privatization is the
Cochabamba, Bolivia case. In that instance, a water compa-
ny partly owned by the multinational corporation Bechtel
took over water services in Cochabamba in late 1999.9 Water
bills rose sky-high and in April, Bolivians began to riot in the
streets.10 After eight days, the government announced that
the water company had fled the country, and water services
had returned to the control of the government.11
Other countries in Latin America face similar conflicts
over the privatization of water services. Nicaragua will soon
decide whether or not to accept 13.9 billion dollars from the
Inter-American Development bank for the privatization of
their water services. Non-governmental organizations are
proposing a bill for Nicaragua that, like the recent decision
in Uruguay, recognizes water as a human right and empha-
sizes the necessity for low-cost access to water.12
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO WATER IN URUGUAY
By Rachael Moshman*
Colombians at a protest against the Andean Free Trade Agreement in
Bogotá, Summer 2004, hold a sign reading, “Water is a common good,
never a commodity.”
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newswire.php?story_id=67283 (last visited Nov. 28, 2004).
2Para el Poder Ejecutivo la Reforma del Agua es Retroactive, El Pais, Nov.
11, 2004, available at http://www.elpais.com.uy (last visited Nov. 28, 2004).
3Ejecutivo Decidió que Deben Caer las Concesiones de Agua, El Pais,
Nov. 12, 2004, available at http://www.elpais.com.uy (last visited Nov. 28,
2004).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 OSE Asegura Provision del Servicio de Agua en Lugar de los Privados,
El Pais, Nov. 11, 2004, available at http://www.elpais.com.uy (last visited
Nov. 28, 2004).
7 Id.
8 Supra note 1.
9 See Connie Watson, CBC News, Sell the Rain: How the Privatization of
Water Caused the Riots in Cochabamba, Bolivia (Feb. 4, 2003), available
at http://www.cbc.ca/news/features/water/bolivia.html (last visited Nov. 28,
2004).
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INTRODUCTION
The Methanex case involves a California state law pro-tecting the environment and public health, which cameunder increasing scrutiny and involved a lengthy legal
dispute within the confines of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”). The Methanex case initiated from a
claim filed by Canadian-based Methanex Corporation under
NAFTA Chapter 11 against the United States, based on an
investment dispute rising from a California state environmental
protection measure. 
SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND REGARDING MTBE
In 1999, the Governor of California released Executive
Order D-55-99 that ordered the removal of Methyl Tertiary-
Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) from California gasoline at the earliest
possible date, but no later than December 31, 2002.1 In March
2002, the Governor extended the phase out for another year,
until March 2003.2 MTBE is a chemical made of oxygen, but
often is added to gasoline to boost its octane content, specifical-
ly to meet clean fuel requirements.3 The oxygen content in gaso-
line helps the gasoline burn more completely and reduce the
harmful emissions from automobiles.4 MTBE has been used by
the United States in different forms since 1979, and is a volatile
clear liquid that dissolves easily into water.5 MTBE poses a
health risk when it enters the drinking water supply from leak-
ing underground storage tanks, pipelines, spills, emissions from
marine engines into lakes and reservoirs, and minimally from air
deposition.6 The World Health Organization has claimed that
MTBE presents a risk to the water supply as a known carcino-
gen.7 California passed the ban on MTBE because of its con-
tamination of drinking supplies, and consequent potential for
negative health and environmental impacts.8
BACKGROUND ON NAFTA CHAPTER 11
Methanex Corporation filed suit against the United States
in June 1999, as a party to NAFTA under the treaty’s Chapter 11.
NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994 and since its ini-
tiation, multinational corporations have used its dispute settle-
ment mechanism to bring suits against national public regula-
tions in Mexico, Canada, and the United States.9 Chapter 11 of
NAFTA provides rights to foreign investors and their invest-
ments within NAFTA countries, and protects them from regula-
tions and measures taken by governments.10 Under Chapter 11,
the definition of “measure” is broad and entails laws adopted by
national, state, or provincial legislatures; regulations that imple-
ment these laws; local or municipal laws and bylaws; and poli-
cies that affect government interaction with businesses.11
Chapter 11 also governs laws and regulations that existed prior
to its entry into force, unless specifically excluded in the statute,
and excludes all state laws in force before 1994.12 These provi-
sions of NAFTA became controversial because they decreased
government’s ability to maintain and pursue regulations and
laws created for the public good.13 Chapter 11 also holds two
dispute settlement processes: the first can be seen in the
Methanex case where an investor state process is instigated
directly by the investor against the host state, and the second
involves a state-to-state dispute resolution process that can also
be found in Chapter 20.14 The first type of dispute resolution
process remains the most common, with 17 cases brought before
panels until 2001. Chapter 11 contains three different types of
environmental statutes: (1) Article 1114 states that nothing in
Chapter 11 prevents a country from establishing an environ-
mental measure that is otherwise inconsistent with the Chapter;
(2) the second paragraph of Article 1114 states that no country
should avoid relaxing environmental legislation in exchange for
trade lenient measures; and (3) Article 2101 of NAFTA includes
the general exceptions to NAFTA, including those environmen-
tal measures meant to protect human, animal and plant life,
health, and conservation of natural resources.15
METHANEX’S CLAIMS
Methanex filed a claim under Article 1110 of NAFTA.
Article 1110 states: “no Party shall directly or indirectly nation-
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alize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another
Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to national-
ization or expropriation of such an investment...[without] com-
pensation.”16 Methanex claims that the effect of Governor
Davis’ phase-out measure had the effect of expropriating part of
Methanex’s business and requires a compensation claim for
damages.17 In 2000, Methanex brought the one billion dollar
claim against the United States for violation of Article 1110 by
enacting the specific regulations to phase out MTBE in
California, and turned the investment dispute into the single
largest takings claim in U.S. history.18
NAFTA TRANSPARENCY ISSUES
One of the main issues and dispute resolution landmarks of
this case has been its transparency. NAFTA Chapter 11 claims
notoriously lack transparency in their dispute resolution
process.19 Specifically, in this case non-profit organizations
petitioned and won the right to present amici briefs to the dis-
pute resolution arbitration panel in support of a claimant. The
Center for International Environmental Law, Earthjustice repre-
senting Bluewater Network, Communities for a Better
Environment, and the International Institute for Sustainable
Development all petitioned to write supporting briefs for the
United States, and succeeded to present their cases to the tribu-
nal as amicus briefs.20 This became the first time NAFTA stat-
ed that it has the authority to accept amici briefs in dispute res-
olution arbitrations, and allowed third party participation in
investor and state arbitration.21
In June 2004, the Arbitration Tribunal, headed by President
V.V. Veeder, Q.C., Arbitrator Professor W. Michael Reisman,
and Arbitrator J. William Rowley, Q.C., began its final hearings
and listened to the arguments for each party at the World Bank
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Another aspect of transparen-
cy apparent in this case included the availability of the Tribunal
hearings via videotape to the public. Representatives from non-
governmental organizations and groups interested in the out-
come of the case who attended these hearings were able to
ascertain the main arguments from each party. The Tribunal has
not reached a decision on the case to date, but the case remains
a first step into full transparency surrounding international
investment disputes under NAFTA.
1See California Energy Commission: MTBE Phase-Out, Energy Commission
Phase-Out Study (explaining the reasoning and scientific basis behind the
phase out planned by the state of California), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/mtbe (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). 
2See id.
3See United States Environmental Protection Agency: MTBE Overview (artic-
ulating the specific uses of MTBE, and the environmental consequences of its
production and use), at http://www.epa.gov/mtbe/, (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). 
4See id.
5See id.
6See id.
7See Julia Ferguson, California Concerned About Water: Canadian
Corporation Files NAFTA Expropriation Claim Against United States, 1999
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 65, 66 (1999). 
8See California MTBE Phase Out Study, supra note 1. 
9See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA’S
CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTORS RIGHTS (2001). 
10See North American Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1994, ch. 11. 
11See id. 
12See id. See also GUIDE TO NAFTA’S CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON
INVESTORS’ RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 10. 
13See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 11, 19
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1993). 
14See id.; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 20, 19
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1993).
15See id.
16See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 11, art. 1110
19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1993); Ferguson, supra note 7. 
17See Ferguson, supra note 7.
18See Joel C. Beauvais, Student Article, Regulatory Expropriations under
NAFTA: Emerging Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245,
245-46 (2002). 
19See Lucien J. Dhooge, The Revenge of the Trail Smelter: Environmental
Regulation as Expropriation Pursuant to The North American Free Trade
Agreement, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 475, 555 (2001) (arguing that NAFTA dispute
resolution procedures need transparency, which can be attained by allowing
public access to the dispute resolution process in every way, and that disclo-
sure of the consultative process between the investor and the host state that is
not prohibited by any provision within NAFTA). 
20See, e.g., Submission of Non-Disputing Parties Bluewater Network,
Communities for a Better Environment, and Center for International
Environmental Law, In the Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
Between Methanex Corporation, Claimant/Investor, and United States of
American, Respondent/Party (March 9, 2004). 
21See A Backgrounder on the Controversial Case Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11,
and on IISD’s Involvement, International Institute for Sustainable
Development, (Aug. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.iisd.org/investment/methanex_background.asp (last visited Nov. 30,
2004). 
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INTRODUCTION
The case of Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. andVivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, often referredto as the “Vivendi-Argentina water dispute,” has been
ongoing for almost eight years. The case stems from a dispute
surrounding a 1995 concession contract (hereinafter
“Concession Contract”) made between a French company,
Compagnie Generale des Eaux (“CGE”) (acting with its
Argentine affiliate, Compania de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A) and
the Argentine province of Tucuman.1
After a lengthy series of arbitrations and appeals, the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”) agreed in May 2004 to create a new three-member
arbitration tribunal to hear the case once more.
THE DISPUTE’S ORIGINS AND CENTRAL ISSUES
Prior to signing the Concession Contract, the Argentine
Republic was a party to a 1991 bilateral investment treaty2 with
the Republic of France (often referred to as the “Argentine-
French BIT”). Additionally, the Argentine Republic and France
were also parties to the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (“ICSID Convention”) at the time of the signing of the
Concession Contract.
Although a provision of the Concession Contract between
CGE and Tucuman provided for the resolution of contract dis-
putes to be submitted solely to the Tucuman administrative
courts,3 CGE preferred ICSID4 to hear the company’s claim,
which sought over USD $300 million. The Argentine Republic
opposed this choice of forum, arguing that it had not consented
to the dispute resolution methodology proposed by the ICSID
Convention. Further, the Argentine Republic, relying on the pro-
vision in the Concession Contract, defended that the adminis-
trative courts of Tucuman should have exclusive jurisdiction.
Because the Concession Contract itself makes no reference
to the BIT or ICSID Convention, the primary issue facing the
ICSID Tribunal was to determine the underlying significance
of the forum selection provision (Article 16.4) of the
Concession Contract.
ARBITRATION HISTORY
On November 21, 2000, the ICSID Tribunal heard
Vivendi’s claim accusing Argentina of breaching its bilateral
investment treaty with France.5 The tribunal rejected Vivendi’s
claims on the basis that they were primarily based upon contract
issues—a matter left to the sole jurisdiction of the Tucuman
administrative courts according to Article 16.4 of the
Concession Contract. 
Then on July 2002, a three-member committee (“ICSID Ad
Hoc Committee”) partially annulled the preceding arbitration
award in holding that the original tribunal failed to exercise its
powers in declining to review the alleged treaty breaches.
On May 28, 2003, the same committee reached an addi-
tional decision on the request for supplementation and rectifica-
tion of its decision concerning annulment of the award, which
permitted Vivendi to register its claim with the ICSID yet again.
NEW ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL SELECTED
In May 2004, ICSID selected a new three-member arbi-
tration tribunal to hear the claim. The members are J. William
Rowley, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, and Carlos Bernal
Verea. Mr. Rowley’s6 arbitration experience includes serving
as a member of the National Panel of Arbitrators for Canada,
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, as well as
numerous other arbitration panels. Ms. Kaufmann-Kohler is a
Professor of Law at the University of Geneva and is currently
serving as an arbitrator in three additional ICSID water com-
pany claims against various provinces of Argentina.7 Mr.
Bernal Verea has also served as an arbitrator in previous, high-
profile ICSID arbitration disputes. Most notably, he arbitrated
the dispute involving the treatment of a hazardous waste dis-
posal business between Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed,
S.A. and Mexico.8
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1 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Compagnie Generale des Eaux
v. Argentine Republic, Award of the Tribunal, ICSID ARB/97/3 (Nov. 21,
2000) (clarifying, “The Republic of Argentina was not a party to the
Concession Contract or to the negotiation that led to its conclusion”).
2 See Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of France
for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on July 3,
1991, approved Argentine Law No. 24.100, Boletin Oficial, July 14, 1992.
3 See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Compagnie Generale des
Eaux v. Argentine Republic, Award of the Tribunal, ICSID ARB/97/3 (Nov.
21, 2000) (indicating “Article 16.4 provided for the resolution of contract dis-
putes, concerning both interpretation and application, to be submitted to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the contentious administrative courts of Tucuman”).
4 See Argentine-French BIT, Articles 3 and 5 (providing each of the
Contracting Parties shall grant, “fair and equitable treatment according to the
principles of international law to investments made by investors of the other
Party,” and that investments shall enjoy, “protection and full security in accor-
dance with the principle of fair and equitable treatment” and that Contracting
Parties shall not adopt expropriatory or nationalizing measures except for a
public purpose, without discrimination and upon payment of “prompt and ade-
quate compensation.” See id. at Art. 8 (conditioning, “if an investment dispute
arises between one Contracting Party and an investor from another
Contracting Party and that dispute cannot be resolved within 6 months through
amicable consultations, then the investor may submit the dispute either to the
national jurisdictions of the Contracting Convention or to an ad hoc tribunal
pursuant to the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law.)
5 See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v.
Argentine Republic, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the
Committee, ICSID ARB/97/3 (Oct. 3, 2001) (citing the new parent company
as Vivendi Universal).
6 See Biography of J. William Rowley, Q.C., Federated Press Home Page, at
http://federatedpress.com/DirOfProf/Rowley.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
7 See Luke Eric Peterson, New Tribunal Constituted in Long-Running Vivendi-
Argentina Water Dispute, INVEST-SD News Bulletin, May 11, 2004, at
http://www.iisd.org/investment/invest-sd (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). 
8 Id.
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Perhaps no other issue better illuminates the clash betweeneconomic development and environmental conservationthan the situation in the Everglades. Billions of dollars
and countless numbers of hours are currently being spent to
reverse the devastation that has been wrought in Florida’s south-
ern tip as a result of centuries of poor engineering and ignorance
of the area’s intricate ecosystem. As Diane Raines Ward points
out in her epilogue to Water Wars, “[t]he fight to reverse what
human beings have done there has become the biggest political
battle and engineering initiative in American history.” And this
multi-billion dollar clash in the Everglades involves one simple
resource – water. 
It is incredibly easy to take water for granted. Most of us,
particularly those living on the east coast of the United States,
have a ready supply of running water and likely spend little time
worrying about our access to it or whether it’s safe and healthy
to consume. This luxury is not the reality for many in the world,
however, a point that Ms. Ward’s Water Wars makes clear. 
In her sweeping and fascinating overview of some of the
most vexing water issues facing the world today, Ms. Ward con-
tinually emphasizes the fact that access to safe, clean water is a
problem that increases in magnitude every day. As she points
out, “[s]ince the middle of the last century, while the population
doubled, water use has tripled. At the same time, we have dirt-
ied that water with human, industrial, and agricultural wastes.”
In too many places around the world, managing, finding and
ensuring the safety of water has become an enormous burden,
and too frequently this task is undertaken without considering
the far reaching effects of man’s efforts on the environment.
Ms. Raines explores the problems of water management
from the arid western United States, with its history of reclama-
tion projects and the current problems facing burgeoning cities
such as Las Vegas, to the struggles in India and Pakistan over
access to water in the Indus Basin. She explores the controver-
sy surrounding dam construction throughout the world, provid-
ing case studies from various countries in a manner that is
respectful of the human ingenuity that contributed to many of
these engineering marvels but realistic in her assessment of the
destruction that many have caused. As she points out, “[a] dam
shouldn’t come down just because it’s there, any more than a
river should be dammed simply because it can be.” As Water
Wars makes clear, a more sophisticated understanding of our
surrounding ecosystem along with increased collaboration
between engineers and environmentalists is crucial to the future
of water management. 
Ms. Raines provides historical accounts of water projects in
countries around the world as well as assessments of the current
state of affairs. Throughout the book, she manages to frame the
issue of development versus conservation in a balanced fashion,
providing examples of projects that have succeeded in manag-
ing water in an environmentally sustainable manner. Such
examples include the use of industrial recycling systems that
catch used water and use it again, a practice that has been adopt-
ed by corporations such as Hewlett-Packard and Xerox. She also
briefly discusses the controversial issues surrounding water
markets and how many believe that governments and communi-
ties might more effectively manage their water if it is treated as
an economic commodity. 
If there is a criticism of Water Wars it is only that it will
likely leave most interested readers wanting more depth and
more specifics about particular water projects. Her piecemeal
approach to the book, however, illustrates an important point –
lessons learned in one area of the world could be vitally impor-
tant to governments, engineers and environmentalists who are
interested in avoiding disasters such as the Everglades from
occurring again. 
Water Wars is an accessible and ideal book for anyone
interested in an introduction to the many issues surrounding
water management and is the ideal starting point for anyone
dedicated to solving the tremendous water problems facing the
world today. 
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Through its in-depth discussion of water resources, TheHuman Right to Water is an astute discussion linkinghuman rights to the environment.  This book is an impor-
tant step in advancing the understanding of how the environ-
ment affects people’s rights and recognizing that human rights
lawyers and environmental lawyers often have similar goals.
Even though a human right to water has gradually gained recog-
nition, only in 2002 did the international community, through
the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(“CESCR”), state that water is a human rights issue bringing the
topic to center stage.
Salman M.A. Salman, a specialist in water law at the World
Bank and lead counsel in the Environmentally and Socially
Sustainable Development (“ESSD”) and International Law
Group of the World Bank Legal Presidency, and Siobhán
McInerney-Lankford, a specialist in human rights law and coun-
sel in the ESSD and International Law Group at the Bank, have
joined this conversation with the publication of the Human Right
to Water.  The main goal of this book is to provide an overview
of how water fits within the human rights framework rather than
an analysis of the implications of declaring water as a human
right.  Overall, the book was not only informative but a well-
written discussion on the evolution of a human right to water and
is a valuable resource for analyzing the legal basis for this right.
This book outlines the progression of general international
law and specific human rights law in framing a linkage to a
human right to water.  The authors discuss resolutions and decla-
rations from a variety of conferences and forums, addressing
water both as a basic human need and as a right.  These include
declarations on the Right to Development, the International Year
of Fresh Water (2003), the Millennium Development Goals, and
the International Decade for Action, “Water for Life” 2005-2015.
The authors narrow the book’s focus to the international legal
regime on human rights by first exploring the International Bill of
Human Rights.  They then explore how the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights have been applied to water.
Any discussion about a human right to water from a legal and
policy point of view must be based upon a sound understanding of
the current status of a human right to water.  It is here that the book
provides the greatest value to the reader.  The two main strengths
of this book are (1) its ability to present comprehensive research
and analysis on the evolution of the CESCR and the importance of
the Committee’s General Comments, and (2) its use of practical
examples illustrating how the human right to water can be
achieved, specifically in South Africa, Armenia, and Chile. 
The authors concluded, “General Comment No. 15 recog-
nizing a human right to water, provides further evidence that
there is an incipient right to water evolving in public interna-
tional law today” (pg. 89).  Though presenting strong legal and
policy support for identifying the connection between human
rights and water, the authors avoid discussing why this connec-
tion is only in its incipient stages rather than an established
right.  Admittedly, the legal and policy implications of recog-
nizing such a right in the global community are beyond the
scope of this book.  However, the discussion of this right may
lead to speculation about what would a human right to water
mean to the Bank as an institution whose mission statement is
“to fight poverty and improve the living standards of people in
the developing world,”1 but is also an institution whose role is
to balance the wants of the people and the interests of its mem-
ber governments?  Readers will not find a definitive discussion
of sustainable solutions that strike a balance between the recog-
nition of water as essential to human life but also as a finite
resource necessitating conservation and regulation.  
Overall, Mr. Salman and Ms. McInerney-Lankford intro-
duce a well-written introduction to recognizing a human right to
water.  It provides an excellent starting point for future insights
into aspects of law and justice surrounding water and advancing
the status of the human right to water.  Yet, although the authors’
purpose is achieved, the question still remains whether a human
right to water should be more fully recognized by institutions
and whether this right will affect the global community as it
strives to satisfy the increasing demands placed on the planet’s
finite water resources.  These complicated questions are ones
that will neither be resolved easily nor quickly.  
1 The World Bank website,  at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER-
NAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:36602~theSitePK:29708,00.
html (last visited Nov. 28, 2004).
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Access to clean water is a long-standing issue inmany large cities where water sources becomescarcer and population increases every year. The
problem of unsafe drinking water recently emerged once
again as a health threat to residents of Washington, D.C. –
a city notorious for failing to meet federal standards of
safe drinking water.1 Most notably, Washington, D.C. has
been scrutinized for lead contamination in its water sys-
tem. Over the past year, thousands of District homes and
public buildings, including universities, tested positive for
unsafe lead levels in taps that were above the federal safe-
ty maximum limit.2
Tap water is affected by lead residues still found in the
water pipe system in D.C. Although the D.C. Water and
Sewer Authority (“WASA”) declared recently that 2,800
lead service pipes will be replaced over the next year where
old pipelines still remain, this does not necessarily mean all
other residences and universities in the Washington area are
free from contaminated water.3 American University (“AU”
or the “University”) ran tests in March 2004 when elevated
lead levels in the Washington area made headline news.
Soon thereafter, the University issued a statement that the
campus was not served by the water service lines reported to
be a threat. However, test results still showed that taps on
campus that had not been used for six to eight hours had lead
levels above the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
action limits.4
Since then, a clear plan has been developed to com-
pletely ensure clean drinking water. While campus officials
have emphasized to students that running the water for a
minute before drinking would mitigate the danger of con-
suming contaminated water, students, faculty, and staff are
not entirely free from the risk of contaminated water.5
Although university students are generally not in the high-
risk category of individuals, this issue is still of concern. The
President of AU, Benjamin Ladner, attempted to allay fear
by stating that “[r]epeated exposure is less likely to occur in
a university residence or workplace than in the general pop-
ulation due to the patterns of water use.”6
In spite of efforts to create awareness and alleviate fear,
Washington D.C. residents and university communities are
still concerned. Many students choose to drink bottled or fil-
tered water, which is an added cost to one’s budget. In addi-
tion, the cost of replacing pipes is a very expensive endeav-
or for which taxpayers will bear the burden. The program
that WASA is developing is estimated to cost at least $300
million dollars and will not be completed until 2010.7
Costs to universities are also an issue. WASA represen-
tatives have stated that their first priorities are looking at the
dwelling places of high-risk individuals, and that universi-
ties such as AU are low on the list.8 Thus, universities are
also forced to bear the cost of hiring independent contractors
to take water samples, report the results and then develop a
plan to ensure water sources are lead-free.9
At this point, American University feels confident that
its water supply is safe for students and plans to resume test-
ing in the future. The University recommends that students
who are concerned about lead contamination should follow
WASA safety tips, such as run the water for several minutes
before consumption.
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AFRICA
CRACKDOWN ON UNREGULATED DOMESTIC IVORY
MARKETS
In October 2004, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (“CITES”) adopted an action plan to
decrease the unregulated domestic ivory markets across Africa.1
Domestic ivory markets have been exempt from regulation due
to a loophole in the previous CITES ivory trade bans, because
such bans have traditionally covered only international mar-
kets.2 For instance, the trade of elephant leather and hair by
Namibia and South Africa is permissible because elephants are
not specifically poached for these commodities.3 If enforced,
this crackdown will force African countries to address the large-
scale and visible ivory trade at the national level.4
New legislation resulting from the CITES action plan would
attempt to break down the ivory trade by placing the burden of
proof of lawful possession upon the person found with ivory.5
NAMIBIA MINISTER PROPOSES DRASTICALLY
DIFFERENT SAFE WATER ACT
A progressive Water Resource Management Bill was intro-
duced in September 2004 by the Ministry of Agriculture, Water
and Rural Development in Namibia.6 A key aspect of this bill
places the responsibility on the Minister to ensure that safe
water is available for basic human functions and necessities.7
The new law would create a licensing system for the extraction
and use of water and discharge of waste water, excluding
abstraction for domestic use.8 New institutions such as a Water
Advisory Council would be created as a result of this law, which
would give advice to the Minister on policies and water resource
management issues.9
The legislation would also heavily penalize polluters of
water.10 Starting in late October, after discovering that the
Ramatex Textile Factory was polluting Windhoek’s water
resources, Minister Malima began advocating for even stiffer
punishment for water polluters.11
AMERICAS
U.S. SUPREME COURT HEARS CERCLA CASE
Contradictory language in the contribution provision of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) led the U.S. Supreme Court to hear
arguments in Avail Services, Inc. v Cooper Industries, Inc., on
October 6, 2004.12 The dispute began when Avail Services
sought contribution from Cooper Industries in relation to the
cleanup of an aircraft engine maintenance sight under CER-
CLA.  Currently, it is unclear as to whether a private company
can seek a contribution claim under CERCLA from a company
without a prior CERCLA governmental action against it.  An en
banc decision from the 5th Circuit ruled that the seemingly con-
tradictory language was not meant to limit contribution claims,
but that companies are allowed to seek contribution at any time
in the clean-up process of a CERCLA site.  
STARBUCKS TO INCREASE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
OF COFFEE
At a conference in San Jose, Costa Rica, Starbucks, the
world’s largest coffee chain, announced that it aims to increase
the quality of its coffee.  The company’s chief green coffee
buyer stated that by 2007, 60 percent of Starbucks’ coffee will
come from growers who meet specific environmental and
social standards.  To meet this increased demand, Starbucks
has launched a program to reward growers who meet these
higher standards.  
Presently, Starbucks admits that there may be a shortage in
this “higher quality coffee” due to the increased demand, but it
intends to use the program both to reach out to existing growers
and to foster new development.  Industry analysts believe the
supply will eventually rise to meet the growing demand for cof-
fee that meets higher environmental and social standards.13
ASIA
GENE TEST REVEALS ARSENIC-CREATING MICROBE IN
DRINKING WATER
In a study released in the October 15, 2004 issue of Science,
scientists reported the creation of a gene test to identify the
microscopic organisms that are a key factor in the arsenic con-
tamination of drinking water throughout Asia.14 The test iden-
tifies a gene that allows the microbe to convert a harmless form
of arsenic into a toxic form.  The microbes are from a family of
metal-reducing bacteria that breathe metal by passing electrons
onto the surface of the metal. The reduction process causes
changes in the metal’s characteristics and then releases metal
into the environment.  The test, which can be performed in one
day, uses a primer to identify whether any of thirteen species of
bacteria are present in a water sample.15 The scientists believe
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this test will augment the standard chemical and mineralogical
methods of identifying arsenic-contaminated water.16
A high level arsenic exposure can lead to a wide range of
health problems, including cancer, diabetes, high blood pres-
sure, and reproductive disorders.17
The problem of arsenic in drinking water peaked in India
and Bangladesh in the early 1990s in what the World Health
Organization described as the “worst mass poisoning in human
history.”18 While the problem is still most severe in India and
Bangladesh, it persists today throughout Asia, wherever tube
wells are drilled and installed in an effort to prevent “diarrhea-
related problems associated with surface-water use.”
MT. EVEREST ENDANGERED?
In the last thirty years, snow and ice cover has decreased by
about thirty percent in the Himalayas.19 The loss of snow and
ice, due to climate change, has led a group of environmental
activists and lawyers to ask the United Nations Education,
Science, and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) to place
Everest National Park, which includes Mt. Everest, on the
World Heritage Danger list.20 Member countries of UNESCO
are legally bound to protect sites on the World Heritage Danger
list.21 Environmentalists, including Pro-Public (Friends of the
Earth – Nepal), hope to use UNESCO recognition of the park to
force member countries to take action against global warming in
the area.  The director of Pro-Public explained the site’s signif-
icance: “if this mountain is threatened by climate change, then
we know the situation is deadly serious.  If we fail to act, we are
failing future generations. . .”22
EURASIA
RUSSIA RATIFIES THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
Russia, which produces 17 percent of the world’s global
emissions, formally ratified the Kyoto Protocol on November
19, 2004.23 Created in 1997 to encourage industrialized nations
to cut gas emissions by the year 2012,24 the Kyoto Protocol
required support from countries which together create 55 per-
cent of the world’s gas emissions.25 In 2001, when the United
States, the world’s largest producer of emissions, chose not to
participate in the Kyoto Protocol, Russia’s participation became
integral to the survival of the Protocol.26
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION LINKED TO SOUTHERN
CAUCASUS INSTABILITY
A report by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (“OSCE”), the United Nations Development
Programme, and the United Nations Environment Programme
released a report stating that environmental degradation and
access to natural resources in the Southern Caucasus may aggra-
vate already-present conflicts in the area.27 In Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and nearby regions of Azerbaijan,
citizens face issues concerning the control of international river
basins and the destruction of old Soviet weapons and chemi-
cals.28 Recognizing that environmental and resource issues
might either frustrate or resolve a politically tense situation, the
OSCE and U.N. organizations have extended their Environment
and Security Initiative to the Southern Caucasus, thereby direct-
ing resources toward positively affecting the environment and
political stability.29
MIDDLE EAST
RESTORING THE FERTILE CRESCENT
Iraq is home to what was once referred to as the Fertile
Crescent, an important marsh ecosystem.  Twelve years ago,
however, the area was nearly wiped out by Saddam Hussein,
who ordered its destruction in an attempt to eradicate the Marsh
Arabs who had unsuccessfully staged a rebellion against him in
1991.30 Only an estimated seven percent of the marshes
remained in 2002.  The area was home to several now endan-
gered species such as the African Darter.31
The Iraqi Government, with the aid from the United
Nations Environment Programme, is now overseeing an inter-
national effort to restore these wetlands.  One of the major proj-
ects conducted in 2003 was to remove many of the dams and
canals that originally diverted the flow of water.  These acts
alone re-flooded approximately 40 percent of the wetlands and
have begun a recovery effort for the region.32
The international effort may also allow for limited drilling
in the region, as some geologists believe that millions of barrels
of oil lie underneath the area.33
RED DEAD INITIATIVE
Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority developed the
Red Dead Initiative in Summer 2004 as an effort to prevent fur-
ther decrease of the Dead Sea’s water level.34 Promoted in June
at a multinational water management conference taking place at
the Dead Sea, Jordan appealed to the international community to
save this unique body of water from extinction.35 With water
level decreasing at one meter per year, the future of the lowest
point on the planet is bleak.36 A proposal has been offered to
pump over two billion cubic meters of water through a channel
from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, which will thereby allow
water levels to rise and prevent possible earthquakes and sink
holes.37 The project is estimated to cost USD $1 billion, and
financing is expected mainly to come from international
sources.38 If water is not pumped into the Dead Sea, it is pro-
jected that the world’s saltiest body of water will disappear
within fifty years.
z
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